Unobservable Communication over Fully Untrusted Infrastructure

Authors: 

Sebastian Angel, The University of Texas at Austin and New York University; Srinath Setty, Microsoft Research

Abstract: 

Keeping communication private has become increasingly important in an era of mass surveillance and state-sponsored attacks. While hiding the contents of a conversation has well-known solutions, hiding the associated metadata (participants, duration, etc.) remains a challenge, especially if one cannot trust ISPs or proxy servers. This paper describes a communication system called Pung that provably hides all content and metadata while withstanding global adversaries. Pung is a key-value store where clients deposit and retrieve messages without anyone— including Pung’s servers—learning of the existence of a conversation. Pung is based on private information retrieval, which we make more practical for our setting with new techniques. These include a private multi-retrieval scheme, an application of the power of two choices, and batch codes. These extensions allow Pung to handle 103× more users than prior systems with a similar threat model.

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {199325,
author = {Sebastian Angel and Srinath Setty},
title = {Unobservable Communication over Fully Untrusted Infrastructure},
booktitle = {12th {USENIX} Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation ({OSDI} 16)},
year = {2016},
isbn = {978-1-931971-33-1},
address = {Savannah, GA},
pages = {551--569},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/osdi16/technical-sessions/presentation/angel},
publisher = {{USENIX} Association},
}