Vanessa Teague, The University of Melbourne
The Ancient Greeks could vote securely and privately with bronze disks and a wooden urn, so why can't we get it right using a sophisticated technology like the Internet? End-to-end verifiability gives voters the opportunity to verify that their vote matches their intention and is accurately included in a correct count. In this talk I'll explain what it is, how it works and why it can help us to run supervised poll site e-voting more flexibly and securely than paper alone. I'll describe its first deployment in a state election: the vVote project in Victoria, Australia. Then I'll discuss the open problems that need to be solved before we can safely run government elections over the Internet.
Vanessa Teague is a Senior Lecturer in the department of computing and information systems at the University of Melbourne, Australia. Her main research interest is in electronic voting, with a focus on cryptographic schemes for end-to-end verifiable elections and a special interest in complex voting schemes such as IRV. She was a major contributor to the Victorian Electoral Commission's end-to-end verifiable electronic voting project, the first of its kind to run at a state level anywhere in the world. With Alex Halderman, she recently discovered serious security vulnerabilities in the NSW iVote Internet voting system.
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