Drifuzz: Harvesting Bugs in Device Drivers from Golden Seeds

Authors: 

Zekun Shen, Ritik Roongta, and Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, NYU

Abstract: 

Peripheral hardware in modern computers is typically assumed to be secure and not malicious, and device drivers are implemented in a way that trusts inputs from hardware. However, recent vulnerabilities such as Broadpwn have demonstrated that attackers can exploit hosts through vulnerable peripherals, highlighting the importance of securing the OS-peripheral boundary. In this paper, we propose a hardware-free concolic-augmented fuzzer targeting WiFi and Ethernet drivers, and a technique for generating high-quality initial seeds, which we call golden seeds, that allow fuzzing to bypass difficult code constructs during driver initialization. Compared to prior work using symbolic execution or greybox fuzzing, Drifuzz is more successful at automatically finding inputs that allow network interfaces to be fully initialized, and improves fuzzing coverage by 214% (3.1×) in WiFi drivers and 60% (1.6×) for Ethernet drivers. During our experiments with fourteen PCI and USB network drivers, we find twelve previously unknown bugs, two of which were assigned CVEs.

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {281316,
author = {Zekun Shen and Ritik Roongta and Brendan Dolan-Gavitt},
title = {Drifuzz: Harvesting Bugs in Device Drivers from Golden Seeds},
booktitle = {31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22)},
year = {2022},
isbn = {978-1-939133-31-1},
address = {Boston, MA},
pages = {1275--1290},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity22/presentation/shen-zekun},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug,
}

Presentation Video