HTTPT: A Probe-Resistant Proxy

Authors: 

Sergey Frolov and Eric Wustrow, University of Colorado Boulder

Abstract: 

Recently, censors have been observed using increasingly sophisticated active probing attacks to reliably identify and block proxies. In this paper, we introduce HTTPT, a proxy designed to hide behind HTTPS servers to resist these active probing attacks. HTTPT leverages the ubiquity of the HTTPS protocol to effectively blend in with Internet traffic, making it more difficult for censors to block. We describe the challenges that HTTPT must overcome, and the benefits it has over previous probe resistant designs.

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {257172,
author = {Sergey Frolov and Eric Wustrow},
title = {{HTTPT}: A Probe-Resistant Proxy},
booktitle = {10th {USENIX} Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet ({FOCI} 20)},
year = {2020},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci20/presentation/frolov},
publisher = {{USENIX} Association},
month = aug,
}

Presentation Video