15th USENIX Security Symposium Abstract
Pp. 321336 of the Proceedings
Designing Voting Machines for Verification
Naveen Sastry, University of California, Berkeley; Tadayoshi Kohno, University of California, San Diego; David Wagner, University of California, Berkeley
We provide techniques to help vendors, independent testing
agencies, and others verify critical security properties
in direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines.
We rely on specific hardware functionality, isolation, and
architectural decision to allow one to easily verify these
critical security properties; we believe our techniques
will help us verify other properties as well. Verification
of these security properties is one step towards a fully
verified voting machine, and helps the public gain con-
fidence in a critical tool for democracy. We present a
voting system design and discuss our experience building
a prototype implementation based on the design in
Java and C.
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