The Law and Economics of Bug Bounties

Amit Elazari Bar On, Doctoral Candidate, Berkeley Law, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity Grantee

Abstract: 

Bug Bounties are one of the fastest growing, popular and cost-effective ways for companies to engage with the security community and find unknown security vulnerabilities. Now it’s time to make them fair to the most important element in the Internet’s immune system: security researchers. This talk will showcase how lacking policies in bug bounty programs put hackers at legal risk and affect their incentives, and how to fix this problem that affects all of us, researchers, security practitioners and technology users.

Amit Elazari Bar On, Doctoral Candidate, Berkeley Law, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity Grantee

Amit is a Doctoral Law Candidate at UC Berkeley School of Law and a Berkeley Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity Grantee. She graduated Summa Cum Laude from her LL.M. (Master of Laws), LL.B. (Law) and B.A. (Business Administration) from IDC, Israel. Her research work on technology law has been published in leading legal and privacy journals, presented in conferences such as RSA, USENIX Enigma, BsidesLV and DEF CON-Skytalks, and featured in popular news sites such as Vice (Motherboard), the Washington Post and The Guardian. Additionally, Amit teaches at Berkeley’s Legal Studies program and serves as the submissions editor of BTLJ, the world’s leading Tech Law Journal.

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BibTeX
@conference {219983,
author = {Amit Elazari Bar On},
title = {The Law and Economics of Bug Bounties},
year = {2018},
address = {Baltimore, MD},
publisher = {{USENIX} Association},
}