With Great Power Come Great Side Channels: Statistical Timing Side-Channel Analyses with Bounded Type-1 Errors

Authors: 

Martin Dunsche, Marcel Maehren, and Nurullah Erinola, Ruhr University Bochum; Robert Merget, Technology Innovation Institute; Nicolai Bissantz, Ruhr University Bochum; Juraj Somorovsky, Paderborn University; Jörg Schwenk, Ruhr University Bochum

Abstract: 

Constant-time implementations are essential to guarantee the security of secret-key operations. According to Jancar et al. [42], most cryptographic developers do not use statistical tests to evaluate their implementations for timing side-channel vulnerabilities. One of the main reasons is their high unreliability due to potential false positives caused by noisy data. In this work, we address this issue and present an improved statistical evaluation methodology with a controlled type-1 error (α) that restricts false positives independently of the noise distribution. Simultaneously, we guarantee statistical power with increasing sample size. With the bounded type-1 error, the user can perform trade-offs between false positives and the size of the side channels they wish to detect. We achieve this by employing an empirical bootstrap that creates a decision rule based on the measured data.

We implement this approach in an open-source tool called RTLF and compare it with three different competitors: Mona, dudect, and tlsfuzzer. We further compare our results to the t-test, a commonly used statistical test for side-channel analysis. To show the applicability of our tool in real cryptographic network scenarios, we performed a quantitative analysis with local timing measurements for CBC Padding Oracle attacks, Bleichenbacher's attack, and the Lucky13 attack in 823 available versions of eleven TLS libraries. Additionally, we performed a qualitative analysis of the most recent version ofeach library. We find that most libraries were long-time vulnerable to at least one of the considered attacks, with side channels big enough likely to be exploitable in a LAN setting. Through the qualitative analysis based on the results of RTLF, we identified seven vulnerabilities in recent versions.

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {298152,
author = {Martin Dunsche and Marcel Maehren and Nurullah Erinola and Robert Merget and Nicolai Bissantz and Juraj Somorovsky and J{\"o}rg Schwenk},
title = {With Great Power Come Great Side Channels: Statistical Timing {Side-Channel} Analyses with Bounded Type-1 Errors},
booktitle = {33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24)},
year = {2024},
isbn = {978-1-939133-44-1},
address = {Philadelphia, PA},
pages = {6687--6704},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/dunsche},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}