Page-Oriented Programming: Subverting Control-Flow Integrity of Commodity Operating System Kernels with Non-Writable Code Pages


Seunghun Han, The Affiliated Institute of ETRI, Chungnam National University; Seong-Joong Kim, Wook Shin, and Byung Joon Kim, The Affiliated Institute of ETRI; Jae-Cheol Ryou, Chungnam National University


This paper presents a novel attack technique called page-oriented programming, which reuses existing code gadgets by remapping physical pages to the virtual address space of a program at runtime. The page remapping vulnerabilities may lead to data breaches or may damage kernel integrity. Therefore, manufacturers have recently released products equipped with hardware-assisted guest kernel integrity enforcement. This paper extends the notion of the page remapping attack to another type of code-reuse attack, which can not only be used for altering or sniffing kernel data but also for building and executing malicious code at runtime. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this attack on state-of-the-art hardware and software, where control-flow integrity policies are enforced, thus highlighting its capability to render most legacy systems vulnerable.

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