USENIX 2006 Annual Technical Conference Refereed Paper
[USENIX 2006 Annual Technical Conference Technical Program]
\Large
\ourtitle
\date{\ourdate }
ComparebyHash:
A Reasoned Analysis
Apr 14, 2006
J. Black ^{1}
Abstract
Comparebyhash is the nowcommon practice used by systems designers
who assume that when the digest of a cryptographic hash function is
equal on two distinct files, then those files are identical. This
approach has been used in both real projects and in research efforts
(for example rysnc [16] and LBFS [12]).
A recent paper by Henson criticized this practice [8].
The present paper revisits the topic from an advocate's standpoint:
we claim that comparebyhash is completely reasonable, and we
offer various arguments in support of this viewpoint in addition to
addressing concerns raised by Henson.
Keywords:
Cryptgraphic hash functions, distributed file systems, probability theory
1 Introduction
There is a wellknown shortcut technique for testing two files for
equality.
The technique entails using a cryptographic hash function,
such as SHA1 or RIPEMD160, to compare the files: instead
of comparing them bytebybyte, we instead compare their hashes. If
the hashes differ, then the files are certainly different; if the hashes agree,
then the files are almost certainly the same.
The motivation here
is that the two files in question might live on opposite ends of a
lowbandwidth network connection and therefore a substantial performance gain
can be realized by sending a small (eg, 20 byte) hash digest rather than
a large (eg, 20 megabyte) file. Even without this slow network connection,
it is still a significant performance gain to compare hashes rather than
compare files directly
when the files live on the same disk: if we always keep the latest hash value
for files of interest, we can quickly check the files for equality
by once again comparing only a few bytes rather than reading through
them bytebybyte.
One wellknown use of this technique is the file synchronizing tool called
rsync [16]. This tool allows one to maintain two identical
copies of a set of files on two separate machines. When updates are applied
to some subset of the files on one machine,
rsync copies those updates to the other machine.
In order to determine
which files have changed and which have not, rsync
compares the hashes of
respective files and if they match, assumes they have not changed since
the last synchronization was performed.^{2}
Another wellknown use of comparebyhash in the research community is
the LowBandwidth File System (LBFS) [12]. The LBFS provides
a fullysychronized file system over lowbandwidth connections, once
again using a cryptographic hash function (this time SHA1)
to aid in determining when
and where updates have to be distributed.
Cryptographic hash functions are found throughout cryptographic
protocols as well: virtually every digital signature scheme requires
that the message to be signed is first processed by a hash function, for
example. Timestamping mechanisms, some messageauthentication protocols,
and several widelyused publickey cryptosystems also use cryptographic
hash functions.
A difference between the above scenarios is that usually in the comparebyhash
case (rsync and LBFS are our examples here)
there is no adversary.
Or at least the goal of the designers was not to provide
security via the use of cryptographic hash functions. So in some
sense using a cryptographic hash function is overkill: a hash function
that is simply "good" at spreading distinct inputs randomly over some
range should suffice. In the cryptographic
examples, there is
an adversary: indeed all the latter examples are taken from the
cryptographic literature and the hash functions in these scenarios are
specifically introduced in order to foil a wouldbe attacker.
In spite of the fact these functions are stronger than what is needed,
a recent paper by Henson [8] criticizes the approach and
gives a list of concerns. In this paper we will
revisit some of the issues raised by Henson and
argue that in most cases they are not of great concern.
We will argue in favor
of continuing to use comparebyhash as a cheap and practical tool.
2 The Basics of Hash Functions
They are variously called "cryptographic hash functions,"
"collisionresistant hash functions," and "Universally OneWay
Hash Functions," not to mention the various acronyms in common
usage. Here we will just say "hash function" and assume we mean
the cryptographic sort.
A hash function h accepts any string from {0,1}^{*} and outputs
some bbit string called the "hash" or "digest." The most wellknown
hash functions are MD4, MD5 [14], RIPEMD160 [6],
and SHA1 [7]. The first two functions
output digests of 128 bits, and the
latter two output 160 bits.
Although it is not possible to rigorously define the security of these
hash functions, we use the following (informal) definitions to capture
the main goals.^{3}
A hash function h should be
 CollisionResistant: it should be "computationally
intractible" to find distinct inputs a and b such that h(a)=h(b).
Of course such a and b must exist given the infinite domain
and finite range
of h, but finding such a pair should be very hard.
 InversionResistant: given any digest v, it should
be "computationally intractible" to find an input a such that
h(a)=v. This means that hashing a document should provide a
"fingerprint" of that document without revealing anything about it.
 SecondPreimageResistant:
given an input a and its digest v=h(a), it should be
"computationally intractible" to find a second input b � a
with h(b)=v. This is the condition necessary for secure digital
signatures, which is the context in which hashing is most commonly
employed cryptographically.
In the context of comparebyhash, collisionresistance is our main
concern: if ever two distinct inputs produced the same digest, we
would wrongly conclude that distinct objects were the same and
this would result in an error whose severity is determined by the
application; typically a file would be outofsync or a file system would
become inconsistent.
FINDING COLLISIONS.
If avoiding a collision (the event that two distinct inputs hash to the
same output) is our main goal, we must determine how hard it is to
find one. For a random function, this is given by the wellknown
"birthday bound." Roughly stated, if we are given a list of
bbit independent random strings, we expect to start seeing collisions
after about 2^{b/2} strings have appeared. This means that MD4 and
MD5 should begin showing collisions after we have seen about 2^{64}
hash values, and RIPEMD160 and SHA1 should begin showing
collisions after about 2^{80} hash evaluations.
This is the expected number of hash evaluations before any
pair of files collide. The probability that a given
pair of files collide is much lower: 2^{160} for SHA1, for example.
3 ComparebyHash: A Flawed Technique?
In her paper,
Henson raises a number of issues which she deems important shortcomings of
the comparebyhash technique [8].
A central theme in Henson's paper is her opposition to the notion that
digests can be treated as unique ids for blocks of data. She gives a
list of arguments, often supported by numerical calculations, as to why
this is a dangerous notion. In order to take an opposing viewpoint, we now
visit several of her most prominent claims and examine them.
INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS. One of Henson's most
damning claims is her repeated assertion (cf. Sections 3
and 4.1) that in order for the outputs of a cryptographic hash function to be
uniform and random, the inputs to the function must be
random.^{4}
In fact, in Section 4.1,
she claims that this supposedlywrong assumption on the inputs is
"the key insight into the weakness of comparebyhash." She correctly
points out that most filesystem data are in fact not uniform
over any domain. However, her assertion about hash functions is
incorrect.
Cryptographic hash functions are designed to model "random functions."
A random function from the set of all strings to the set of bbit values
can be thought of as an infinitelylong table where every possible string
is listed in the left column, and for each row
a random and independent bbit number
is listed in the right column. Obviously with this (fantasy) mapping,
even highlycorrelated distinct inputs will map to independent and random
outputs. Of course any actual hash function we write down cannot have
this property (since it is a static object the moment we write it down),
most researchers agree that our best hash functions, like SHA1 and
RIPEMD160, do a very good job at mapping correlated inputs to
uncorrelated outputs. (This is what's known as withstanding
"differential cryptanalysis.")
If the assumption that inputs must be random is indeed the key insight
into the weakness of comparebyhash, as Henson claims,
then we argue that perhaps comparebyhash is not so weak after all.
ESTABLISHED USES OF HASHING. In section 3, Henson states that
"comparebyhash" sets a new precedent by relying solely on hashvalue
comparison in place of a direct comparison. While new precedents are
not necessarily a bad thing, in this case it is simply untrue: one
of the oldest uses of cryptographic hashing is (unsurprisingly) in
cryptography. More specifically, they are universally used in digitial
signature schemes where a document being digitally
signed is first hashed
with a cryptographic hash function, and then the signature is applied to the
hash value. This is expressly done for performance reasons: applying
a computationallyexpensive digital signature to a large file would be
prohibitive, but
applying it to a short hashfunction output is quite practical.
The unscrupulous attacker now need only find a different (evil) file with
the same hash value and this signature will appear valid for it as well.
Therefore the security of the scheme rests squarely on the strength of
the hash function used (in addition to the strength of the signature
scheme itself), and the comparison of files is never performed: it
is done entirely through the hash function. In fact, this could
fairly be called "comparebyhash" as well, and it has been accepted
by the security community for decades.
QUESTIONABLE EXAMPLES. Henson notes that if a massive
collisionfinding attempt
for SHA1 were mounted by employing a large distributed bruteforce attack
using a comparebyhashbased file system that also uses SHA1,
collisions would not be detected.
First,
the example is a bit contrived: using a filesystem based on SHA1 to
look for collisions in SHA1 is a bit like testing NFS by mirroring it
with the exact same implementation of NFS and then comparing to see if
the results match.
But even given this, it's still not clear that searching
for SHA1 collisions using a SHA1based comparebyhash file system
would present any problems. Van Oorschot and Wiener have described the
bestknown ways of doing parallel collision searching in this
domain [17]. Let's use SHA1 in an example:
each computer selects a (distinct, random) starting point
x_{0}, and then iterates the hash function x_{i} = SHA1(x_{i1}),
looking for "landmark" values that are stored in the file system.
(These landmark values might be hash values with 40 leading zeros, for
example. Under the assumption the hash outputs are uniform and random,
we would expect to see such a point every 2^{40} iterations. We do
this in order to avoid storing all hash values which for
SHA1 would approximately require an expected 2^{85} bytes of storage,
not including overhead for data structures for collision detection!)
Since these landmark values would be written to the file system (along
with other bookkeeping information all stored in some data structure),
and since the number of blocks would be far less than 2^{80},
it's highly unlikely that even a SHA1based comparebyhash file system
would have any difficulties at all.
The second example Henson gives is the VAL1 hash function.
The VAL1 hash creates a publiclyknown collision on two
points, zero and one, and otherwise behaves like SHA1. Henson claims the
VAL1 hash has "almost identical probability of collision" as SHA1 and
yet allows a user to make changes that would go undetected in a
comparebyhashbased file system.
(The term "collision probability" is not defined anywhere in her paper.)
Of course
it is correct that the probability of collision is nearly the same between
VAL1 and SHA1 when
the inputs are random (which itself is difficult to define as we mentioned
above).
But more to the point, VAL1 does not have security equivalent
to SHA1 by any normal notion of hashfunction security in common use. The
informal notion of collisionresistance given above
dictates that it is intractible to
find collisions in our hash function; in VAL1 it is quite trivial since
VAL1(0) = VAL1(1). (In the formal definitions for hashfunction security,
VAL1 would fail to be secure as well.) Once again, the example is dubious
due to the assumption that hashfunction security rests solely on the
distribution of digests over randomlychosen inputs.
WHAT IS THE ATTACK MODEL?
Although Henson mentions correctness as the principal concern, she also
mentions security. But throughout the paper it's unclear what the attack
model is, exactly. More specifically, if we are worried about collisions,
do we assume that our enemy is just bad luck, or is there an intelligent
attacker trying to cause collisions?
If we're just concerned with bad luck, we have seen there is very little
to worry about: the chance that two files will have the same hash
(assuming once again that the hash function adequately approximates a
random function) is about 2^{160} for a 160bit hash function like
SHA1 or RIPEMD160. If there is an active attacker trying
to cause trouble, he must first somehow find a collision. This is a
difficult proposition, but in the extremely unlikely case he succeeds,
he may find blocks b_{1} and b_{2} that collide. In this case, he
may freely cause problems by substituting b_{1} for b_{2} or viceversa,
and a comparebyhash file system will not notice. However, finding
this one collision (which we must emphasize has still not been done todate)
would not
enable him to alter arbitrary blocks. If the method by which he found
b_{1} and b_{2} was to try random blocks until he found a collision, it's
highly unlikely that b_{1} or b_{2} are blocks of interest to him, that
they have any real meaning, or that they even exist on the
file system in question.
In either case, it would seem that comparebyhash holds up well in both
attack models.
THE INSECURITY OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC OBJECTS. Henson
spends a lot of time talking about the poor trackrecord of cryptographic
algorithms (cf. Section 4.2), stating that the literature is "rife with
examples of cryptosystems that turned out not to be nearly as secure as
we thought." She further asserts that "history tells us that we should
expect any popular cryptographic hash to be broken within a few years
of its introduction." Although it is true that some algorithms are
broken, this is by no means as routine as she implies.
The DaviesMeyers hash has been known since 1979, and the
MatyasMeyerOseas scheme since 1985 [11]. These have never been
broken despite their being very wellknown and wellanalyzed [13,2].
RIPEMD160
and SHA1 were both published more recently (1995) but have still held up
for more than just "a few years," since there is still no known practical
attack against either algorithm. While it is true that there have been many
published cryptographic ideas which were later broken, rarely have these
schemes ever made it into FIPS, ANSI, or ISO standards. The vetting
process usually weeds them out first. Probably the best example is the
DES blockcipher which endured 25 years of analysis without any
effective attacks being found.
Even when these "breaks" occur, they are often only of theoretical
interest: they break because they fail to meet some very strict
definition of security set forth by the cryptographic community, not
because the attack could be used in any practical way by a malicious
party.
Ask any security expert and he or she will tell you the same thing: if
you want to subvert the security of a computer system, breaking the
cryptography is almost never the expeditious route. It's highly more
likely that there is some flaw in the system itself that is easier to
discover and exploit than trying to find collisions in SHA1.
That said, there have been attacks on cryptographic
hash functions over the past 10 years, and some very striking ones
just in just the past few years. We briefly discuss these.
RECENT ATTACKS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTIONS.
Collisions in MD4 were found by Hans Dobbertin in 1996 [5].
However, MD4 is
still used in rsync undoubtedly due to the arguments made above:
there is typically no adversary, and just happening on a collision
in MD4 is highly unlikely. MD4 was known to have shortcomings long before
Dobbertin's attack, so its inventor (Ron Rivest) also produced the stronger
hash function MD5. MD5 was also attacked by Dobbertin, with partial success,
in 1996 [4].
However, full collisions in MD5 were not found until 2004 when
Xiaoyun Wang shocked the community by announcing that she could find
collsions in MD5 in a few hours on an IBM P690 [19].
Since that time, other
researchers have refined her attack to produce collisions in MD5 in just a
few minutes on a Pentium 4, on average [9,1].
Clever application of this result has allowed
various attacks: distinct X.509 certificates with the same
MD5 digest [10],
distinct postscript files with the same MD5 digest [3],
and distinct Linux binaries with the same MD5 digest [1].
No inversion or
secondpreimage attacks have yet been found, but nonetheless cryptographers
now consider MD5 to be compromised.
SHA1 and RIPEMD160 still have no published collisions, but many believe
it is only a matter of time. Wang's latest attacks claim an attack
complexity of around 2^{63}, well within the scope of a parallelized
attack [18].
However, until the attack is implemented, we won't know for sure
if her analysis is accurate.
Given all of this, we can now revisit the central question of this
paper one final time: "is it safe to use cryptographic hash functions for
comparebyhash?" I argue that it is: even with MD4 (collisions can be
found by hand in MD4!). This is, once again, because in the typical
comparebyhash setting there is no adversary. The event that two
arbitrary distinct files will have the same MD4 hash is highly unlikely.
And in the rysnc setting, comparisons are done between files
only if they have the same filename; we don't compare all possible pairs
of files across the filesystems. No birthday phenomenon exists here.
In the cryptographic arena, the issue is more complicated: there is
an adversary and what can be done with the current attack technology is a
topic currently generating much discussion. Where this ends up remains
to be seen.
4 Conclusion
We conclude that it is certainly fine to use a
160bit hash function like SHA1 or RIPEMD160 with comparebyhash.
The chances of an
accidental collision is about 2^{160}. This is unimaginably small.
You are roughly 2^{90} times
more likely to win a U.S. state lottery and be struck by
lightning simultaneously than you are to encounter this type of error in
your file system.
In the adversarial model, the probability is higher but consider the
following:
it was estimated that general techniques and custom hardware could find
collisions in a 128bit hash function for 10,000,000 USD in an expected
24 days [17]. Given that this estimate was made in 1994 we could
use Moore's law to extrapolate the cost in 2006 to be more like
80,000 USD. Since SHA1 has 32 more bits, we could rescale these estimates
to be 80,000,000 USD and 2 years to find a collision in SHA1.
This cost is far out of reach for anyone other than large corporations
and governments. But if we are worried about adversarial users with
lots of resources, it might make sense to use the new SHA256 instead.
Of course, if someone is willing to spend 80,000,000 USD to break into your
computer system, it would probably be better spent finding vulnerabilities
in the operating system or on social engineering. And this approach would
likely yield results in a lot less than 2 years.
References
 [1]

Black, J., Cochran, M., and Highland, T.
A study of the MD5 attacks: Insights and improvements.
In Fast Software Encryption (2006), Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, SpringerVerlag.
 [2]

Black, J., Rogaway, P., and Shrimpton, T.
Blackbox analysis of the blockcipherbased hashfunction
constructions from PGV.
In Advances in Cryptology  CRYPTO '02 (2002), vol. 2442 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, SpringerVerlag.
 [3]

Daum, M., and Lucks, S.
Attacking hash functions by poisoned messages.
Presented at the rump session of Eurocrypt '05.
 [4]

Dobbertin, H.
Cryptanalysis of MD5 compress.
Presented at the rump session of Eurocrypt '96.
 [5]

Dobbertin, H.
Cryptanalysis of MD4.
In Fast Software Encryption (1996), vol. 1039 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, SpringerVerlag, pp. 5369.
 [6]

Dobbertin, H., Bosselaers, A., and Preneel, B.
Ripemd160, a strengthened version of ripemd.
In 3rd Workshop on Fast Software Encryption (1996), vol. 1039
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, SpringerVerlag, pp. 7182.
 [7]

FIPS 1801.
Secure hash standard.
NIST, US Dept. of Commerce, 1995.
 [8]

Henson, V.
An analysis of comparebyhash.
In HotOS: Hot Topics in Operating Systems (2003), USENIX,
pp. 1318.
 [9]

Klima, V.
Finding MD5 collisions on a notebook PC using multimessage
modifications.
In International Scientific Conference Security and Protection
of Information (May 2005).
 [10]

Lenstra, A. K., and de Weger, B.
On the possibility of constructing meaningful hash collisions for
public keys.
In Information Security and Privacy, 10th Australasian
Conference  ACISP 2005 (2005), vol. 3574 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, SpringerVerlag, pp. 267279.
 [11]

Matyas, S., Meyer, C., and Oseas, J.
Generating strong oneway functions with cryptographic algorithms.
IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin 27, 10a (1985), 56585659.
 [12]

Muthitacharoen, A., Chen, B., and Mazières, D.
A lowbandwidth network file system.
In SOSP: ACM Symposium on Operating System Principles (2001),
pp. 174187.
 [13]

Preneel, B., Govaerts, R., and Vandewalle, J.
Hash functions based on block ciphers: A synthetic approach.
In Advances in Cryptology  CRYPTO '93 (1994), Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, SpringerVerlag, pp. 368378.
 [14]

RFC 1321.
The MD5 message digest algorithm.
IETF RFC1321, R. Rivest, 1992.
 [15]

Rogaway, P., and Shrimpton, T.
Cryptographic hashfunction basics: Definitions, implications, and
separations for preimage resistance, secondpreimage resistance, and
collision resistance.
In FSE: Fast Software Encryption (2004), SpringerVerlag,
pp. 371388.
 [16]

Tridgell, A.
Efficient algorithms for sorting and synchronization, Apr. 2000.
PhD thesis, Australian National University.
 [17]

van Oorschot, P., and Wiener, M.
Parallel collision search with cryptanalytic applications.
Journal of Cryptology 12, 1 (1999), 128.
Earlier version in ACM CCS '94.
 [18]

Wang, X., Yao, A., and Yao, F.
Recent improvements in finding collisions in sha1.
Presented at the rump session of CRYPTO '05 by Adi Shamir.
 [19]

Wang, X., and Yu, H.
How to break MD5 and other hash functions.
In EUROCRYPT (2005), vol. 3494 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, SpringerVerlag, pp. 1935.
A A Mathematical Note
This appendix is related to the paper, but not essential to the
arguments made.
A further issue with Henson's paper should be pointed out
for purposes of clarity.
Many of Henson's claims are supported
by calculation. However these calculations are sometimes not quite right:
in section 3, she claims that the
probability of one or more collisions among n outputs from a bbit
cryptographic hash function is 1(12^{b})^{n}. (Here we model the bbit
outputs as independent uniform random strings.) This is incorrect.
In fact it greatly underestimates the collision probability.
While it is true the probability that two bbit random strings
will not collide is (1  2^{b}), we cannot raise this to the n and
expect this to be the number of noncollisions among n total outputs
since it neglects to count collisions across alreadyselected pairs.
The probability that n outputs of bbits will contain a collision
is C(2^{b},n) = 1  (2^{b}1)/2^{b} ×(2^{b}2)/2^{b} ×�×(2^{b}n+1)/2^{b}. It can be shown that, when
1 � n � 2^{(b+1)/2} we have
0.316n(n1)/2^{b} � C(2^{b}, n) � 0.5n(n1)/2^{b}.
This formula shows that the probability of a collision is very
unlikely when n is well below the square root of 2^{b}, and then
grows dramatically as n approaches this number.
Indeed, it can
be shown that the expected number of outputs needed before a collision
occurs is n � �{2^{b1}p}.
Footnotes:
^{1} Department of Computer Science,
430 UCB, Boulder, Colorado 80309 USA.
Email: jrblack@cs.colorado.edu
WWW: www.cs.colorado.edu/ ~ jrblack/
^{2}This is an oversimplification;
rsync actually uses a lightweight "rolling" hash function in
concert with a cryptographic hash function, MD4, on blocks of the files
being compared. The simplified description will suffice for our purposes.
^{3}For a proper discussion of these notions, along
with a discussion of how they relate to one another, see [15].
^{4}Technically, this statement cannot make sense since the
input set is infinite and not compact and therefore cannot even have
a probability measure.
File translated from
T_{E}X
by
T_{T}H,
version 3.74. On 14 Apr 2006, 15:43.
