CacheAudit: A Tool for the Static Analysis of Cache Side Channels
Authors:
Goran Doychev, IMDEA Software Institute; Dominik Feld, Saarland University; Boris Köpf and Laurent Mauborgne, IMDEA Software Institute; Jan Reineke, Saarland University
Abstract:
We present CacheAudit, a versatile framework for the automatic, static analysis of cache side channels. CacheAudit takes as input a program binary and a cache configuration, and it derives formal, quantitative security guarantees for a comprehensive set of side-channel adversaries, namely those based on observing cache states, traces of hits and misses, and execution times.
Our technical contributions include novel abstractions to efficiently compute precise overapproximations of the possible side-channel observations for each of these adversaries. These approximations then yield upper bounds on the information that is revealed. In case studies we apply CacheAudit to binary executables of algorithms for symmetric encryption and sorting, obtaining the first formal proofs of security for implementations with countermeasures such as preloading and data-independent memory access patterns.
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@inproceedings {182946,
author = {Goran Doychev and Dominik Feld and Boris Kopf and Laurent Mauborgne and Jan Reineke},
title = {CacheAudit: A Tool for the Static Analysis of Cache Side Channels},
booktitle = {Presented as part of the 22nd {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 13)},
year = {2013},
isbn = {978-1-931971-03-4},
address = {Washington, D.C.},
pages = {431--446},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/paper/doychev},
publisher = {{USENIX}},
}
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