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An Empirical Study of Vulnerability Rewards Programs

Matthew Finifter, Devdatta Akhawe, and David Wagner, University of California, Berkeley

We perform an empirical study to better understand two well-known vulnerability rewards programs, or VRPs, which software vendors use to encourage community participation in finding and responsibly disclosing software vulnerabilities. The Chrome VRP has cost approximately $580,000 over 3 years and has resulted in 501 bounties paid for the identification of security vulnerabilities. The Firefox VRP has cost approximately $570,000 over the last 3 years and has yielded 190 bounties. 28% of Chrome’s patched vulnerabilities appearing in security advisories over this period, and 24% of Firefox’s, are the result of VRP contributions. Both programs appear economically efficient, comparing favorably to the cost of hiring full-time security researchers. The Chrome VRP features low expected payouts accompanied by high potential payouts, while the Firefox VRP features fixed payouts. Finding vulnerabilities for VRPs typically does not yield a salary comparable to a full-time job; the common case for recipients of rewards in either program is that they have received only one reward. Firefox has far more critical-severity vulnerabilities than Chrome, which we believe is attributable to an architectural difference between the two browsers.

Matthew Finifter, University of California, Berkeley

Devdatta Akhawe, University of California, Berkeley

David Wagner, University of California, Berkeley

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {180372,
author = {Matthew Finifter and Devdatta Akhawe and David Wagner},
title = {An Empirical Study of Vulnerability Rewards Programs},
booktitle = {22nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 13)},
year = {2013},
isbn = {978-1-931971-03-4},
address = {Washington, D.C.},
pages = {273--288},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/finifter},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}
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