Efficient Protection of {Path-Sensitive} Control Security Ding R, Qian C, Song C, Harris B, Kim T, Lee W. 2017. Efficient Protection of {Path-Sensitive} Control Security. 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). :131--148. Read more about Efficient Protection of {Path-Sensitive} Control SecurityDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
{Prime+Abort}: A {Timer-Free} {High-Precision} L3 Cache Attack using Intel {TSX} Disselkoen C, Kohlbrenner D, Porter L, Tullsen D. 2017. {Prime+Abort}: A {Timer-Free} {High-Precision} L3 Cache Attack using Intel {TSX}. 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). :51--67. Read more about {Prime+Abort}: A {Timer-Free} {High-Precision} L3 Cache Attack using Intel {TSX}DBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
Ensuring Authorized Updates in Multi-user {Database-Backed} Applications Eykholt K, Prakash A, Mozafari B. 2017. Ensuring Authorized Updates in Multi-user {Database-Backed} Applications. 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). :1445--1462. Read more about Ensuring Authorized Updates in Multi-user {Database-Backed} ApplicationsDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
Measuring {HTTPS} Adoption on the Web Felt APorter, Barnes R, King A, Palmer C, Bentzel C, Tabriz P. 2017. Measuring {HTTPS} Adoption on the Web. 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). :1323--1338. Read more about Measuring {HTTPS} Adoption on the WebDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
{Constant-Time} Callees with {Variable-Time} Callers García CPereida, Brumley BBob. 2017. {Constant-Time} Callees with {Variable-Time} Callers. 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). :83--98. Read more about {Constant-Time} Callees with {Variable-Time} CallersDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
Detecting Android Root Exploits by Learning from Root Providers Gasparis I, Qian Z, Song C, Krishnamurthy SV. 2017. Detecting Android Root Exploits by Learning from Root Providers. 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). :1129--1144. Read more about Detecting Android Root Exploits by Learning from Root ProvidersDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
{HELP}: {Helper-Enabled} {In-Band} Device Pairing Resistant Against Signal Cancellation Ghose N, Lazos L, Li M. 2017. {HELP}: {Helper-Enabled} {In-Band} Device Pairing Resistant Against Signal Cancellation. 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). :433--450. Read more about {HELP}: {Helper-Enabled} {In-Band} Device Pairing Resistant Against Signal CancellationDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
{AutoLock}: Why Cache Attacks on {ARM} Are Harder Than You Think Green M, Rodrigues-Lima L, Zankl A, Irazoqui G, Heyszl J, Eisenbarth T. 2017. {AutoLock}: Why Cache Attacks on {ARM} Are Harder Than You Think. 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). :1075--1091. Read more about {AutoLock}: Why Cache Attacks on {ARM} Are Harder Than You ThinkDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
Strong and Efficient Cache {Side-Channel} Protection using Hardware Transactional Memory Gruss D, Lettner J, Schuster F, Ohrimenko O, Haller I, Costa M. 2017. Strong and Efficient Cache {Side-Channel} Protection using Hardware Transactional Memory. 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). :217--233. Read more about Strong and Efficient Cache {Side-Channel} Protection using Hardware Transactional MemoryDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
Detecting Credential Spearphishing in Enterprise Settings Ho G, Sharma A, Javed M, Paxson V, Wagner D. 2017. Detecting Credential Spearphishing in Enterprise Settings. 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). :469--485. Read more about Detecting Credential Spearphishing in Enterprise SettingsDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX