Marcell Szakály, Sebastian Köhler, and Ivan Martinovic, University of Oxford
This paper presents PIBuster, a new attack vector against the EV charging infrastructure. The attack targets the Qualcomm HomePlug GreenPHY modems used inside CCS chargers and vehicles, and is enabled by a common misconfiguration in their Parameter Information Block (PIB). The vulnerability allows an attacker to overwrite the PIB of modems, which contains many critical fields. We create a safe laboratory testbed for evaluating PIB security, use it to pinpoint the necessary conditions for the attack, and determine that a single configuration byte is responsible. We collect a large dataset of PIBs from real-world EV chargers, and evaluate them using our test bed, determining that 41 out of 69 charging stations exhibit the vulnerable configuration. Finally, we identify a specific high-impact attack that results in a persistent denial of service, and that can only be resolved by replacing hardware.
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author = {Marcell Szak{\'a}ly and Sebastian K{\"o}hler and Ivan Martinovic},
title = {Short: {PIBuster}: Exploiting a Common Misconfiguration in {CCS} {EV} Chargers},
booktitle = {3rd USENIX Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec 25)},
year = {2025},
isbn = {978-1-939133-49-6},
address = {Seattle, WA},
pages = {243--249},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/vehiclesec25/presentation/szakaly},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}