Zachary Espiritu, MongoDB Research; David Cash, University of Chicago
Fine-grained access control (FGAC) mechanisms such as row-level security (RLS) and document-level security (DLS) are widely deployed in databases to restrict access to data stored in physical indexing structures shared by multiple users (e.g., in multi-tenant databases, or in the implementation of least-privilege within an organization). FGAC implementations often use post-filtering where untrusted queries run over all data and private results are redacted afterwards. Prior work shows this approach can lead to side-channels that enable attackers to test if a chosen value exists in unseen data. While damaging, prior attacks do not enable the efficient recovery of rich, high-entropy data like full records or text documents.
We show these side-channels are more damaging than previously thought. Using rich query interfaces (e.g., range, prefix, and conjunctive predicates), we amplify existence leakage into reconstruction attacks. We do this in two settings:
- PostgreSQL (RLS timing). We exploit a timing side-channel and expressive SQL queries (e.g., ranges, conjunctions) to enumerate unknown attribute values and, in turn, full records via binary search over large domains.
- Elasticsearch/OpenSearch (DLS scoring). We exploit scoring and prefix-expansion side-channels to recover indexed terms from documents. In some cases, we can extract n-grams in the corpus to recover approximate text.
Our results show that FGAC side-channels must be evaluated in the presence of rich predicates, which can turn membership tests into scalable reconstruction of high-entropy records.
USENIX Security '26 Open Access Sponsored by
King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST)
Open Access Media
USENIX is committed to Open Access to the research presented at our events. Papers and proceedings are freely available to everyone once the event begins. Any video, audio, and/or slides that are posted after the event are also free and open to everyone. Support USENIX and our commitment to Open Access.
author = {Zachary Espiritu and David Cash},
title = {Plaintext Recovery Against {Post-Filtering} Access Control},
booktitle = {35th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 26)},
year = {2026},
isbn = {978-1-939133-58-8},
address = {Baltimore, MD},
pages = {3753--3772},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/presentation/espiritu},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}


