EnclavePDP: A General Framework to Verify Data Integrity in Cloud Using Intel SGX

Authors: 

Yun He, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Yihua Xu, Metropolitan College, Boston University; Xiaoqi Jia, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Shengzhi Zhang, Metropolitan College, Boston University; Peng Liu, Pennsylvania State University; Shuai Chang, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences

Abstract: 

As the cloud storage service becomes pervasive, verifying the integrity of their outsourced data on cloud remotely turns out to be challenging for users. Existing Provable Data Possession (PDP) schemes mostly resort to a Third Party Auditor (TPA) to verify the integrity on behalf of users, thus reducing their communication and computation burden. However, such schemes demand fully trusted TPA, that is, placing TPA in the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), which is not always a reasonable assumption. In this paper, we propose EnclavePDP, a secure and general data integrity verification framework that relies on Intel SGX to establish the TCB for PDP schemes, thus eliminating the TPA from the TCB. EnclavePDP supports both new and existing PDP schemes by integrating core functionalities of cryptography libraries into Intel SGX. We choose 10 existing representative PDP schemes, and port them into EnclavePDP with reasonable effort. By deploying EnclavePDP in a real-world cloud storage platform and running the 10 PDP schemes respectively, we demonstrate that EnclavePDP can eliminate the dependence on TPA and introduce reasonable performance overhead.

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {259691,
author = {Yun He and Yihua Xu and Xiaoqi Jia and Shengzhi Zhang and Peng Liu and Shuai Chang},
title = {EnclavePDP: A General Framework to Verify Data Integrity in Cloud Using Intel {SGX}},
booktitle = {23rd International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses ({RAID} 2020)},
year = {2020},
isbn = {978-1-939133-18-2},
address = {San Sebastian},
pages = {195--208},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/raid2020/presentation/he},
publisher = {{USENIX} Association},
month = oct,
}