Source-Level Disengagement: A Usable Security Defense Against Misinformation

Zaid Hakami, Florida International University and Jazan University; Yuzhou Feng and Bogdan Carbunar, Florida International University

Misinformation defenses on social media mostly focus on individual posts, and do not address repeated exposure from the same misinformation-sharing accounts. We frame source-level disengagement as a usable security defense and study how interface design shapes adoption and escalation of such controls. We built TimeLineR, an instrumented timeline environment, and used it to run a within-subject lab study with 29 participants. We design and compare three interface designs that vary the visibility and timing of source-level defensive actions, and introduce a Filter action that hides misinformation-labeled posts from an account while preserving other content. We find that actionability increases defensive uptake: in-context controls substantially increased adoption in our controlled setting. Users select relationship-appropriate defenses, with the introduced Filter acting as a stable middle-ground endpoint.

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {325776,
author = {Zaid Hakami and Yuzhou Feng and Bogdan Carbunar},
title = {{Source-Level} Disengagement: A Usable Security Defense Against Misinformation},
booktitle = {Twenty-Second Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2026)},
year = {2026},
isbn = {978-1-939133-59-5},
pages = {565--581},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2026/presentation/hakami},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}