Election Audits

Election audits have the ability to establish an objective and quantifiable measure of confidence in an election. Unfortunately, in the U.S., there are no clear best practices (nor rigorous requirements) regarding audits. For example, of the states requiring audits, none specify how random selection must be done. This and other ambiguities are generally interpreted (to various degrees of success) at the local, county level, leading to practices that in many cases defeat the effectiveness of the audit. For instance, the requirement for an audit to be fully transparent to allow for public oversight, is jeopardized by the use of software to perform the random selection. To address this, we have proposed using well-known, physical methods of random selection—such as dice, or lotteries—to do the selection. In our analysis, though, each solution has its own (sometimes subtle and non-obvious) pitfalls. Contributing to the problem is the critical issue of public perception, which (ironically) is a source of resistance to accepting our proposals. For example, some election officials are wary of using dice because of a feared association with gambling, (while others have embraced it). Also because of perception, technically superior methods had to be turned down over simpler ones.

The work in progress talk will describe the problem and briefly cover some of the takeaway messages of our experiences.