Lennart Beringer, Princeton University; Adam Petcher, Harvard University and MIT Lincoln Laboratory; Katherine Q. Ye and Andrew W. Appel, Princeton University
Abstract:
We have proved, with machine-checked proofs in Coq, that an OpenSSL implementation of HMAC with SHA- 256 correctly implements its FIPS functional specification and that its functional specification guarantees the expected cryptographic properties. This is the first machine-checked cryptographic proof that combines a source-program implementation proof, a compilercorrectness proof, and a cryptographic-security proof, with no gaps at the specification interfaces.
The verification was done using three systems within the Coq proof assistant: the Foundational Cryptography Framework, to verify crypto properties of functional specs; the Verified Software Toolchain, to verify C programs w.r.t. functional specs; and CompCert, for verified compilation of C to assembly language.
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BibTeX
@inproceedings {190894,
author = {Lennart Beringer and Adam Petcher and Katherine Q. Ye and Andrew W. Appel},
title = {Verified Correctness and Security of OpenSSL {HMAC}},
booktitle = {24th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 15)},
year = {2015},
isbn = {978-1-939133-11-3},
address = {Washington, D.C.},
pages = {207--221},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/presentation/beringer},
publisher = {{USENIX} Association},
month = aug,
}
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