Varys: Protecting SGX Enclaves from Practical Side-Channel Attacks


Oleksii Oleksenko, Bohdan Trach, Robert Krahn, and André Martin, TU Dresden; Mark Silberstein, Technion; Christof Fetzer, TU Dresden


Numerous recent works have experimentally shown that Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) are vulnerable to cache timing and page table side-channel attacks which could be used to circumvent the data confidentiality guarantees provided by SGX. Existing mechanisms that protect against these attacks either incur high execution costs, are ineffective against certain attack variants, or require significant code modifications.

We present Varys, a system that protects unmodified programs running in SGX enclaves from cache timing and page table side-channel attacks. Varys takes a pragmatic approach of strict reservation of physical cores to security-sensitive threads, thereby preventing the attacker from accessing shared CPU resources during enclave execution. The key challenge that we are addressing is that of maintaining the core reservation in the presence of an untrusted OS.

Varys fully protects against all L1/L2 cache timing attacks and significantly raises the bar for page table side-channel attacks - all with only 15% overhead on average for Phoenix and PARSEC benchmarks. Additionally, we propose a set of minor hardware extensions that hold the potential to extend Varys' security guarantees to L3 cache and further improve its performance.

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@inproceedings {216033,
author = {Oleksii Oleksenko and Bohdan Trach and Robert Krahn and Mark Silberstein and Christof Fetzer},
title = {Varys: Protecting {SGX} Enclaves from Practical {Side-Channel} Attacks},
booktitle = {2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 18)},
year = {2018},
isbn = {ISBN 978-1-939133-01-4},
address = {Boston, MA},
pages = {227--240},
url = {},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = jul

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