Jiarui Li, Joseph Brewington, Qingzhao Zhang, and Z. Morley Mao, University of Michigan
Modern vision-based object tracking is a vital component of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems. It enables advanced applications such as follow-me, which allows a drone to automatically track and follow a subject. While a wealth of research explored the vulnerabilities of object tracking algorithms, there lacks a comprehensive analysis on whether the vulnerabilities can be exploited on real UAV systems, considering challenges including physical constraints, real-world uncertainties, and limited attacker's knowledge. To bridge the knowledge gap, we design a hijacking attack that deceives the UAV follow-me mode to track a wrong subject by leveraging existing object tracking attacks. We thoroughly analyze its feasibility in real-world scenarios. With insights from the study, we are able to improve the attack success rate on the UAV follow-me application from 47% to 95% by leveraging inaccuracies of sensor measurements and instability of the gimbal camera, which indicates a realistic system exploit.
Open Access Media
USENIX is committed to Open Access to the research presented at our events. Papers and proceedings are freely available to everyone once the event begins. Any video, audio, and/or slides that are posted after the event are also free and open to everyone. Support USENIX and our commitment to Open Access.
author = {Jiarui Li and Joseph Brewington and Qingzhao Zhang and Z. Morley Mao},
title = {{WIP}: Hijacking Attacks on {UAV} {Follow-Me} Systems in Realistic Scenarios},
booktitle = {3rd USENIX Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec 25)},
year = {2025},
isbn = {978-1-939133-49-6},
address = {Seattle, WA},
pages = {63--72},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/vehiclesec25/presentation/li-jiarui},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}