Cryptanalysis of a Universally Verifiable Efficient Re-encryption Mixnet

Authors: 

Shahram Khazaei, Sharif University; Björn Terelius and Douglas Wikström, Royal Institute of Technology

Abstract: 

We study the heuristically secure mix-net proposed by Puiggalí and Guasch (EVOTE 2010). We present practical attacks on both correctness and privacy for some sets of parameters of the scheme. Although our attacks only allow us to replace a few inputs, or to break the privacy of a few voters, this shows that the scheme can not be proven secure.

Open Access Media

USENIX is committed to Open Access to the research presented at our events. Papers and proceedings are freely available to everyone once the event begins. Any video, audio, and/or slides that are posted after the event are also free and open to everyone. Support USENIX and our commitment to Open Access.

Khazaei PDF

Presentation Video

Presentation Audio