Venerable Variadic Vulnerabilities Vanquished


Priyam Biswas, Purdue University; Alessandro Di Federico, Politecnico di Milano; Scott A. Carr, Purdue University; Prabhu Rajasekaran, Stijn Volckaert, Yeoul Na, and Michael Franz, University of California, Irvine; Mathias Payer, Purdue University


Programming languages such as C and C++ support variadic functions, i.e., functions that accept a variable number of arguments (e.g., printf). While variadic functions are flexible, they are inherently not type-safe. In fact, the semantics and parameters of variadic functions are defined implicitly by their implementation. It is left to the programmer to ensure that the caller and callee follow this implicit specification, without the help of a static type checker. An adversary can take advantage of a mismatch between the argument types used by the caller of a variadic function and the types expected by the callee to violate the language semantics and to tamper with memory. Format string attacks are the most popular example of such a mismatch.

Indirect function calls can be exploited by an adversary to divert execution through illegal paths. CFI restricts call targets according to the function prototype which, for variadic functions, does not include all the actual parameters. However, as shown by our case study, current CFI implementations are mainly limited to nonvariadic functions and fail to address this potential attack vector. Defending against such an attack requires a stateful dynamic check.

We present HexVASAN, a compiler based sanitizer to effectively type-check and thus prevent any attack via variadic functions (when called directly or indirectly). The key idea is to record metadata at the call site and verify parameters and their types at the callee whenever they are used at runtime. Our evaluation shows that Hex- VASAN is (i) practically deployable as the measured overhead is negligible (0.45%) and (ii) effective as we show in several case studies.

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@inproceedings {203638,
author = {Priyam Biswas and Alessandro Di Federico and Scott A. Carr and Prabhu Rajasekaran and Stijn Volckaert and Yeoul Na and Michael Franz and Mathias Payer},
title = {Venerable Variadic Vulnerabilities Vanquished},
booktitle = {26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17)},
year = {2017},
isbn = {978-1-931971-40-9},
address = {Vancouver, BC},
pages = {186--198},
url = {},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug

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