Qinrun Dai, Kirby Linvill, Yueqi Chen, and Gowtham Kaki, University of Colorado Boulder
Vulnerability and exploit analysis are at the heart of soft- ware security research and practice. However, a formalization framework for dissecting the cause, development, and impact of common software errors has been missing. To address this gap, we introduce Lancet, a formalization framework that reliably tracks three distinct types of ownership within its operational semantics that can be used to identify and differ- entiate between various types of vulnerabilities and exploit primitives even in the presence of memory corruption. Addi- tionally, we developed two downstream tools, FCS and EPF, to demonstrate how security analysts can use Lancet for de- tailed crash and exploit analysis. FCS serves as a fast crash triaging tool, aiding patch synthesis in our winning system in the DARPA AIxCC semi-final, while EPF fingerprints the transition of exploitation primitives to facilitate exploit analy- sis. Experiment results show that both tools are efficient and effective.
Open Access Media
USENIX is committed to Open Access to the research presented at our events. Papers and proceedings are freely available to everyone once the event begins. Any video, audio, and/or slides that are posted after the event are also free and open to everyone. Support USENIX and our commitment to Open Access.
author = {Qinrun Dai and Kirby Linvill and Yueqi Chen and Gowtham Kaki},
title = {Lancet: A Formalization Framework for Crash and Exploit Pathology},
booktitle = {34th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 25)},
year = {2025},
isbn = {978-1-939133-52-6},
address = {Seattle, WA},
pages = {375--394},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/dai},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}


