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Billion-Gate Secure Computation with Malicious Adversaries

Authors: 

Benjamin Kreuter, abhi shelat, and Chih-hao Shen, University of Virginia

Abstract: 

The goal of this paper is to assess the feasibility of two-party secure computation in the presence of a malicious adversary. Prior work has shown the feasibility of billion-gate circuits in the semi-honest model, but only the 35k-gate AES circuit in the malicious model, in part because security in the malicious model is much harder to achieve. We show that by incorporating the best known techniques and parallelizing almost all steps of the resulting protocol, evaluating billion-gate circuits is feasible in the malicious model. Our results are in the standard model (i.e., no common reference strings or PKIs) and, in contrast to prior work, we do not use the random oracle model which has well-established theoretical shortcomings.

Benjamin Kreuter, University of Virginia

Abhi Shelat, University of Virginia

Chih-hao Shen, University of Virginia

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {180219,
author = {Benjamin Kreuter and Abhi Shelat and Chih-hao Shen},
title = {{Billion-Gate} Secure Computation with Malicious Adversaries},
booktitle = {21st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 12)},
year = {2012},
isbn = {978-931971-95-9},
address = {Bellevue, WA},
pages = {285--300},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/technical-sessions/presentation/kreuter},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug,
}
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