Efficient Protection of Path-Sensitive Control Security


Ren Ding and Chenxiong Qian, Georgia Tech; Chengyu Song, UC Riverside; Bill Harris, Taesoo Kim, and Wenke Lee, Georgia Tech


Control-Flow Integrity (CFI), as a means to prevent control-flow hijacking attacks, enforces that each instruction transfers control to an address in a set of valid targets. The security guarantee of CFI thus depends on the definition of valid targets, which conventionally are defined as the result of a static analysis. Unfortunately, previous research has demonstrated that such a definition, and thus any implementation that enforces it, still allows practical control-flow attacks.

In this work, we present a path-sensitive variation of CFI that utilizes runtime path-sensitive point-to analysis to compute the legitimate control transfer targets. We have designed and implemented a runtime environment, PITTYPAT, that enforces path-sensitive CFI efficiently by combining commodity, low-overhead hardware monitoring and a novel runtime points-to analysis. Our formal analysis and empirical evaluation demonstrate that, compared to CFI based on static analysis, PITTYPAT ensures that applications satisfy stronger security guarantees, with acceptable overhead for security-critical contexts.

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@inproceedings {203656,
author = {Ren Ding and Chenxiong Qian and Chengyu Song and Bill Harris and Taesoo Kim and Wenke Lee},
title = {Efficient Protection of Path-Sensitive Control Security},
booktitle = {26th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 17)},
year = {2017},
isbn = {978-1-931971-40-9},
address = {Vancouver, BC},
pages = {131--148},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/presentation/ding},
publisher = {{USENIX} Association},