Short: Investigating Stealthy Latency Attacks Against Camera-Based Object Detection Systems

Lichen Xia, Xing Gao, and Weisong Shi, University of Delaware

Object detection (OD) systems are fundamental to safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving and indoor mobile robots, yet remain vulnerable to latency-based attacks that degrade real-time performance. Existing attacks suffer from computational inefficiency and poor stealthiness, as phantom object generation disrupts original detections, making attacks easily identifiable. We propose Groundswell, a novel latency attack employing Regional Perturbation Balance (RPB) to inject adversarial phantom objects while preserving original detections. By leveraging spatial object distribution patterns, RPB generates masks that guide phantom placement into regions with minimal interference, enabling efficient optimization via Projected Gradient Descent. Evaluations across multiple OD architectures demonstrate that Groundswell reduces resource utilization by 50% and training time by 80% over existing methods, while successfully inducing latency delays that exceed real-time thresholds for safety-critical systems.

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