{SPOILER}: Speculative Load Hazards Boost Rowhammer and Cache Attacks Islam S, Moghimi A, Bruhns I, Krebbel M, Gulmezoglu B, Eisenbarth T, Sunar B. 2019. {SPOILER}: Speculative Load Hazards Boost Rowhammer and Cache Attacks. 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). :621--637. Read more about {SPOILER}: Speculative Load Hazards Boost Rowhammer and Cache AttacksDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
Evaluating Differentially Private Machine Learning in Practice Jayaraman B, Evans D. 2019. Evaluating Differentially Private Machine Learning in Practice. 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). :1895--1912. Read more about Evaluating Differentially Private Machine Learning in PracticeDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
Mobile Private Contact Discovery at Scale Kales D, Rechberger C, Schneider T, Senker M, Weinert C. 2019. Mobile Private Contact Discovery at Scale. 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). :1447--1464. Read more about Mobile Private Contact Discovery at ScaleDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
Origin-sensitive Control Flow Integrity Khandaker MRahman, Liu W, Naser A, Wang Z, Yang J. 2019. Origin-sensitive Control Flow Integrity. 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). :195--211. Read more about Origin-sensitive Control Flow IntegrityDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
{RVFuzzer}: Finding Input Validation Bugs in Robotic Vehicles through {Control-Guided} Testing Kim T, Kim CHwan, Rhee J, Fei F, Tu Z, Walkup G, Zhang X, Deng X, Xu D. 2019. {RVFuzzer}: Finding Input Validation Bugs in Robotic Vehicles through {Control-Guided} Testing. 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). :425--442. Read more about {RVFuzzer}: Finding Input Validation Bugs in Robotic Vehicles through {Control-Guided} TestingDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
From {IP} {ID} to Device {ID} and {KASLR} Bypass Klein A, Pinkas B. 2019. From {IP} {ID} to Device {ID} and {KASLR} Bypass. 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). :1063--1080. Read more about From {IP} {ID} to Device {ID} and {KASLR} BypassDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
{CANvas}: Fast and Inexpensive Automotive Network Mapping Kulandaivel S, Goyal T, Agrawal AKumar, Sekar V. 2019. {CANvas}: Fast and Inexpensive Automotive Network Mapping. 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). :389--405. Read more about {CANvas}: Fast and Inexpensive Automotive Network MappingDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
{JEDI}: {Many-to-Many} {End-to-End} Encryption and Key Delegation for {IoT} Kumar S, Hu Y, Andersen MP, Popa RAda, Culler DE. 2019. {JEDI}: {Many-to-Many} {End-to-End} Encryption and Key Delegation for {IoT}. 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). :1519--1536. Read more about {JEDI}: {Many-to-Many} {End-to-End} Encryption and Key Delegation for {IoT}DBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
All Things Considered: An Analysis of {IoT} Devices on Home Networks Kumar D, Shen K, Case B, Garg D, Alperovich G, Kuznetsov D, Gupta R, Durumeric Z. 2019. All Things Considered: An Analysis of {IoT} Devices on Home Networks. 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). :1169--1185. Read more about All Things Considered: An Analysis of {IoT} Devices on Home NetworksDBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX
{uXOM}: Efficient {eXecute-Only} Memory on {ARM} {Cortex-M} Kwon D, Shin J, Kim G, Lee B, Cho Y, Paek Y. 2019. {uXOM}: Efficient {eXecute-Only} Memory on {ARM} {Cortex-M}. 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). :231--247. Read more about {uXOM}: Efficient {eXecute-Only} Memory on {ARM} {Cortex-M}DBLPLog in to post commentsGoogle ScholarBibTeX