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FormatGuard: Automatic Protection From printf Format String Vulnerabilities

In June 2000, a major new class of vulnerabilities called "format bugs" was discovered when an vulnerability in WU-FTP appeared that acted almost like a buffer over-flow, but wasnÕt. Since then, dozens of format string vulnerabilities have appeared. This paper describes the format bug problem, and presents FormatGuard: our proposed solution. FormatGuard is a small patch to glibc that provides general protection against format bugs. We show that FormatGuard is effective in protect-ing several real programs with format vulnerabilities against live exploits, and we show that FormatGuard imposes minimal compatibility and performance costs.

Matt Barringer, WireX Communications, Inc.

Mike Frantzen, Purdue University

Jamie Lokier, CERN

BibTeX
@inproceedings {270910,
author = {Matt Barringer and Mike Frantzen and Jamie Lokier},
title = {{FormatGuard}: Automatic Protection From printf Format String Vulnerabilities},
booktitle = {10th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 01)},
year = {2001},
address = {Washington, D.C.},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/10th-usenix-security-symposium/formatguard-automatic-protection-printf-format-string},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}
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Links

Paper: 
http://www.usenix.org/events/sec01/full_papers/cowanbarringer/cowanbarringer.pdf
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