ReDMArk: Bypassing RDMA Security Mechanisms

Authors: 

Benjamin Rothenberger, Konstantin Taranov, Adrian Perrig, and Torsten Hoefler, ETH Zurich

Abstract: 

State-of-the-art remote direct memory access (RDMA) technologies such as InfiniBand (IB) or RDMA over Converged Ethernet (RoCE) are becoming widely used in data center applications and are gaining traction in cloud environments. Hence, the security of RDMA architectures is crucial, yet potential security implications of using RDMA communication remain largely unstudied. ReDMArk shows that current security mechanisms of IB-based architectures are insufficient against both in-network attackers and attackers located on end hosts, thus affecting not only secrecy, but also integrity of RDMA applications. We demonstrate multiple vulnerabilities in the design of IB-based architectures and implementations of RDMA-capable network interface cards (RNICs) and exploit those vulnerabilities to enable powerful attacks such as packet injection using impersonation, unauthorized memory access, and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. To thwart the discovered attacks we propose multiple mitigation mechanisms that are deployable in current RDMA networks.

Open Access Media

USENIX is committed to Open Access to the research presented at our events. Papers and proceedings are freely available to everyone once the event begins. Any video, audio, and/or slides that are posted after the event are also free and open to everyone. Support USENIX and our commitment to Open Access.

BibTeX
@inproceedings {263818,
author = {Benjamin Rothenberger and Konstantin Taranov and Adrian Perrig and Torsten Hoefler},
title = {{ReDMArk}: Bypassing {RDMA} Security Mechanisms},
booktitle = {30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21)},
year = {2021},
isbn = {978-1-939133-24-3},
pages = {4277--4292},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/rothenberger},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}

Presentation Video