DisARMed: Attacking ARM TrustZone from Userspace with Memory Aliasing

Jacqueline Henes, Matthew Bowden, and Mihai Ordean, University of Birmingham; David Oswald, Durham University

Modern systems security relies on memory isolation mechanisms like trusted execution environments and kernel privilege separation to enforce strong isolation boundaries. However, many of these mechanisms place implicit trust in system memory, leaving them open to hardware attacks on external DRAM. In this paper, we introduce DisARMed, an attack on ARM processors that exploits memory aliasing techniques from userspace, compromising both the Linux kernel and ARM TrustZone. We demonstrate for the first time that memory aliasing attacks are practical for adversaries that do not have access to the kernel. We additionally implement and evaluate a mitigation for DisARMed, using a lightweight alias detection mechanism. Our solution has minimal impact on boot time of about one second. Finally, we discuss the wider applicability of DisARMed, considering other relevant potential attack vectors, applicable memory massaging techniques, and security mechanisms that may be affected.

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {320119,
author = {Jacqueline Henes and Matthew Bowden and Mihai Ordean and David Oswald},
title = {{DisARMed}: Attacking {ARM} {TrustZone} from Userspace with Memory Aliasing},
booktitle = {20th USENIX WOOT Conference on Offensive Technologies (WOOT 26)},
year = {2026},
isbn = {978-1-939133-57-1},
address = {Baltimore, MD},
pages = {31--48},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot26/presentation/henes},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}

Presentation Video