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Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions

Nav Jagpal, Eric Dingle, Jean-Philippe Gravel, Panayiotis Mavrommatis, Niels Provos, Moheeb Abu Rajab, and Kurt Thomas, Google

In this work we expose wide-spread efforts by criminals to abuse the Chrome Web Store as a platform for distributing malicious extensions. A central component of our study is the design and implementation of WebEval, the first system that broadly identifies malicious extensions with a concrete, measurable detection rate of 96.5%. Over the last three years we detected 9,523 malicious extensions: nearly 10% of every extension submitted to the store. Despite a short window of operation—we removed 50% of malware within 25 minutes of creation— a handful of under 100 extensions escaped immediate detection and infected over 50 million Chrome users. Our results highlight that the extension abuse ecosystem is drastically different from malicious binaries: miscreants profit from web traffic and user tracking rather than email spam or banking theft.

Nav Jagpal, Google

Eric Dingle, Google

Jean-Philippe Gravel, Google

Panayiotis Mavrommatis, Google

Niels Provos, Google

Moheeb Abu Rajab, Google

Kurt Thomas, Google

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {190984,
author = {Nav Jagpal and Eric Dingle and Jean-Philippe Gravel and Panayiotis Mavrommatis and Niels Provos and Moheeb Abu Rajab and Kurt Thomas},
title = {Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions},
booktitle = {24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 15)},
year = {2015},
isbn = {978-1-939133-11-3},
address = {Washington, D.C.},
pages = {579--593},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/presentation/jagpal},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}
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