Breaking Bridgefy, again: Adopting libsignal is not enough


Martin R. Albrecht, Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London; Raphael Eikenberg and Kenneth G. Paterson, Applied Cryptography Group, ETH Zurich


Bridgefy is a messaging application that uses Bluetooth-based mesh networking. Its developers and others have advertised it for use in areas witnessing large-scale protests involving confrontations between protesters and state agents. In August 2020, a security analysis reported severe vulnerabilities that invalidated Bridgefy's claims of confidentiality, authentication, and resilience. In response, the developers adopted the Signal protocol and then continued to advertise their application as being suitable for use by higher-risk users.

In this work, we analyse the security of the revised Bridgefy messenger and SDK and invalidate its security claims. One attack (targeting the messenger) enables an adversary to compromise the confidentiality of private messages by exploiting a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) issue, side-stepping Signal's guarantees. The other attack (targeting the SDK) allows an adversary to recover broadcast messages without knowing the network-wide shared encryption key.

We also found that the changes deployed in response to the August 2020 analysis failed to remedy the previously reported vulnerabilities. In particular, we show that (i) the protocol persisted to be susceptible to an active attacker-in-the-middle, (ii) an adversary continued to be able to impersonate other users in the broadcast channel of the Bridgefy messenger, (iii) the DoS attack using a decompression bomb was still applicable, albeit in a limited form, and that (iv) the privacy issues of Bridgefy remained largely unresolved.

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@inproceedings {279938,
author = {Martin R. Albrecht and Raphael Eikenberg and Kenneth G. Paterson},
title = {Breaking Bridgefy, again: Adopting libsignal is not enough},
booktitle = {31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22)},
year = {2022},
isbn = {978-1-939133-31-1},
address = {Boston, MA},
pages = {269--286},
url = {},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug,