Verifiable European Elections: Risk-limiting Audits and Universally Verifiable Tallies for D'Hondt and Its Relatives

Authors: 

Philip B. Stark, University of California, Berkeley; Vanessa Teague, University of Melbourne

Abstract: 

We provide Risk Limiting Audits for proportional representation election systems such as D'Hondt and Sainte-Laguë. These techniques could be used to produce evidence of correct (electronic) election outcomes in Denmark, Luxembourg, Estonia, Norway, and many other countries.

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BibTeX
@article {208774,
author = {Philip B. Stark and Vanessa Teague},
title = {Verifiable European Elections: Risk-limiting Audits and Universally Verifiable Tallies for {D{\textquoteright}Hondt} and Its Relatives},
journal = {USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems (JETS)},
year = {2015},
address = {Washington, D.C.},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/jets15/workshop-program/presentation/stark},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}
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