Medusa Attack: Exploring Security Hazards of In-App QR Code Scanning

Authors: 

Xing Han, Yuheng Zhang, and Xue Zhang, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China and Shanghai Qi Zhi Institute; Zeyuan Chen, G.O.S.S.I.P; Mingzhe Wang, Xidian University; Yiwei Zhang, Purdue University; Siqi Ma, The University of New South Wales; Yu Yu, Shanghai Qi Zhi Institute and Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Elisa Bertino, Purdue University; Juanru Li, Shanghai Qi Zhi Institute and Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Abstract: 

Smartphone users are eliminating traditional QR codes as many apps have integrated QR code scanning as a built-in functionality. With the support of embedded QR code scanning components, apps can read QR codes and immediately execute relevant activities, such as boarding a flight. Handling QR codes in such an automated manner is obviously user-friendly. However, this automation also creates an opportunity for attackers to exploit apps through malicious QR codes if the apps fail to properly check these codes.

In this paper, we systematize and contextualize attacks on mobile apps that use built-in QR code readers. We label these as MEDUSA attacks, which allow attackers to remotely exploit the in-app QR code scanning of a mobile app. Through a MEDUSA attack, remote attackers can invoke a specific type of app functions – Remotely Accessible Handlers (RAHs), and perform tasks such as sending authentication tokens or making a payment. We conducted an empirical study on 800 very popular Android and iOS apps with billions of users in the two largest mobile ecosystems, the US and mainland China mobile markets, to investigate the prevalence and severity of MEDUSA attack related security vulnerabilities. Based on our proposed vulnerability detection technique, we thoroughly examined the target apps and discovered that a wide range of them are affected. Among the 377/800 apps with in-app QR code scanning functionality, we found 123 apps containing 2,872 custom RAHs that were vulnerable to the MEDUSA attack. By constructing proof-of-concept exploits to test the severity, we confirmed 46 apps with critical or high-severity vulnerabilities, which allows attackers to access sensitive local resources or remotely modify the user data.

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {291039,
author = {Xing Han and Yuheng Zhang and Xue Zhang and Zeyuan Chen and Mingzhe Wang and Yiwei Zhang and Siqi Ma and Yu Yu and Elisa Bertino and Juanru Li},
title = {Medusa Attack: Exploring Security Hazards of {In-App} {QR} Code Scanning},
booktitle = {32nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 23)},
year = {2023},
isbn = {978-1-939133-37-3},
address = {Anaheim, CA},
pages = {4607--4624},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/han-xing},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}

Presentation Video