SOUPS 2025 Technical Sessions

All sessions will be held in Ballroom 6A unless otherwise noted.

The full Proceedings published by USENIX for the conference are available for download below. Individual papers can also be downloaded from their respective presentation pages. Copyright to the individual works is retained by the author[s].

Proceedings Front Matter
Proceedings Cover | Title Page and List of Organizers | Message from the Program Co-Chairs | Table of Contents

Attendee Files 
SOUPS 2025 Attendee List (PDF)
SOUPS 2025 Proceedings Web Archive (117.11 MB ZIP)

Monday, August 11

7:30 am–9:00 am

Continental Breakfast

Room 605-610

9:00 am–9:30 am

Opening Remarks and Awards

General Chair: Patrick Gage Kelley, Google

9:30 am–10:45 am

Phishing and Advice

Session Chair: Julie Haney, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

"Hello, is this Anna?": Unpacking the Lifecycle of Pig-Butchering Scams

Rajvardhan Oak and Zubair Shafiq, University of California, Davis

Available Media

Pig-butchering scams have emerged as a complex form of fraud that combines elements of romance, investment fraud, and advanced social engineering tactics to systematically exploit victims. In this paper, we present the first qualitative analysis of pig-butchering scams, informed by in-depth semi-structured interviews with N=26 victims. We capture nuanced, first-hand accounts from victims, providing insight into the lifecycle of pig-butchering scams and the complex emotional and financial manipulation involved. We systematically analyze each phase of the scam, revealing that perpetrators employ tactics such as staged trust-building, fraudulent financial platforms, fabricated investment returns, and repeated high-pressure tactics, all designed to exploit victims’ trust and financial resources over extended periods. Our findings reveal an organized scam lifecycle characterized by emotional manipulation, staged financial exploitation, and persistent re-engagement efforts that amplify victim losses. We also find complex psychological and financial impacts on victims, including heightened vulnerability to secondary scams. Finally, we propose actionable intervention points for social media and financial platforms to curb the prevalence of these scams and highlight the need for non-stigmatizing terminology to encourage victims to report and seek assistance.

Language as Lure: A Naturalistic Study on Pasifika Phishing Susceptibility

Eric Spero, Isa Seow, Lucas Betts, and Eddie Fuatimau, University of Auckland; Robert Biddle, University of Auckland and Carleton University; Danielle Lottridge and Giovanni Russello, University of Auckland

Available Media

Online scams targeting Pasifika people are on the rise, posing a challenge for security. To investigate how language affects phishing susceptibility, we partnered with the IT department of the national government of a Melanesian country to conduct an ecologically valid phishing simulation study with the government's employees. Each month for four months, 2,000 participants received a simulated phishing email written in either English or the local language of their country; all participants were competent in both languages. We recorded whether participants opened the email and whether they clicked the link within it. When emails included personal requests for assistance, those in the local language elicited more clicks than those in English. These findings may be due to the influence of emotion on reasoning when thinking in a foreign language, a cultural emphasis on helping in Melanesian societies, and in-group preferences. We discuss the implications for how language and culture can impact vulnerability with special attention to low-resource languages which are likely to have less effective mail filters.

Can You Walk Me Through It? Explainable SMS Phishing Detection using LLM-based Agents

Yizhu Wang, Haoyu Zhai, Chenkai Wang, and Qingying Hao, University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign; Nick A. Cohen, Roopa Foulger, and Jonathan A. Handler, OSF Healthcare; Gang Wang, University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign

Available Media

SMS phishing poses a significant threat to users, especially older adults. Existing defenses mainly focus on phishing detection, but often cannot explain why the SMS is malicious to lay users. In this paper, we use large language models (LLMs) to detect SMS phishing while generating evidence-based explanations. The key challenge is that SMS is short, lacking the necessary context for security reasoning. We develop a prototype called SmishX which gathers external contexts (e.g., domain and brand information, URL redirection, and web screenshots) to augment the chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning of LLMs. Then, the reasoning process is converted into a short explanation message to help users with their decision-making. Evaluation using real-world SMS datasets shows SmishX can achieve an overall accuracy of 98.8%, outperforming existing methods. Through user studies (N=175), we show that SmishX's explanation can significantly improve users' phishing detection efficacy across age groups. Its usability is rated "excellent" by participants (SUS score 82.6). We conclude by discussing open challenges in resolving human-AI disagreements and safely handling AI errors.

Victims, Vigilantes, and Advice Givers: An Analysis of Scam-Related Discourse on Reddit

Rajvardhan Oak and Zubair Shafiq, University of California, Davis

Available Media

Online scams have become increasingly sophisticated, evolving from simple phishing attacks to complex, multi-stage frauds that leverage social engineering, financial manipulation, and emerging technologies such as cryptocurrency. Victims of these scams often turn to online communities for advice, support, and validation, particularly on Reddit, a pseudonymous social media platform that fosters open discourse. This study presents a qualitative analysis of scam-related discussions on Reddit, exploring how users conceptualize scams, the tactics scammers employ, and the role online communities play in scam awareness and mitigation. Using an inductive thematic analysis of n=2435 scam-related posts, we identify key scam types discussed, users’ knowledge gaps, and the psychological and technical factors contributing to susceptibility. Our findings highlight the dual function of Reddit’s scam discourse: preventive communities that focus on education and awareness, and performative engagement communities that engage in scambaiting as a form of counteraction. Additionally, we examine how Reddit serves as a critical support system for scam victims, offering emotional validation and actionable recovery strategies. Our research underscores the importance of grassroots knowledge-sharing in shaping digital security behaviors and informs policy, platform design, and consumer protection efforts to counter online fraud more effectively.

"You go now! No trouble!" Understanding the Offboarding Process in Companies from an IT Security Perspective

Christina Detsika, Fraunhofer FKIE; Timo Jagusch, Nora Weidner, Larissa Weir, Florin Martius, and Christian Tiefenau, University of Bonn

Available Media

Insider threats account for a significant portion of security breaches. One strategy to mitigate this threat is effective offboarding practices. However, existing standards from ISO, NIST, and BSI provide limited actionable guidance on offboarding, leaving it an underexplored aspect of IT security. In this paper, we collected offboarding advice from these standards and conducted qualitative interviews with 15 professionals directly responsible for managing or overseeing offboarding in their organizations. We identified gaps and usability issues in current practices and highlighted the need for structured, usability-focused solutions. To support organizations in addressing these challenges, we reviewed and consolidated the offboarding advice contained in multiple standards into a collection of offboarding actions, integrating them with insights from our study.

10:45 am–11:15 am

Coffee and Tea Break

Room 605-610

11:15 am–12:15 pm

AI Privacy, Safety, and Security Issues

Session Chair: Karola Marky, Ruhr University Bochum

Safety Perceptions of Generative AI Conversational Agents: Uncovering Perceptual Differences in Trust, Risk, and Fairness

Jan Tolsdorf, The George Washington University; Alan F. Luo, University of Maryland; Monica Kodwani and Junho Eum, The George Washington University; Mahmood Sharif, Tel Aviv University; Michelle L. Mazurek, University of Maryland; Adam J. Aviv, The George Washington University

Available Media

Public and academic discourse on the safety of conversational agents using generative AI, particularly chatbots, often centers on fairness, trust, and risk. However, there is limited insight into how users differentiate these perceptions and what factors shape them. To address this gap, we developed a survey instrument based on previous work. We conducted an exploratory study using factor analysis and latent class analysis on survey responses from n=123 participants in the U.S. to offer an initial attempt at measuring and delineating the dimensionality of these safety perceptions. Latent class analysis revealed three distinct user groups with sometimes counterintuitive perception patterns: The Hesitant Skeptics, The Cautious Trusters, and The Confident Adopters. We find that greater usage frequency of AI chatbots is associated with higher trust and fairness perceptions but lower perceived risk. Some demographic traits like sexual orientation, income, and ethnicity also had strong and significant effects on group membership. Our findings highlight the need for more refined measurement approaches and a more nuanced perspective on users' AI safety perceptions regarding trust, fairness, and risk, particularly in capturing the kinds of experiences and interactions that lead users to develop their perceptions.

"We are not Future-ready": Understanding AI Privacy Risks and Existing Mitigation Strategies from the Perspective of AI Developers in Europe

Alexandra Klymenko and Stephen Meisenbacher, Technical University of Munich; Patrick Gage Kelley, Sai Teja Peddinti, and Kurt Thomas, Google; Florian Matthes, Technical University of Munich

Available Media

The proliferation of AI has sparked privacy concerns related to training data, model interfaces, downstream applications, and more. We interviewed 25 AI developers based in Europe to understand which privacy threats they believe pose the greatest risk to users, developers, and businesses and what protective strategies, if any, would help to mitigate them. We find that there is little consensus among AI developers on the relative ranking of privacy risks. These differences stem from salient reasoning patterns that often relate to human rather than purely technical factors. Furthermore, while AI developers are aware of proposed mitigation strategies for addressing these risks, they reported minimal real-world adoption. Our findings highlight both gaps and opportunities for empowering AI developers to better address privacy risks in AI.

Integrating Large Language Models into Security Incident Response

Diana Kramer, Google; Lambert Rosique, DataPhant; Ajay Narotam, Elie Bursztein, Patrick Gage Kelley, Kurt Thomas, and Allison Woodruff, Google

Available Media

Incident response is a manually-intensive process whereby security analysts detect and respond to security events. In this study, we explore whether large language models (LLMs) can fully automate—or otherwise assist with—the final step of an incident response investigation: summarizing findings for stakeholders, auditors, and legal experts. We run a series of experiments with 18 security analysts and 50 real-world incidents to understand (1) whether LLMs can autonomously reason about security events and produce high-quality summaries; (2) whether LLMs can collaboratively assist security analysts with summarization; and (3) what overall benefits and risks security analysts foresee with integrating LLMs into incident summarization. We find that current LLMs may lack the security reasoning necessary to operate autonomously, producing summaries that omit critical details in 35% of cases and/or inject factual inaccuracies in 42% of cases. However, when used collaboratively, LLMs reduce the effort required from analysts to produce a summary, while improving the readability and consistency of summaries. We explore opportunities for improving the security reasoning of LLMs as well as other potential applications for incident response.

Youth-Centered GAI Risks (YAIR): A Taxonomy of Generative AI Risks from Empirical Data

Yaman Yu, Yiren Liu, Jacky Zhang, Yun Huang, and Yang Wang, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Available Media

Generative AI is changing how youth engage with technology, yet the unique risks they face remain underexplored and are missing from existing safety frameworks. Without a focused taxonomy, important harms to youth may be overlooked. To fill this gap, we present the first Youth-Centered Risk Taxonomy for Generative AI, built from 344 youth–GAI chat logs, 30,305 Reddit discussions, and 153 AI incident reports. We identify six key risk categories and 84 specific risks organized along four interaction pathways. Our findings reveal new risks, e.g., Mental Wellbeing Risks, Behavioral and Social Developmental Risks, and new manifestations of Toxicity, Privacy, Bias/Discrimination and Misuse/Exploitation, which are not addressed in existing child online safety taxonomies and AI risk taxonomies. Grounded in real-world data, this taxonomy offers a clear framework to help AI practitioners, educators, parents, and policymakers better understand and address risks in youth–GAI interactions.

12:15 pm–1:45 pm

Monday Luncheon and Mentoring Tables

Room 606-609

1:45 pm–2:45 pm

Trusting IoT and Embedded Devices

Session Chair: Cori Faklaris, University of North Carolina at Charlotte

Shiny Shells, Rusty Cores: A Crowdsourced Security Evaluation of Integrated Web Browsers

Gertjan Franken, Pieter Claeys, Tom Van Goethem, and Lieven Desmet, DistriNet, KU Leuven

Available Media

Over the past decade, web browsers have expanded far beyond their traditional role as standalone applications. Today, browsers are also integrated into a wide range of consumer products—including smart TVs, e-readers, gaming consoles, and even cars—where they serve as secondary features for users. However, while users can rely on the transparent security practices and frequent updates of standalone browsers, integrated browsers often lack these guarantees.

In this paper, we assess the security of integrated browsers from two perspectives: their obsolescence and the completeness of their security policy implementations. To overcome the challenges posed by closed-source firmware and hardware, we developed a crowdsourcing framework that leverages dynamic analysis to examine the security properties of browsers integrated into consumer products. Using this framework, we conducted a study in which participants tested their personal devices, resulting in 76 enrollments across 53 unique products and 68 unique software versions. Our findings reveal that while security policies are generally fully supported, many embedded browsers rely on outdated engines—some already obsolete at product release. By reproducing publicly disclosed vulnerabilities, we illustrate that users face considerable and hidden security risks due to the presence of unpatched flaws.

Spy-oT: Understanding How Users Learn to Use Internet of Things Devices For Abusive Purposes

Kieron Ivy Turk and Alice Hutchings, University of Cambridge

Available Media

Internet of Things (IoT) devices are internet-connected household devices that make homes "smarter". They can be used maliciously for unintended purposes, including for intimate partner abuse. While abuse is a known issue, there is a lack of understanding of how abusers discover malicious uses. We run an exploration-based "abusability" study to understand how people learn to use IoT devices maliciously, and which abuses are most easily discoverable. We found that users with a variety of levels of technical expertise all focused on non-technical attacks, and identified the common features that enable these abuses. We identified access control and logging as two features which require redesigns to better protect against domestic abuse, and discuss the trade-offs of alternative designs. Finally, we propose an updated "Functionality-Enabled" adversary model for technology-facilitated domestic abuse.

Smart Spaces, Private Lives: A Culturally Grounded Examination of Privacy Tensions in Smart Homes

Yara Alsiyat, University of Oxford and King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology; Yuanhaur Chang and Ning Zhang, Washington University in St. Louis; Ivan Flechais, University of Oxford

Available Media

Smart home technologies offer convenience and security, but also raise privacy challenges shaped by cultural norms and household dynamics. We conducted an iterative Grounded Theory study using semi-structured interviews to examine how privacy is understood and managed in smart homes. Our initial data collection included participants from both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, which highlighted a range of privacy tensions influenced by cultural expectations. Based on these insights, we focused subsequent data collection on Saudi households to explore how privacy concerns are navigated in specific religious and social contexts. Our findings show that privacy in Saudi homes is collectively negotiated and shaped by factors such as family hierarchies, interpersonal roles, and cultural obligations. Cameras, in particular, are perceived not merely as tools, but also as socially present entities, leading to behavioral adaptations and negotiated device usage. These insights underscore the importance of designing culturally responsive smart home technologies that align with local norms while supporting privacy and usability. By situating privacy within everyday household practice, this study contributes to broader discussions on culturally embedded design and privacy-aware innovation for smart homes.

Playing in the Sandbox: A Study on the Usability of Seccomp

Maysara Alhindi and Joseph Hallett, University of Bristol

Available Media

Sandboxing restricts what applications do, and prevents exploited processes being abused; yet relatively few applications get sandboxed: why? We report a usability trial with 7 experienced Seccomp developers exploring how they approached sandboxing an application and the difficulties they faced. The developers each approached sandboxing the application differently and each came to different solutions. We highlight many challenges of using Seccomp, the sandboxing designs by the participants, and what developers think would make it easier for them to sandbox applications effectively.

2:45 pm–3:15 pm

Lightning Talks

3:15 pm–3:45 pm

Coffee and Tea Break

Room 605-610

3:45 pm–4:45 pm

Keynote Presentation

Minding the (Privacy Research/Practice) Gap

Greg Chappell, Angel Investor

Available Media

Greg Chappell is a software engineer and angel investor with over 20 years of experience at leading technology companies. Most recently, he worked on AI Responsibility at Meta, where he served as the senior engineer leading efforts in targeted AI transparency, youth advertising, and user data governance for large language model (LLM) training. Prior to Meta, Greg was a Principal Engineer at Amazon, spearheading initiatives in AI Privacy & HIPAA. He also held engineering roles at Microsoft.

Today, Greg focuses on angel investing, partnering with early-stage startups at the forefront of privacy, security, and responsible data innovation. He holds an M.S. in Computer Science & Engineering from the University of Washington and a B.S. in Computer Science from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

5:15 pm–6:30 pm

SOUPS 2025 Poster Session and Reception

Check out the cool new ideas and the latest preliminary research on display at the SOUPS Poster Session and Reception. The list of accepted posters will be available soon.

Room 606-609

Tuesday, August 12

8:00 am–9:00 am

Continental Breakfast

Room 605-610

9:00 am–10:15 am

Privacy and Security Concerns

Session Chair: Jonas Hielscher, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Between Court Orders and Platform Policies: Understanding Law Enforcement and Meta Interactions in Addressing Non-Consensual Image Disclosure Abuse

Amna Batool and Kentaro Toyama, University of Michigan

Available Media

Non-Consensual Image Disclosure Abuse (NCIDA) occurs when one person posts, or threatens to post, sensitive images of another person online with the intent to extort, humiliate, or harm. Though much is known about NCIDAs, almost nothing is known about how law enforcement agencies (LEAs) work with social media companies to address them, especially outside the West. Through discussions with Pakistani law enforcement, and legal experts, and analysis of LEA requests submitted to Meta platforms, we find that platforms are reasonably proactive in responding to NCIDA-related requests. However, their decisions are seem to be heavily influenced by their universal content-moderation policies, which are determined by Western norms that prioritize sexually explicit content but neglect content considered sensitive in other cultures. Our findings contribute a nuanced understanding of the communication between LEAs and social media companies in combating NCIDA, and lead to recommendations for platforms and government policy in mitigating NCIDA.

Minoritised Ethnic People’s Security and Privacy Concerns and Responses towards Essential Online Services

Aunam Quyoum and Mark Wong, University of Glasgow; Sebati Ghosh and Siamak F. Shahandashti, University of York

Available Media

Minoritised ethnic people are marginalised in society, and therefore at a higher risk of adverse online harms, including those arising from the loss of security and privacy of personal data. Despite this, there has been very little research focused on minoritised ethnic people's security and privacy concerns, attitudes, and behaviours. In this work, we provide the results of one of the first studies in this regard. We explore minoritised ethnic people's experiences of using essential online services across three sectors: health, social housing, and energy, their security and privacy-related concerns, and responses towards these services. We conducted a thematic analysis of 44 semi-structured interviews with people of various reported minoritised ethnicities in the UK. Privacy concerns and lack of control over personal data emerged as a major theme, with many interviewees considering privacy as their most significant concern when using online services. Several creative tactics to exercise some agency were reported, including selective and inconsistent disclosure of personal data. A core concern about how data may be used was driven by a fear of repercussions, including penalisation and discrimination, influenced by prior experiences of institutional and online racism. The increased concern and potential for harm resulted in minoritised ethnic people grappling with a higher-stakes dilemma of whether to disclose personal information online or not. Furthermore, trust in institutions, or lack thereof, was found to be embedded throughout as a basis for adapting behaviour. We draw on our results to provide lessons learned for the design of more inclusive, marginalisation-aware, and privacy-preserving online services.

User Understandings of Technical Terms in App Privacy Labels

Ishika Keswani, Kerick Walker, Adrian Clement, Eusila Kitur, Nannapas Wonghirundacha, Ryan Aubrey, Vivien Song, and Eleanor Birrell, Pomona College

Available Media

Privacy labels are concise, standardized representations of privacy policies that are required for apps on both the iOS and Android app stores. However, prior research shows that users find current app privacy labels confusing and are unable to correctly identify data practices based on these labels. This work explores how understandings of technical terms impact comprehension of app privacy labels. We conduct a pair of online user studies—a qualitative user study (n=46) and a large-scale quantitative study (n=383) in which we identify terms used in privacy labels that are widely misunderstood and explore common misunderstandings. We also formulate evidence-based recommendations for how to improve app privacy labels.

Do You See If I See? Investigating Reciprocity in Interpersonal Access-Control Settings (in the U.S.)

Nathan Malkin, New Jersey Institute of Technology; Alan F. Luo, Evan J. Zhao, and Michelle L. Mazurek, University of Maryland

Available Media

People often share information with each other, motivated by mutual benefit. However, some interfaces force reciprocity by requiring users to reveal the same type of information they want to obtain. For example, in some social networks, a user can view someone’s profile only if they allow the other person to access theirs. Read receipts in many messaging apps follow the same pattern. These settings may be detrimental to privacy, since users are forced to reveal information that they may otherwise not wish to share. On the other hand, forced reciprocity may be beneficial, as it keeps interfaces simpler and enforces social norms of fairness. To understand how people perceive these trade-offs and make choices about reciprocal settings, we surveyed 802 participants from the U.S. about interpersonal access-control settings in three domains: read receipts in messaging apps, profile views in social networks, and data visibility settings in smart home devices. We found that forced reciprocity results in privacy losses, but many consider it fair, generally preferring reciprocal access-control settings to interfaces with more options. Our findings suggest that reciprocity is a potent motivator in privacy decision-making and has the potential to be useful as a mechanism in new privacy controls.

“TikTok, Do Your Thing”: User Reactions to Social Surveillance in the Public Sphere

Meira Gilbert, Miranda Wei, and Lindah Kotut, University of Washington

Available Media

"TikTok, Do Your Thing" is a viral trend where users attempt to identify strangers they see in public via information crowd-sourcing. The trend started as early as 2021 and users typically engage with it for romantic purposes (similar to a "Missed Connections" personal advertisement). This practice includes acts of surveillance and identification in the public sphere, although by peers rather than governments or corporations. To understand users' reactions to this trend we conducted a qualitative analysis of 60 TikTok videos and 1,901 user comments. Of the 60 videos reviewed, we find 19 individuals were successfully identified. We also find that while there were comments expressing disapproval (n=310), more than double the number expressed support (n=883). Supportive comments demonstrated genuine interest and empathy, reflecting evolving conceptions of community and algorithmic engagement. On the other hand, disapproving comments highlighted concerns about inappropriate relationships, stalking, consent, and gendered double standards. We discuss these insights in relation to the normalization of interpersonal surveillance, online stalking, and as an evolution of social surveillance to offer a new perspective on user perceptions surrounding interpersonal surveillance and identification in the public sphere.

10:15 am–11:00 am

Lightning Talks

11:00 am–11:30 am

Coffee and Tea Break

Room 605-610

11:30 am–12:30 pm

Authentication

Session Chair: Zhibo Sun, University of Drexel

Measuring NIST Authentication Standards Compliance by Higher Education Institutions

Noah Apthorpe and Boen Beavers, Colgate University; Yan Shvartzshnaider, York University; Brett Frischmann, Villanova University

Available Media

Technical standards are a longstanding method of communicating best practice recommendations based on expert consensus. Cybersecurity standards are particularly important for informing policies that protect critical systems and sensitive data. Measuring standards compliance is therefore essential to identify vulnerabilities arising from outdated policies and to determine whether expert advice has effectively diffused to practitioners. In this paper, we examine the authentication policies of a diverse set of 135 colleges and universities in the United States and Canada to determine compliance with four standards from NIST Special Publication 800-63 Digital Identity Guidelines. We find widespread, but not universal, deployment of multi-factor authentication across institutions. We also find prevalent outdated use of password expiration, password composition rules, and knowledge-based authentication. These results support further investment and research into incentive structures for standards compliance and the diffusion of expert guidance to practitioners.

The more accounts I use, the less I have to think': A Longitudinal Study on the Usability of Password Managers for Novice Users

Patricia Arias Cabarcos, Paderborn University and KASTEL Security Research Labs; Peter Mayer, University of Southern Denmark and Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Available Media

Despite the security benefits of password managers (PM), many users refrain from adopting them, usability being a major friction point. In this work, we go beyond prior research that captures usability issues as isolated snapshots. Instead, we provided n=37 novice participants with a 3-month license for a commercial password manager and captured their experiences in weekly questionnaires over the first month and at the end of the trial period. Our findings highlight the strong impact of first-impression usability, with initial hurdles in managing primary passwords making adoption cumbersome. While trust in the password manager improves over time, perceived usability stays unchanged. Users tend to ignore credential audit flags, potentially undermining the security benefits the password manager provides. Based on these insights, we provide recommendations to enhance password manager adoption and usability so users can benefit from the full functionality and protections password managers provide.

From TOTPs to Security Keys: Studying the Reality of Passwordless FIDO2 Authentication With PIN and Biometrics in a Corporate Environment

Leona Lassak, Nicklas Lindemann, and Marvin Kowalewski, Ruhr University Bochum

Available Media

Phishing remains a major threat to companies. Many organizations use multi-factor authentication (MFA) methods like SMS or TOTPs which unfortunately still leave them vulnerable to attacks and even add cognitive, physical, and time strain for employees. Passwordless authentication with FIDO2 security keys could offer a promising alternative with strong phishing resistance and better usability, yet real-world adoption in corporate settings is underexplored. In a five-week field study at a mid-sized IT company, we compared security keys (PIN and biometrics) to passwords with TOTPs using authentication logs, surveys, and interviews with 34 employees. While biometric security keys reduced login times by nearly five seconds, PIN-based keys were not significantly faster. Despite this, and despite usability challenges such as hardware compatibility, employees were significantly more satisfied with both on-device authentication methods. Security perception remained unchanged, as employees already considered existing authentication secure. Critically, overall inconsistencies and complexities of authentication workflows were frequently criticized, suggesting that the authentication method itself may not always be the core issue and highlighting the need for organizations to analyze root causes of problems before adopting new authentication methods as quick fixes for fundamentally flawed infrastructures.

Design and Evaluation of Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Agent-Facilitated Mobile Money Services in Kenya

Karen Sowon, Indiana University; Collins W. Munyendo, The George Washington University; Lily Klucinec, Carnegie Mellon University; Eunice Maingi and Gerald Suleh, Strathmore University; Lorrie Faith Cranor and Giulia Fanti, Carnegie Mellon University; Conrad Tucker and Assane Gueye, Carnegie Mellon University-Africa

IAPP SOUPS Privacy Award

Available Media

Mobile Money (MoMo), a technology that allows users to complete financial transactions using a mobile phone without requiring a bank account, is a common method for processing financial transactions in Africa and other developing regions. Users can deposit and withdraw money with the help of human agents. During deposit and withdraw operations, know-your-customer (KYC) processes require agents to access and verify customer information such as name and ID number, which can introduce privacy and security risks. In this work, we design alternative protocols for MoMo deposits/withdrawals that protect users’ privacy while enabling KYC checks by redirecting the flow of sensitive information from the agent to the MoMo provider. We evaluate the usability and efficiency of our proposed protocols in a role-play and semi-structured interview study with 32 users and 15 agents in Kenya. We find that users and agents prefer the new protocols, due in part to convenient and efficient verification using biometrics as well as better data privacy and access control. However, our study also surfaced challenges that need to be addressed before these protocols can be deployed.

12:30 pm–2:15 pm

Tuesday Luncheon and Speed Mentoring Tables

Room 606-609

2:15 pm–3:15 pm

Advice

Session Chair: Nina Gerber, Technical University of Darmstadt

I never reuse passwords! Development and Validation of a Security and Privacy Social Desirability Scale (SP-SDS) for end users without a background in computer science

Laura Marie Abels, University of Bonn; Matthew Smith, University of Bonn and Fraunhofer FKIE; Anna-Marie Ortloff, University of Bonn

Awarded Distinguished Paper!

Available Media

Social desirability bias can be a problem in human-subjects research, if participants give answers they believe researchers want to hear, instead of their true opinion. This is especially concerning for sensitive topics, which are prevalent in Usable Security and Privacy (USP) research, e.g. when asking users about their security habits, experiences of digital abuse or opinions on surveillance. While validated scales measuring general social desirability bias exist, it is unclear how applicable they are in USP. Besides the jarring context switch, it is uncertain how well social desirability of security and privacy related behavior matches general social desirability. To address this, we developed and validated a 13-item security and privacy-specific social desirability scale (SP-SDS), (total N=1167). A correlation of τ = .43 between SP-SDS and the established Marlowe-Crowne SDS confirms that social desirability bias in USP is related to, but distinct from, general social desirability bias. Based on our validated scale we conducted a study with a representative US-sample (N=867) for participants without a CS-background, to measure the perception of social desirability for the behaviors contained in the SP-SDS and to create a baseline for comparison with other samples. Finally, we make recommendations for using SP-SDS in USP studies.

Replication: “No one can hack my mind” - 10 years later: An update and outlook on experts’ and non-experts’ security practices and advice

Anna-Marie Ortloff, University of Bonn; Jenny Tang, Carnegie Mellon University; Arthi Arumugam, Daniel Huschina, Lisa Geierhaas, and Florin Martius, University of Bonn; Luisa Jansen, University of Bern; Kolja von der Twer and Lilly Jungbluth, University of Bonn; Matthew Smith, University of Bonn and Fraunhofer FKIE

Available Media

In 2015, Ion, Reeder, and Consolvo studied IT security advice and self-reported security behavior of experts and non-experts. In 2019, Busse et al. replicated this study and found only minor changes in expert advice and non-expert behavior, with persisting differences between the two groups. Now, 10 years later, we replicated the study with an updated survey and compared our results to both prior studies. Additionally, we interviewed security experts and asked them for their views on the past and future of IT security advice. We report the current state of security behavior and advice based on two survey samples: one non-expert (N=990), and one expert sample (N=75) and an additional expert interview sample (N=35). We identified notable changes in reported security behavior for both experts and non-experts, including that experts and non-experts are beginning to adopt new security practices in authentication. The expert interviews show a path forward, with experts hoping for more improvements to usability and targeted advice for specific user and device-contexts.

More than Usability: Differential Access to Digital Security and Privacy

Annalina Buckmann and Jan Magnus Nold, Ruhr University Bochum; Yasemin Acar, Paderborn University and The George Washington University; Yixin Zou, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy

Available Media

Despite over two decades of usable security and privacy (S&P) research, there remains a yawning gap between expert-recommended S&P advice and user behavior. The Security and Privacy Acceptance Framework (SPAF) identifies awareness, motivation, and ability as main factors influencing S&P behavior. The inclusive S&P literature highlights the importance of user diversity, yet there are open questions regarding how and why sociodemographic differences in S&P emerge. We apply SPAF to analyze interview data from 47 participants with varying age, gender, education, income, (dis)ability, and expertise. Our findings highlight seven new underlying factors not covered by SPAF (e.g., how experiences with threats and doing one's own research contribute to awareness) and four barriers (e.g., limited social support). Drawing from our findings, we establish the notion of differential access as a new concept to consider for inclusive S&P research beyond system-level accessibility: Users' access to S&P protections and information largely hinges on their social and relational position within the society and access to resources, which varies across sociodemographics.

Misuse, Misreporting, Misinterpretation of Statistical Methods in Usable Privacy and Security Papers

Jenny Tang, Lujo Bauer, and Nicolas Christin, Carnegie Mellon University

Available Media

Null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) is commonly used in quantitative usable privacy and security studies. Many papers use results from statistical tests to assert whether effects or differences exist depending on the resulting p-value. We conduct a systematic review of papers published in 10 editions of the Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security over a span of 20 years to evaluate the field's use of NHST. We code statistical tests for potential statistical validity, reporting, or interpretation issues that may undermine assertions made in the 121 papers that use NHST. Most problematically, tests in 23% of papers inadequately account for non-independence between samples, leading to potentially invalid claims. 58% of papers lack information to verify whether an assertion is supported, such as imprecisely specifying the statistical test conducted. Many papers contain more minor statistical issues or report statistics in ways that deviate from best practice. We conclude with recommendations for statistical reporting and statistical thinking in the field.

3:15 pm–3:45 pm

Coffee and Tea Break

Room 605-610

3:45 pm–4:45 pm

Trust and Social Aspects of User Privacy

Session Chair: Eleanor Birrell, Pomona College

Trust-Enabled Privacy: Social Media Designs to Support Adolescent User Boundary Regulation

JaeWon Kim and Robert Wolfe, University of Washington; Ramya Bhagirathi Subramanian, Mei-Hsuan Lee, and Jessica Colnago, Independent Contributor; Alexis Hiniker, University of Washington

Available Media

Adolescents heavily rely on social media to build and maintain close relationships, yet current platform designs often make self-disclosure feel risky or uncomfortable. Through a three-part study involving 19 teens aged 13–18, we identify key barriers to meaningful self-disclosure on social media. Our findings reveal that while these adolescents seek casual, frequent sharing to strengthen relationships, existing platform norms often discourage such interactions. Based on our co-design interview findings, we propose platform design ideas to foster a more dynamic and nuanced privacy experience for teen social media users. We then introduce trust-enabled privacy as a framework that recognizes trust—whether building or eroding—as central to boundary regulation, and foregrounds the role of platform design in shaping the very norms and interaction patterns that influence how trust unfolds. When trust is supported, boundary regulation becomes more adaptive and empowering; when it erodes, users resort to self-censorship or disengagement. This work provides empirical insights and actionable guidelines for designing social media spaces where teens feel empowered to engage in meaningful relationship-building processes.

How Predatory Monetization Designs Manifest in Child-Friendly Video Games

Qiurong Song, Zinan Zhang, Rie Helene (Lindy) Hernandez, Xinning Gui, and Yubo Kou, The Pennsylvania State University

Available Media

Numerous children play video games labeled as ‘child-friendly.’ However, the prevalence of predatory monetization designs in video games has raised safety concerns about their impact on children's online safety and financial well-being. While existing research has extensively examined general predatory monetization categories—such as pay-to-win mechanics and loot boxes—little is known about whether and how predatory monetization designs manifest in child-friendly video games. We address this question by studying Roblox, a child-friendly game platform with an enormous child player base. We conducted two investigations: (1) an interview study exploring how Roblox game developers perceive predatory monetization designs and (2) a walkthrough study analyzing how these predatory monetization designs manifest within Roblox games. Our findings revealed that many Roblox developers are aware of and even deploy predatory monetization designs in Roblox games to exploit child players. Additionally, we identified the ways predatory monetization designs function, such as user interface (UI) design manipulations and psychological tactics, which reinforce and amplify each other to nudge players toward spending, raising serious concerns about their financial security and digital autonomy. Finally, we propose implications for ethical game design and regulation in child-friendly video games.

Unpacking the Social and Emotional Dimensions of Security and Privacy User Engagement

Nina Gerber, Technical University of Darmstadt; Verena Zimmermann, ETH Zurich; Alexandra von Preuschen, Justus-Liebig-University Gießen; Karen Renaud, University of Strathclyde, UK; University of South Africa, South Africa; and Rhodes University, South Africa

Available Media

Despite the acknowledged importance of security and privacy (S&P), user engagement with protective practices remains limited, influenced by complex social dynamics and emotional responses. In this study, we surveyed a representative sample of 496 U.S. participants to examine the interplay between social dynamics and emotional responses in shaping S&P behaviours. Our findings highlight that S&P conversations are infrequent, hindered by perceived social norms, complexity, and assumed disinterest from others. Participants associated S&P-savvy individuals with positive traits such as trustworthiness and intelligence, yet also challenge stereotypes of paranoia or social awkwardness. Normalizing discussions and fostering social interactions around S&P could drive greater user engagement. Emotionally, S&P practices evoke not only frustration, fear, and feelings of being overwhelmed, but also curiosity and a desire for empowerment. Participants cited simplification, enhanced self-efficacy, and tangible evidence of the impact of their actions as critical factors making S&P more approachable and engaging. These insights suggest opportunities to design socially supportive and emotionally resonant interventions to improve user adoption of S&P behaviours.

Adopting AI to Protect Industrial Control Systems: Assessing Challenges and Opportunities from the Operators’ Perspective

Clement Fung, Carnegie Mellon University; Eric Zeng, Georgetown University; Lujo Bauer, Carnegie Mellon University

Available Media

Industrial control systems (ICS) manage critical physical processes such as electric distribution and water treatment. Attackers infiltrate ICS and manipulate these critical processes, causing damage and harm. AI-based approaches can detect such attacks and raise alarms for operators, but they are not commonly used in practice and it is unclear why. In this work, we directly asked practitioners about current practices for alarms in ICS and their perspectives on adopting AI to support these practices. We conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with practitioners who work on protecting ICS, through which we identified tasks commonly performed for alarms such as raising alarms when anomalies are detected, coordinating operator response to alarms, and analyzing data to improve alarm rule sets. We found that practitioners often struggle with tasks beyond anomaly detection, such as alarm diagnosis, and we propose designing AI-based tools to support these tasks. We also identified barriers to adopting AI in ICS (e.g., limited data collection, low trust in vendor technology) and recommend ways to make AI-based tools more effective and trusted by practitioners, such as demonstrating model transparency through interactive pilot projects.

4:45 pm–5:00 pm

Closing Remarks and Poster Awards

General Chair: Patrick Gage Kelley, Google