Ben Gardiner, National Motor Freight Traffic Association Inc.
This paper presents a reverse engineering analysis of a firmware update for the Bendix EC80 Brake ECU, a critical component in heavy-duty vehicles. Unlike prior research focusing on CAN or UDS, this study isolates vulnerabilities in the legacy J2497 Power Line Carrier (PLC4TRUCKS) interface. We analyze the "ID9363" updater executable to extract firmware and perform differential binary analysis of the S12X architecture firmware images. Our research identifies specific changes in the recall that address undocumented vulnerabilities in J1587 PID processing and interrupt handling on J2497.
We demonstrate that the patched functionality contained critical flaws, including a write-where primitive and denial-of-service (DoS) conditions. These vulnerabilities were validated on a test bench and in a moving truck, where exploitation caused the loss of speedometer, dynamic steering, and automatic shifting. The findings confirm the safety recall remediation was also a security patch, mitigating risks in legacy protocol implementations. This work motivates the necessity of scrutinizing legacy interfaces in general in modern heavy vehicle safety systems, and the J2497 interface in particular.
Open Access Media
USENIX is committed to Open Access to the research presented at our events. Papers and proceedings are freely available to everyone once the event begins. Any video, audio, and/or slides that are posted after the event are also free and open to everyone. Support USENIX and our commitment to Open Access.

author = {Ben Gardiner},
title = {Reversing a Brake {ECU} Firmware Update},
booktitle = {4th USENIX Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec 26)},
year = {2026},
isbn = {978-1-939133-56-4},
address = {Baltimore, MD},
pages = {389--408},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/vehiclesec26/presentation/gardiner},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}
