Short: Unencrypted Flying Objects: Security Lessons from University Small Satellite Developers and Their Code

Rachel McAmis and Gregor Haas, University of Washington; Mattea Sim, Indiana University; David Kohlbrenner and Tadayoshi Kohno, University of Washington

Small satellites face unique security challenges, especially when built by budget-constrained university teams with limited security expertise. To understand barriers to secure satellite design, we interviewed 8 members across 4 U.S. university clubs and audited 3 codebases. We found widely varying security practices and vulnerabilities exploitable by ground-based attackers in all projects. Participants foresee many risks of unsecured small satellites and indicate security shortcomings in industry and government. We conclude with practical recommendations for improving small satellite security in amateur organizations and beyond.

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {309200,
author = {Rachel McAmis and Gregor Haas and Mattea Sim and David Kohlbrenner and Tadayoshi Kohno},
title = {Short: Unencrypted Flying Objects: Security Lessons from University Small Satellite Developers and Their Code},
booktitle = {3rd USENIX Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec 25)},
year = {2025},
isbn = {978-1-939133-49-6},
address = {Seattle, WA},
pages = {269--278},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/vehiclesec25/presentation/mcamis},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}

Presentation Video