Workshop Program

Internet censorship is accomplished not only through technological means, but also through manual controls enforced by the state on the private sector and individuals. In China, central and local government bodies issue directives to Internet companies concerning information and activity that should be deleted, filtered, or monitored. Companies must comply with these instructions in order to remain viable, while individual users who discuss “sensitive” issues online may find their social media posts are made invisible or removed, and may even have their accounts shut down. Government directives are often vague, encouraging self-censorship and overcompensation to stay safely away from the invisible "red line."

China Digital Times monitors Chinese Internet censorship through several ongoing projects. This presentation will highlight our work on two primary projects: (1) Directives from the Ministry of Truth, which tracks censorship and propaganda directives issued by central and local government bodies to Internet companies, including news Web sites and portals; and (2) Sensitive Words, which records keywords filtered from the search results of the popular microblogging platform Sina Weibo. I will also introduce the Grass-Mud Horse Lexicon, a wiki of creative, subversive Chinese Internet language created to skirt censorship and mock propaganda.

Social media companies operating in China face a complex array of regulations and are liable for content posted to their platforms. Through reverse engineering we provide a view into how keyword censorship operates on four popular social video platforms in China: YY, 9158, Sina Show, and GuaGua. We also find keyword surveillance capabilities on YY. Our findings show inconsistencies in the implementation of censorship and the keyword lists used to trigger censorship events between the platforms we analyzed. We reveal a range of targeted content including criticism of the government and collective action. These results develop a deeper understanding of Chinese social media via comparative analysis across platforms, and provide evidence that there is no monolithic set of rules that govern how information controls are implemented in China.

Since the Snowden revelations about NSA/PRISM and other governmental online surveillance operations, understanding the impact and potential harms of such surveillance (and related)—particularly any regulatory chilling effects has taken on an even greater urgency. This talk provides an update on recent developments in both constitutional litigation challenging such surveillance practices, as well as empirical research aimed at understanding their impact, including a new study that examines surveillance-related chilling effects stemming from NSA surveillance.

Documents released by Edward Snowden have revealed that the National Security Agency, and its Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealand equivalents, routinely monitor the Internet for the identifiers that are contained in advertising and tracking cookies. Once collected, the identifiers are stored in government databases and used to develop patterns of life, or the chains of activities that individuals engage in when they use Internet-capable devices. This paper investigates the extent to which contemporary advertising and analytics identifiers that are used in establishing such patterns continue to be transmitted in plaintext following Snowden’s revelations. We look at variations in the secure transmission of cookie-based identifiers across different website categories, and identify practical steps for both website operators and ad tracking companies to take to better secure their audiences and readers from passive surveillance.