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Home ยป Attacking the Linux PRNG On Android: Weaknesses in Seeding of Entropic Pools and Low Boot-Time Entropy
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Attacking the Linux PRNG On Android: Weaknesses in Seeding of Entropic Pools and Low Boot-Time Entropy

Monday, August 4, 2014 - 11:45am
Authors: 

David Kaplan, Sagi Kedmi, Roee Hay, and Avi Dayan, IBM Security Systems

Abstract: 

Android is the most prevalent Linux-based mobile Operating System in the market today. Many features of the platform security (such as stack protection, key generation, etc.) are based on values provided by the Linux Pseudorandom Number Generator (LPRNG) and weaknesses in the LPRNG could therefore directly affect platform security. Much literature has been published previously investigating and detailing such weaknesses in the LPRNG. We build upon this prior work and show that - given a leak of a random value extracted from the LPRNG - a practical, inexpensive attack against the LPRNG internal state in early boot is feasible. Furthermore, the version of the Linux kernel vulnerable to such an attack is used in the majority of Android-based mobile devices in circulation. We also present two real-world exploitation vectors that could be enabled by such an attack. Finally, we mention current mitigations and highlight lessons that can be learned in respect to the design and use of future PRNGs for security features on embedded platforms.

David Kaplan, IBM Security Systems

Sagi Kedmi, IBM Security Systems

Roee Hay, IBM Security Systems

Avi Dayan, IBM Security Systems

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {185179,
author = {David Kaplan and Sagi Kedmi and Roee Hay and Avi Dayan},
title = {Attacking the Linux {PRNG} On Android: Weaknesses in Seeding of Entropic Pools and Low {Boot-Time} Entropy},
booktitle = {8th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT 14)},
year = {2014},
address = {San Diego, CA},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot14/workshop-program/presentation/kaplan},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug,
}
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