Anatoly Shusterman, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Lachlan Kang, University of Adelaide; Yarden Haskal and Yosef Meltser, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Prateek Mittal, Princeton University; Yossi Oren, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Yuval Yarom, University of Adelaide and Data61
Website fingerprinting attacks, which use statistical analysis on network traffic to compromise user privacy, have been shown to be effective even if the traffic is sent over anonymity-preserving networks such as Tor. The classical attack model used to evaluate website fingerprinting attacks assumes an on-path adversary, who can observe all traffic traveling between the user's computer and the secure network.
USENIX Security '19 Open Access Videos Sponsored by
King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST)
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