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YouTubeReturn-Oriented Rootkits: Bypassing Kernel Code Integrity Protection Mechanisms
Authors:
Ralf Hund, Thorsten Holz, and Felix C. Freiling, Laboratory for Dependable Distributed Systems, University of Mannheim, Germany
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BibTeX
@inproceedings {182802,
title = {{Return-Oriented} Rootkits: Bypassing Kernel Code Integrity Protection Mechanisms},
booktitle = {18th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 09)},
year = {2009},
address = {Montreal, Quebec},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity09/technical-sessions/presentation/return-oriented-rootkits-bypassing},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}
title = {{Return-Oriented} Rootkits: Bypassing Kernel Code Integrity Protection Mechanisms},
booktitle = {18th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 09)},
year = {2009},
address = {Montreal, Quebec},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity09/technical-sessions/presentation/return-oriented-rootkits-bypassing},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}
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