SCRAPS: Scalable Collective Remote Attestation for Pub-Sub IoT Networks with Untrusted Proxy Verifier

Authors: 

Lukas Petzi, Ala Eddine Ben Yahya, and Alexandra Dmitrienko, University of Würzburg; Gene Tsudik, UC Irvine; Thomas Prantl and Samuel Kounev, University of Würzburg

Abstract: 

Remote Attestation (RA) is a basic security mechanism that detects malicious presence on various types of computing components, e.g., IoT devices. In a typical IoT setting, RA involves a trusted Verifier that sends a challenge to an untrusted remote Prover, which must in turn reply with a fresh and authentic evidence of being in a trustworthy state. However, most current RA schemes assume a central Verifier, which represents a single point of failure. This feature is problematic when mutually suspicious stakeholders are involved. Furthermore, scalability issues arise as the number of IoT devices (Provers) grows.

Although some RA schemes allow peer Provers to act as Verifiers, they involve unrealistic (for IoT devices) requirements, such as time synchronization and synchronous communication. Moreover, they incur heavy memory, computation, and communication burdens, while not considering sleeping or otherwise disconnected devices. Motivated by the need to address these limitations, we construct Scalable Collective Remote Attestation for Pub-Sub (SCRAPS), a novel collective RA scheme. It achieves scalability by outsourcing Verifier duties to a smart contract and mitigates DoS attacks against both Provers and Verifiers. It also removes the need for synchronous communication. Furthermore,RA evidence in SCRAPS is publicly verifiable, which significantly reduces the number of attestation evidence computations, thus lowering Prover burden. We report on a prototype of SCRAPS over Hyperledger Sawtooth (a blockchain geared for IoT use-cases) and evaluate its performance, scalability, and security aspects.

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {279932,
author = {Lukas Petzi and Ala Eddine Ben Yahya and Alexandra Dmitrienko and Gene Tsudik and Thomas Prantl and Samuel Kounev},
title = {{SCRAPS}: Scalable Collective Remote Attestation for {Pub-Sub} {IoT} Networks with Untrusted Proxy Verifier},
booktitle = {31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22)},
year = {2022},
isbn = {978-1-939133-31-1},
address = {Boston, MA},
pages = {3485--3501},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity22/presentation/petzi},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug,
}