Skip to main content
USENIX
  • Conferences
  • Students
Sign in

connect with us


  •  Twitter
  •  Facebook
  •  LinkedIn
  •  Google+
  •  YouTube

twitter

Tweets by @usenix

usenix conference policies

  • Event Code of Conduct
  • Conference Network Policy
  • Statement on Environmental Responsibility Policy

You are here

Home ยป Remote Timing Attacks Are Practical
Tweet

connect with us

Remote Timing Attacks Are Practical

Abstract: 

Timing attacks are usually used to attack weak computing devices such as smartcards. We show that timing attacks apply to general software systems. Specifically, we devise a timing attack against OpenSSL. Our experiments show that we can extract private keys from an OpenSSL-based web server running on a machine in the local network. Our results demonstrate that timing attacks against network servers are practical and therefore security systems should defend against them.

David Brumley, Stanford University

Dan Boneh, Stanford University

BibTeX
@inproceedings {270176,
author = {David Brumley and Dan Boneh},
title = {Remote Timing Attacks Are Practical},
booktitle = {12th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 03)},
year = {2003},
address = {Washington, D.C.},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/12th-usenix-security-symposium/remote-timing-attacks-are-practical},
publisher = {{USENIX} Association},
month = aug,
}
Download

Links

Paper (HTML): 
http://www.usenix.org/events/sec03/tech/brumley/brumley_html/index.html
Paper: 
http://www.usenix.org/events/sec03/tech/brumley/brumley.pdf
Award: 
Best Paper
  • Log in or    Register to post comments

© USENIX

  • Privacy Policy
  • Conference Policies
  • Contact Us