Merve Gülmez, Ericsson Security Research; Ruben Sturm, DistriNet, KU Leuven; Hossam ElAtali, University of Waterloo; Håkan Englund, Ericsson Security Research; Jonathan Woodruff, University of Cambridge; N. Asokan, University of Waterloo and KTH Royal Institute of Technology; Thomas Nyman, Ericsson Product Security
While the CHERI instruction-set architecture extensions for capabilities enable strong spatial memory safety, CHERI lacks built-in temporal safety, particularly for heap allocations. Prior attempts to augment CHERI with temporal safety fall short in terms of scalability, memory overhead, and incomplete security guarantees due to periodical sweeps of the system's memory to individually revoke stale capabilities.
We address these limitations by introducing colored capabilities that add a controlled form of indirection to CHERI's capability model. This enables provenance tracking of capabilities to their respective allocations via a hardware-managed provenance-validity table, allowing bulk retraction of dangling pointers without needing to quarantine freed memory. Colored capabilities significantly reduce the frequency of capability revocation sweeps while improving security.
We realize colored capabilities in PICASSO, an extension of the CHERI-RISC-V architecture on a speculative out-of-order FPGA softcore (CHERI-Toooba). We also integrate colored-capability support into the CheriBSD OS and CHERI-enabled Clang/LLVM toolchain. Our evaluation shows effective mitigation of use-after-free and double-free bugs across all heap-based temporal memory-safety vulnerabilities in NIST Juliet test cases, real-world CVEs, only a small performance overhead on SPEC CPU benchmarks (≈ 5% g.m.), less latency, and more consistent performance in long-running SQLite, PostgreSQL, and gRPC workloads compared to prior work.
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author = {Merve G{\"u}lmez and Ruben Sturm and Hossam ElAtali and H{\r a}kan Englund and Jonathan Woodruff and N. Asokan and Thomas Nyman},
title = {{PICASSO}: Scaling {CHERI} {Use-After-Free} Protection to Millions of Allocations using Colored Capabilities},
booktitle = {35th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 26)},
year = {2026},
isbn = {978-1-939133-58-8},
address = {Baltimore, MD},
pages = {3773--3792},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/presentation/guelmez},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}


