Vεrity: Verifiable Local Differential Privacy

James Bell-Clark, Adrià Gascón, Baiyu Li, and Mariana Raykova, Google; Amrita Roy Chowdhury, University of Michigan

Local differential privacy (LDP) enables individuals to report sensitive data while preserving privacy. Unfortunately, LDP mechanisms are vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where adversaries controlling a fraction of the reporting users can significantly distort the aggregate output–much more so than in a non-private solution where the inputs are reported directly. In this paper, we present two novel solutions that prevent poisoning attacks under LDP while preserving its privacy guarantees.
Our first solution, Vεrity-Auth, addresses scenarios where the users report inputs with a ground truth available to a third party. The second solution, Vεrity, tackles the more challenging case in which the users locally generate their input and there is no ground truth which can be used to bootstrap verifiable randomness generation.

Open Access Media

USENIX is committed to Open Access to the research presented at our events. Papers and proceedings are freely available to everyone once the event begins. Any video, audio, and/or slides that are posted after the event are also free and open to everyone. Support USENIX and our commitment to Open Access.