Adwait Nadkarni, Benjamin Andow, and William Enck, North Carolina State University; Somesh Jha, University of Wisconsin—Madison
Smartphone users often use private and enterprise data with untrusted third party applications. The fundamental lack of secrecy guarantees in smartphone OSes, such as Android, exposes this data to the risk of unauthorized exfiltration. A natural solution is the integration of secrecy guarantees into the OS. In this paper, we describe the challenges for decentralized information flow control (DIFC) enforcement on Android. We propose contextsensitive DIFC enforcement via lazy polyinstantiation and practical and secure network export through domain declassification. Our DIFC system, Weir, is backwards compatible by design, and incurs less than 4 ms overhead for component startup. With Weir, we demonstrate practical and secure DIFC enforcement on Android.
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BibTeX
@inproceedings {197199,
author = {Adwait Nadkarni and Benjamin Andow and William Enck and Somesh Jha},
title = {Practical {DIFC} Enforcement on Android},
booktitle = {25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16)},
year = {2016},
isbn = {978-1-931971-32-4},
address = {Austin, TX},
pages = {1119--1136},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/nadkarni},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}
