Skip to main content
Back to USENIX
  • Conferences
  • Students
Sign in

USENIX Conference Policies

  • Event Code of Conduct
  • Conference Network Policy
  • Statement on Environmental Responsibility Policy

Finite-State Analysis of SSL 3.0

John C. Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, and Ulrich Stern, Stanford University

The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol is analyzed using a finite-state enumeration tool called Murtex2html_wrap_inline1336 . The analysis is presented using a sequence of incremental approximations to the SSL 3.0 handshake protocol. Each simplified protocol is ``model-checked'' using Murtex2html_wrap_inline1336 , with the next protocol in the sequence obtained by correcting errors that Murtex2html_wrap_inline1336 finds automatically. This process identifies the main shortcomings in SSL 2.0 that led to the design of SSL 3.0, as well as a few anomalies in the protocol that is used to resume a session in SSL 3.0. In addition to some insight into SSL, this study demonstrates the feasibility of using formal methods to analyze commercial protocols.

John C. Mitchell, Stanford University

Vitaly Shmatikov, Stanford University

Ulrich Stern, Stanford University

BibTeX
@inproceedings {261405,
author = {John C. Mitchell and Vitaly Shmatikov and Ulrich Stern},
title = {{Finite-State} Analysis of {SSL} 3.0},
booktitle = {7th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 98)},
year = {1998},
address = {San Antonio, TX},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/7th-usenix-security-symposium/finite-state-analysis-ssl-30},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = jan
}
Download

Links

Paper: 
http://usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/sec98/full_papers/mitchell/mitchell.pdf
Paper (HTML): 
http://usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/sec98/full_papers/mitchell/mitchell_html/mitchell.html
  • Log in or register to post comments

© USENIX
EIN 13-3055038

  • Privacy Policy
  • Contact Us