Experiences Deploying Multi-Vantage-Point Domain Validation at Let's Encrypt

Authors: 

Henry Birge-Lee and Liang Wang, Princeton University; Daniel McCarney, Square Inc.; Roland Shoemaker, unaffiliated; Jennifer Rexford and Prateek Mittal, Princeton University

Abstract: 

An attacker can obtain a valid TLS certificate for a domain by hijacking communication between a certificate authority (CA) and a victim domain. Performing domain validation from multiple vantage points can defend against these attacks. We explore the design space of multi-vantage-point domain validation to achieve (1) security via sufficiently diverse vantage points, (2) performance by ensuring low latency and overhead in certificate issuance, (3) manageability by complying with CA/Browser forum requirements, and requiring minimal changes to CA operations, and (4) a low benign failure rate for legitimate requests. Our opensource implementation was deployed by the Let's Encrypt CA in February 2020, and has since secured the issuance of more than half a billion certificates during the first year of its deployment. Using real-world operational data from Let's Encrypt, we show that our approach has negligible latency and communication overhead, and a benign failure rate comparable to conventional designs with one vantage point. Finally, we evaluate the security improvements using a combination of ethically conducted real-world BGP hijacks, Internet-scale traceroute experiments, and a novel BGP simulation framework. We show that multi-vantage-point domain validation can thwart the vast majority of BGP attacks. Our work motivates the deployment of multi-vantage-point domain validation across the CA ecosystem to strengthen TLS certificate issuance and user privacy.

Open Access Media

USENIX is committed to Open Access to the research presented at our events. Papers and proceedings are freely available to everyone once the event begins. Any video, audio, and/or slides that are posted after the event are also free and open to everyone. Support USENIX and our commitment to Open Access.

BibTeX
@inproceedings {272232,
author = {Henry Birge-Lee and Liang Wang and Daniel McCarney and Roland Shoemaker and Jennifer Rexford and Prateek Mittal},
title = {Experiences Deploying {Multi-Vantage-Point} Domain Validation at Let{\textquoteright}s Encrypt},
booktitle = {30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21)},
year = {2021},
isbn = {978-1-939133-24-3},
pages = {4311--4327},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}

Presentation Video