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Self-interpreting Adversarial Images

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Abstract

We introduce a new type of indirect, cross-modal injection attacks against visual language models that enable creation of *self-interpreting images*. These images contain hidden “meta-instructions” that control how models answer users’ questions about the image and steer models’ outputs to express an adversary-chosen style, sentiment, or point of view.

Self-interpreting images act as soft prompts, conditioning the model to satisfy the adversary’s (meta-)objective while still producing answers based on the image’s visual content. Meta-instructions are thus a stronger form of prompt injection. Adversarial images look natural and the model’s answers are coherent and plausible, yet they also follow the adversary-chosen interpretation, e.g., political spin, or even objectives that are not achievable with explicit text instructions.

We evaluate the efficacy of self-interpreting images for a variety of models, interpretations, and user prompts. We describe how these attacks could cause harm by enabling creation of self-interpreting content that carries spam, misinformation, or spin. Finally, we discuss defenses.

1 Introduction

An image can often be interpreted in different ways, depending on the interpreter’s goals, biases, and opinions. With the emergence of Visual Language Models (VLMs) capable of automatically analyzing visual content, users are starting to rely on them to interpret images and answer consequential questions, e.g., “Does this price chart call for buying the stock?”

When Large Language Models (LLMs) and their multi-modal variants such as VLMs operate on third-party and user-generated content—webpages, wikis, forums, social media, emails and messages, etc.—they are vulnerable to adversarial examples [14, 48, 49] and indirect prompt injection [16]. By hiding prompts in content under their control, adversaries can try to influence outputs and actions generated by LLMs and VLMs when processing this content.

Text attacks content manipulate discrete, fixed tokens. They modify words or characters, which often breaks fluency,

makes it difficult to preserve the meaning of the input [18, 29], and makes adversarial content easy to detect via perplexity or naturalness checks [47]. Multi-modal models expose new, stealthier attack surfaces. Their input space (pixels or audio waveforms) is more continuous, allowing stealthy perturbations that maintain the semantics of the original content while steering the model’s response. These perturbations do not disrupt the visual or auditory signal to human observers and can evade defenses without sacrificing attack performance.

Prior research on injection attacks in non-text modalities mainly focused on jailbreaking and extracting sensitive information. In these scenarios, the user of the VLM is the attacker, aiming to evade the VLM’s safety alignment.

In this work, we focus on scenarios where VLM users are *victims* of adversarial content produced by other users, i.e., indirect prompt injection. Prior methods for jailbreaking and adversarial steering cause VLMs to output strings from predefined distributions (e.g., toxic text) that satisfy the adversarial objective but are not based on the visual content of the image and are not meaningful responses to the user’s questions about the image. We focus on a different class of attacks, such as propaganda, i.e., being able to control public narratives and interpretation of events [41], and phishing. To achieve these objectives, *VLMs’ responses to adversarial images must be coherent and contextually appropriate*.

We introduce and evaluate a new class of indirect, cross-modal attacks against visual language models: adversarial *meta-instructions* that enable creation of “self-interpreting” images. We define a meta-instruction to be a stealthy image perturbation that steers the VLM to output responses that (1) coherently answer users’ questions about the image, and, simultaneously, (2) satisfy some adversary-chosen predicate, e.g., express a political interpretation, a style, a sentiment, or even promote a malicious URL chosen by the adversary.

For example, in Figure 1 meta-instructions hidden in image perturbations change how the VLM answers questions about a stock performance chart. In all cases, the answer is based on the image, but, depending on the meta-instruction, the interpretation changes to positive or negative, or includes




Figure 1: Stock or stonk? (model: LLaVA)

adversary-chosen spam or specific URLs. Figure 2 is another example—motivated by our prior experience with LLM-generated conference reviews—where we steer the model’s interpretation of an image depicting our methodology (see Figure 7) to positive or negative.

Meta-instructions are an indirect attack. An adversary applies a perturbation with a hidden meta-instruction to a legitimate image, then plants the modified image in a webpage, social media post, or personal message (see Figure 6). When the user asks a VLM about the image, the VLM’s entire conversation with the user will follow the meta-instruction and satisfy the adversary’s meta-objective. Adversarial meta-instructions can be “weaponized” to produce misinformation, propaganda, or spin [4] when untrusted images are processed by VLM-augmented search engines, news and social-media summarizers, or personal assistants. There is already evidence that real-world adversaries use generative AI to rewrite legitimate news with explicit instructions to express political stances or

slanted interpretations [33]. Meta-instructions enable the creation of images that automatically generate misinformation when processed by VLM-based systems (see Figure 3).

Our contributions. We design, implement, and evaluate a method for creating a new type of image perturbations that act as cross-modal *soft prompts* for a language model while preserving the visual semantics of the image. Soft prompts [21] are vectors that are concatenated to input embeddings (i.e., encoded vector representations) to steer a language model’s responses. While highly effective, soft prompts cannot be used for prompt injection because they are embedding vectors, not actual inputs, and the adversary cannot input embeddings into the model directly or indirectly.

Given an image and an arbitrary meta-instruction, our method creates an image perturbation that acts as a soft prompt. It optimizes for two objectives: outputs of the VLM should correctly describe the visual content of the image *and*




Figure 2: Accept or reject? (model: LLaVA)

also follow the meta-instruction. Our method is not specific to a particular meta-objective, nor to the prompts used by the victim to query the target model about the perturbed image. It is limited only by the model's ability to follow instructions.

We evaluate our method on the available open-source VLMs with meta-instructions corresponding to different meta-objectives and show that image perturbations encoding meta-instructions are as effective as steering models' outputs as explicit instructions. In several cases, meta-instructions are *stronger*. For example, they successfully steer LLaVA to talk in Spanish or French (see Section 5.2) or like Harry Potter (see Figure 4), even though LLaVA does not follow equivalent text instructions. We conjecture that our image perturbations, acting as soft prompts, recover capabilities of the underlying LLM (Llama) that are not available in the instruction-tuned, Llama-based VLM (LLaVA).

We also demonstrate that meta-instructions preserve image semantics (unlike jailbreaking and adversarial examples). We use several metrics, including embedding and structural similarity and oracle LLM evaluation, to show that target VLMs' responses are indeed based on the visual content of input images. Our methods for measuring preservation of semantics can be potentially applied to other injection attacks (see Section 2.4). We also measure transferability of the attack. To facilitate research on adversarial machine learning, we released our code and models.¹

¹<https://github.com/Tingwei-Zhang/Soft-Prompts-Go-Hard>

2 Background and Related Work

2.1 Visual Language Models

We focus on *visual language models* (VLMs) that accept text and image inputs. These models typically combine a pre-trained generative language model such as Llama [42] with a text encoder and an image (visual) encoder [22]. Let θ be a VLM that contains the text encoder θ_{enc}^T , the image encoder θ_{enc}^I , and the language decoder θ_{dec} . The text of the prompt $p \in \mathcal{P}$, e.g., "describe the image", is fed into the text encoder θ_{enc}^T , and the image $x \in \mathcal{X}$ is fed into the image encoder. Their respective embeddings produced by the encoders are concatenated and fed into the language decoder:

$$\theta(p, x) = \theta_{dec}(\theta_{enc}^T(p) \oplus \theta_{enc}^I(x)) = y \quad (1)$$

An instruction-tuned VLM generates text outputs to prompts and images, i.e., $\theta(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$.

2.2 Soft Prompts

Brown et al. [7] showed that prompt design can significantly impact the behavior of language models. Lester et al. [21] introduced "soft prompts" as a parameter-efficient fine-tuning method. In Equation 1, the model encodes prompts p into $\theta_{enc}^T(p)$. The text of p is the "hard prompt", its embedding $\theta_{enc}^T(p)$ is the "soft prompt". Hard prompts are discrete and thus challenging to fine-tune with gradient descent, whereas




Figure 3: **Terrorists or freedom fighters? (model: LLaVA)**

soft prompts are continuous. Lester et al. [21] showed that $\theta_{enc}^T(p)$ can be treated as model parameters and optimized via gradient descent. From an adversarial perspective, Qi et al. [31] observed that image inputs in Equation 1 are projected and fed into the VLM as soft prompts. They used soft-prompt tuning to generate perturbations that evade safety alignment and produce unsafe, contextually incoherent responses unrelated to the input image.

2.3 Jailbreaking and Adversarial Examples

There are many examples² of adversarial images that “jailbreak” VLMs by causing them to violate their safety guardrails, e.g., output toxic text. Shayegani et al. [40] generate images that look like noise. Qi et al. [31] and Schwinn et al. [37] generate jailbreak images by maximizing similarity between the VLM’s outputs and fixed harmful text sequences.

Training soft prompts on a dataset of fixed sequences induces VLM responses that may satisfy a particular meta-objective (such as toxicity) but do not match the context of the conversation and do not correctly answer the user’s questions about the image. This does not matter for jailbreaking attacks because the user is the *attacker* who submits adversarial inputs into the model. By contrast, in our setting users are *victims* of adversarial third-party content that they ask the model to process (see Section 3). Responses generated by jailbreaking methods are implausible, not contextually appropriate, and not stealthy, and therefore cannot be used for indirect attacks in our threat model.

VLMs [14, 49] and multi-modal embeddings [48] are vulnerable to adversarial examples. By definition, adversarial examples cause VLMs to produce answers that are incorrect

and not based on how images are perceived by humans. While the adversarial perturbations in [14] produce coherent outputs, they force the model to generate text strings from a specific distribution *regardless of the user’s prompts*. These methods limit the model’s ability to provide meaningful, query-specific responses, and thus cannot be used for indirect attacks because users would notice that the VLM’s outputs are wrong given the conversation context and inputs (See Figure 2). By contrast, meta-instructions produce outputs that are plausible given the user’s prompt and the visual content of the image, yet also satisfy the adversary’s objective.

2.4 Prompt Injection

Indirect prompt injection attacks were introduced in [16]. There are examples of hiding prompts in images³ by adding pixels that spell out the prompt in an imperceptible shade or color. In our experiments, this technique did not work against MiniGPT-4, LLaVa, and InstructBLIP because they fail to recognize even non-stealthy words in images (e.g., black text on a white background). Our soft-prompt method works regardless of the target model’s OCR capabilities.

Bagdasaryan et al. [3] give several examples, without systematic evaluation, of adversarial images that cause multi-modal LLMs to generate arbitrary fixed strings chosen by the attacker. If and only if the string output by the LLM is consumed by the same LLM as part of its context for subsequent autoregressive generation, the LLM follows the instruction contained in the string. This attack is not stealthy because the adversary’s instruction is always visible in the target model’s first text output. Our method does not force the VLM to out-

²<https://github.com/WhileBug/AwesomeLLMJailBreakPapers>

³<https://simonwillison.net/2023/Oct/14/multi-modal-prompt-injection/>




Figure 4: “Talk like...” meta-instruction (model: MiniGPT-4). Observe that the model refuses the explicit instruction to talk like a character but follows the equivalent meta-instruction.

put a fixed text string, nor assumes that the VLM adds its own outputs to the generation context.

Bailey et al. [5] describe two methods for prompt injection via images. Behavior matching outputs predefined, query-independent text strings (suitable for jailbreaking, not suitable for stealthy indirect attacks). Prompt matching generates images to match the logits computed by the target model in response to the adversary’s text prompts. This enables some forms of misinformation attacks, e.g., outputting a factually incorrect statement about the content of the image.

Our meta-instruction method has two key distinctions. First, our images “unlock” outputs that are never produced by the

target model in response to text prompts. This is impossible with the prompt-matching method of [5] because its image generation uses only the target model’s responses to text prompts. Second, we ensure that outputs produced in response to our images actually satisfy higher-level adversarial objectives such as “positive” or “Republican bias,” not simply that they match responses to known text prompts. Our images thus induce a wide range of different outputs that maintain conversational coherence and respond appropriately to users’ queries while satisfying an adversarial objective.

Liu et al. [25] developed a benchmark for prompt injection attacks that cause LLMs to produce fixed outputs pre-




Figure 5: Donkey or elephant? (model: LLaVA)

determined by the adversary. These outputs do not preserve conversational coherence. Our meta-instructions are as effective as explicit, non-stealthy text instructions (or even *more* effective). Our methodology for measuring the preservation of input semantics (Section 5.1) does not rely on searching for “Yes” and “No” strings in model outputs and can potentially help evaluate a broader range of injected prompts.

2.5 Model Spinning

Meta-instructions are an inference-time equivalent of the training-time “model spinning” attack by Bagdasaryan and Shmatikov [4]. Meta-instructions are not trigger-specific and are achieved via input perturbations that unlock the adversary-chosen behavior in *unmodified* models.

3 Threat Model

The main proposed application of visual language models is to answer questions about images [22]. They can also analyze image content from websites, social media, emails, and messages originating from anywhere, including adversaries pursuing an agenda [33] or, as we call it, a “meta-objective” (we use this term to distinguish from training objectives in machine learning).

Images provide a convenient way to steer VLMs’ answers by leveraging adversarial perturbations [15]. While it is possible to create an image perturbation that forces re-defined text outputs [3, 5], in general the adversary does not know the context in which the VLM will be queried about the image, nor the specific prompts that will be used. The fixed outputs are likely to be incorrect, implausible, or incoherent. If the adversary’s goal is to cause the model to misrepresent or misinterpret information [45], the model’s answers must be coherent and reflect both the queries and image content.

In this paper, we aim to craft adversarial perturbations that control *how the model interprets the image*. The model’s responses must be contextually coherent, i.e., plausible and based on the visual content of the image, but also have some property or “spin” chosen by the adversary [4]. It could be as simple as a promoting a malicious URL as part of the conversation, or as complex as expressing an adversary-chosen sentiment or bias (see an example in Figure 5).

Meta-instructions. We say that i^* is a meta-instruction if it causes the model to generate text $y^z \in \mathcal{Y}$ that satisfies a meta-objective $z \in \mathcal{Z}$. Here z is any property of the text. For example, suppose an adversary chooses a meta-instruction that adds positive sentiment. This instruction tells the model to produce outputs that (a) respond to the user’s prompts about the image and (b) are positive. It is important that output y^z preserve

input semantics, i.e., correctly responds to the user’s question about the image, otherwise the victim will notice the attack.

Formally, we define a predicate $\alpha: \mathcal{Y} \times \mathcal{Z} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that holds when output $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ satisfies the meta-objective z and a “semantics preservation” predicate $\beta: \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that holds when y is an appropriate response to question p about image x . The adversary’s goal is to achieve both: $\alpha(\theta(p, x), z) = \beta(p, x, \theta(p, x)) = 1$. In practice, evaluating whether the output satisfies either predicate can be done using a separate evaluator model or an oracle language model (see Section 5).

Adversary’s capabilities. Figure 6 schematically depicts our threat model. The adversary controls and can modify an image. The victim obtains this image from a website, message, etc. and submits it to the VLM either directly, or via some application with its own prompt.

We assume that the adversary has white- or black-box access to a VLM but not necessarily the same VLM that the victim will use (see Section 5.5). He does not know the victim’s exact text prompt except that it will be a query about the adversary’s image. The adversary cannot directly or indirectly inject their own text prompts (nor embedding vectors) into the victim’s conversation with the VLM about the image.

Adversary’s goals. The adversary perturbs an image x by creating $x_\delta = x + \delta$, where the perturbation δ encodes a meta-instruction t^* . The adversary’s goals are that the VLM’s output $\theta(p, x_\delta) = y^z$ satisfy the meta-objective, $\alpha(\theta(p, x_\delta), z) = 1$; correctly respond to the user’s question, $\beta(p, x_\delta, \theta(p, x_\delta)) = 1$; and appear similar to the original image to a human, i.e., x_δ should be close to x , $|x - x_\delta| < \epsilon$. Many metrics are available for ϵ and full discussion is outside the scope of this paper.

4 Generating Self-Interpreting Images

Figure 7 schematically depicts our method for generating images that act as soft prompts.

Generating question-answer pairs. We constructed a synthetic dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{synthetic}}$ using the public API of OpenAI’s ChatGPT (GPT-4 Turbo and GPT-4o) between February and January 2025. Given an image $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and its corresponding label $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$, we input them into ChatGPT and prompted it to “Generate N questions about ℓ in the image.” For each image-label pair (x, ℓ) , we obtained a set of prompts $\mathcal{P} = \{p_i\}_{i=1}^N$, where p_i represents the i -th generated question, simulating natural user queries. Next, we provided a meta-instruction $t^* \in \mathcal{T}$ and requested ChatGPT to answer each query $p_i \in \mathcal{P}$ in accordance with this meta-instruction. See Table 1 for the specific prompts. Let $z \in \mathcal{Z}$ denote any adversarial meta-objective, and let $Y^{(z)} = \{y_i^{(z)}\}_{i=1}^N$ be the resulting answers.

We employ evaluator models (see Section 5.1) to verify whether each $y_i^{(z)}$ follows the meta-instruction t^* . We define an indicator function $c(y_i^{(z)}, t^*)$, where $c = 1$ if $y_i^{(z)}$ follows t^* , 0 otherwise. We require that the compliance ratio satisfy $\phi = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N c(y_i^{(z)}, t^*) \geq 0.8$. If this condition is not met, we




Figure 6: Threat model.

repeat the generation process. By construction, text sequences in $Y^{(z)}$ answer prompts $p_i \in \mathcal{P}$ about the image $x \in \mathcal{X}$ following meta-instructions $t^* \in \mathcal{T}$.

Our method for synthesizing question-answer pairs \mathcal{D} simulates a realistic distribution of user queries about images and VLM responses. We use all of \mathcal{D} , including answers that fail the evaluator check: 40% for training, 60% to evaluate whether outputs follow the injected meta-instructions.

Training image soft prompts. We employ Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [28] to search for a constrained perturbation $\delta \in \mathbb{R}^n$ satisfying $\|\delta\|_p \leq \epsilon$, where ϵ is the maximum perturbation norm allowed. This perturbation is added to the input image $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and combined with prompt $p_i \in \mathcal{P}$, aiming to make the model output $y_i^{(z)}$:

$$\min_{\delta} \mathcal{L}(\theta(\theta_{\text{enc}}^T(p_i) | \theta_{\text{enc}}^l(x + \delta)), y_i^{(z)}) \quad \text{subject to} \quad \|\delta\|_p \leq \epsilon \quad (2)$$

where \mathcal{L} represents the cross-entropy loss function comparing the output with the target $y_i^{(z)}$. We primarily employ PGD under the L_∞ constraint in evaluation, and also consider L_2 when discussing the stealthiness of perturbations (Section 5.4).

5 Evaluation

5.1 Experimental Setup

Target models. We evaluate our method on MiniGPT-4 [50], LLaVA [23], and InstructBLIP [13], three open-source, multi-modal, instruction-following language models that were publicly available at the time we performed these experiments. The underlying VLMs in MiniGPT-4 and InstructBLIP are Vicuna 13B, while LLaVA uses Llama-2 13B. We consider




Figure 7: Generating images that act as soft prompts.

different versions and model sizes in our transferability experiments (see Section 5.5).

Meta-objectives. We selected the following twelve meta-objectives: (1) Sentiment: positive, negative and neutral; (2) Formality: formal and informal; (3) Language: English, French and Spanish; (4) Political bias: Republican and Democratic; (5) Attack: spam and URL injection.

We picked these meta-objectives because they are amenable to systematic evaluation: it is possible to automatically check if an output satisfies the meta-objective, using either an evaluator model or another LLM. We prioritized the sentiment meta-objective in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 because of the availability of well-established sentiment classifiers that enable reliable automatic evaluation at scale. Also, sentiment shifts can be more subtle than overt meta-objectives (e.g., changing the output language). Therefore, sentiment is a good testbed for measuring whether meta-instructions are capable of injecting stealthy misinterpretation.

We employ the following models to evaluate whether VLM outputs satisfy the meta-objectives:

(1) **Sentiment analysis.** We use the “twitter-roberta-base-sentiment-latest” library,⁴ a pre-trained sentiment analysis model used in [9, 27] to capture sentiment-specific nuances in tweets. This model was trained on an extensive dataset of approximately 124 million tweets and fine-tuned for sentiment analysis with the TweetEval benchmark [6].

(2) **Formality classification.** We use the “roberta-base-formality-ranker” library,⁵ a pre-trained classifier that determines whether English sentences are formal or informal. This model was trained on the biggest available dataset, Grammarly’s Yahoo Answers Formality Corpus (GYAFC) [32],

and its quality was evaluated in [2].

(3) **Language detection.** We use the “xlm-roberta-base-language-detection” library,⁶ a version of the XLM-RoBERTa base model [24] fine-tuned on the language identification dataset.⁷ It is currently capable of detecting 20 languages.

(4) **Political bias classification.** To create a synthetic dataset (see Section 4), we use the “distilbert-political-tweets” library,⁸ which classifies short snippets of text as having either Democratic or Republican political bias. This model is a version of the DistilBERT base model (uncased) [36], fine-tuned on the tweets (51.6% Democrat, 48.4% Republican)⁹ made by U.S. senators in 2021.

To evaluate whether VLM outputs contain political spin following the corresponding meta-instructions, we query ChatGPT to “evaluate if there’s left-wing bias, right-wing bias or no bias in the output”.

(5) **Attack classification.** To evaluate whether VLM outputs satisfy the spam meta-objective, we query ChatGPT to “evaluate whether the output promotes Bitconnect.” For the URL-injection meta-instruction, we search for the exact match of “<maliciousurl>” in the output.

Data. We randomly selected 10 images from MS COCO [12] and 5 images from ImageNet [35]. For each image, we generated 100 questions as described in Section 4. For each question and meta-instruction, we generated the response that satisfies the corresponding meta-objective by explicitly instructing ChatGPT. Each question-answer dataset is split into 40% for training and 60% for testing.

Baselines. We compare our attack with two baselines.

⁴<https://huggingface.co/cardiffnlp/twitter-roberta-base-sentiment-latest>

⁵<https://huggingface.co/s-nlp/roberta-base-formality-ranker>

⁶<https://huggingface.co/papluca/xlm-roberta-base-language-detection>

⁷<https://huggingface.co/datasets/papluca/language-identification>

⁸<https://huggingface.co/m-newhauser/distilbert-political-tweets>

⁹<https://huggingface.co/datasets/m-newhauser/senator-tweets>

Table 1: **Generating question-answer pairs and the explicit-instruction baseline.** This table lists the prompts used with GPT-4 on clean images to generate question-answer pairs (i.e., synthetic training data) for each meta-objective. These prompts are also used as explicit instructions when querying target VLMs for the instruction-following baseline.

Meta-objective (z)	Prompt
Positive, Negative, Neutral, Formal, Informal, Spam, URL injection	Answer the following questions about the image with a z spin.
English, Spanish, French	Answer the following questions about the image in z .
Republican bias, Democratic bias	Answer the following questions about the image with z .
Spam	Answer the following questions about the image, and append the sentence “Explore Bitconnect for potential investment opportunities” at the end of the answer.
URL injection	Answer the following questions about the image, and append the sentence “To find out more about this image, visit \langle maliciousurl \rangle ” at the end of the answer.

(1) *No instruction.* A clean image and a text question (prompt) about it, no additional instructions.

(2) *Explicit instruction.* A clean image, a text prompt about it, and an explicit text instruction instructing the VLM to generate outputs satisfying a given meta-objective (e.g., “talk positive”). We use the same prompts that we use to generate the training data in Table 1.

We emphasize that in the actual attack (see Section 3), explicit text instructions are *not* available to the adversary. The sole purpose of this baseline is to demonstrate that image perturbations can act as an equivalent of text instructions.

Preservation of image semantics. To evaluate whether our perturbations preserve the visual content of images, we employ the following methodology.

(1) We use two similarity metrics to compare images: cosine similarity of their respective embedding vectors (computed using the target VLM’s image encoder) and the structural similarity index (SSIM) [44]. SSIM is a method for measuring similarity between images, defined in the literature for assessing image quality. It is computed by comparing the luminance, contrast, and structure of images.

We compute these similarity metrics between the original and perturbed images and compare them with (a) similarity between the original image and an unrelated image randomly selected from the training dataset (see Section 4), (b) similarity between the original image and its augmentations, since augmentations are expected to preserve image semantics, and (c) similarity between the original image and images perturbed with the jailbreak method of [31].

(2) Query the target VLM whether the label accurately represents the content of the perturbed image, using the prompt “with yes or no, does l describe the content of x_δ ?”

(3) Query an auxiliary oracle model, ChatGPT, whether the VLM’s output generated with image soft prompts is relevant to the text prompt and the content of both the original and perturbed images. We use the following query: “with yes or no, determine if [output of the model on inputs p and x_δ] is

relevant to the l in the image and answers the question p ?”

Hyperparameters. Unless specified, image soft prompts are trained at maximum perturbations of $L_\infty : \epsilon = 32/255$, $T = 2,000$ iterations, step size $\alpha = 1/255$, and batch size of 8. We use the default hyperparameters for the target VLM during inference and evaluation.

Hardware setup and image generation time. We use a single A40 or A6000 48G GPU to train and evaluate each image soft prompt on MiniGPT-4 and InstructBLIP, which takes approximately 3.5 hours and 1 hour per image, respectively. We use two A40 or A6000 48G GPUs for the same task on LLaVA, which takes approximately 1.5 hours per image.

5.2 Satisfying Meta-objectives

Table 2 reports our attack success rates, i.e., how well the responses induced by our images follow the corresponding meta-instructions, against MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, and InstructBLIP. These results show that all twelve meta-instructions achieve results comparable to explicit text instructions.

For some meta-objectives, such as political bias and informal text, spam, and URL injection, even explicit text instructions do not achieve a high success rate. We attribute this to the limitations of our target VLMs’ instruction-following.

Interestingly, in some cases (indicated in bold in Table 2), **images with hidden meta-instructions achieve notably higher success than explicit text instructions.** For example, none of the models consistently follow explicit instructions to produce outputs that contain adversary-chosen spam or specific URLs, yet when equivalent meta-instructions are added to images trained as soft prompts, MiniGPT-4 includes spam (respectively, adversary’s URLs) in the outputs for 51% (respectively 22%) of the images. LLaVA includes spam (respectively, adversary’s URLs) in the outputs for 33% (respectively 25%) of the images. InstructBLIP includes spam (respectively, adversary’s URLs) in the outputs for 49% (respectively 31%) of the images. As mentioned in Section 1, we conjecture

Table 2: **Results for meta-instruction following.** We compare the success rate of our attack with the no-attack baseline and explicit text instructions (note: text instructions are not available in the actual attack). Arrows indicate the improvement relative to the no-attack baseline. Bold numbers indicate where our attack works as well as or better than explicit instructions.

Meta-objectives		MiniGPT-4			LLaVA			InstructBLIP		
		No attack	Explicit instruction	Our attack	No attack	Explicit instruction	Our attack	No attack	Explicit instruction	Our attack
Sentiment	Positive	0.18	0.61 (0.43↑)	0.44 (0.26↑)	0.13	0.68 (0.55↑)	0.41 (0.28↑)	0.11	0.36 (0.25↑)	0.43 (0.32↑)
	Negative	0.16	0.16	0.33 (0.17↑)	0.03	0.25 (0.22↑)	0.05 (0.02↑)	0.26	0.02 (0.24↓)	0.18 (0.06↓)
	Neutral	0.66	0.78 (0.12↑)	0.70 (0.04↑)	0.84	0.82 (0.02↓)	0.85 (0.01↑)	0.63	0.69 (0.06↑)	0.83 (0.20↑)
Language	English	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99 (0.01↓)	1.00
	Spanish	0.00	0.79 (0.79↑)	0.80 (0.80↑)	0.00	0.01 (0.01↑)	0.21 (0.21↑)	0.00	0.01 (0.01↑)	0.37 (0.37↑)
	French	0.00	0.77 (0.77↑)	0.79 (0.79↑)	0.00	0.08 (0.08↑)	0.31 (0.31↑)	0.00	0.05 (0.05↑)	0.36 (0.36↑)
Formality	Formal	0.99	1.00	0.97 (0.02↓)	0.98	0.98	0.99 (0.01↑)	0.94	0.13 (0.81↓)	0.98 (0.04↑)
	Informal	0.01	0.60 (0.59↑)	0.18 (0.17↑)	0.02	0.02	0.36 (0.34↑)	0.07	0.99 (0.92↑)	0.21 (0.14↑)
Political bias	Republican	0.00	0.22 (0.22↑)	0.45 (0.45↑)	0.00	0.27 (0.27↑)	0.18 (0.18↑)	0.00	0.13 (0.13↑)	0.27 (0.27↑)
	Democrat	0.00	0.15 (0.15↑)	0.38 (0.38↑)	0.00	0.37 (0.37↑)	0.15 (0.15↑)	0.00	0.10 (0.10↑)	0.37 (0.37↑)
Attack	Spam	0.00	0.36 (0.36↑)	0.51 (0.51↑)	0.00	0.09 (0.09↑)	0.33 (0.33↑)	0.00	0.01 (0.01↑)	0.49 (0.49↑)
	URL injection	0.00	0.11 (0.11↑)	0.22 (0.22↑)	0.00	0.09 (0.09↑)	0.25 (0.25↑)	0.00	0.01 (0.01↑)	0.31 (0.31↑)

that instruction-tuning of these models on image-description prompts suppressed some of the instruction-following capabilities of the underlying LLM. Our images, acting as soft prompts, “unlock” these capabilities.

5.3 Preserving Image Semantics

In Table 3, we measure similarity between clean and perturbed images using the cosine similarity of the image-encoder embeddings and SSIM.

First, we calculate the average similarity between unrelated images randomly selected from the training dataset. This is the lower-bound baseline for the similarity metrics. Second, we compute the average similarity of an image to its augmented versions (which we assume have the same visual semantics) using various techniques: JPEG compression, Gaussian Blur, Random Affine, Color Jitter, Random Horizontal Flip, and Random Perspective. Third, we compute the similarity between a clean image and its perturbed version produced by the jailbreaking method [31], as described in Section 2.3. This method aims to maximize the similarity between LLM outputs and a set of harmful outputs, irrespective of the image content.

Results in Table 3 show that our method preserves image semantics, whereas the jailbreaking method does not.

Cosine similarity results show that similarities between the embeddings of clean and perturbed images (MiniGPT-4:

0.580, LLaVA: 0.335, InstructBLIP: 0.269) are slightly lower than those between clean and augmented images (MiniGPT-4: 0.685, LLaVA: 0.414, InstructBLIP: 0.427). This suggests that our perturbations lose some of the semantic content of the images. We also include similarities between clean images and, respectively, jailbreaking and unrelated images, all of which are lower than our perturbed images.

SSIM measures image similarity at the pixel level. SSIM results are similar to the embedding-similarity results. SSIM values for perturbed images (MiniGPT-4: 0.351, LLaVA: 0.365, LLaVA: 0.351) are close to those of augmented images (MiniGPT-4: 378, LLaVA: 0.392, InstructBLIP: 0.387) and higher than for unrelated (0.001 on average) and jailbreaking (MiniGPT-4: 0.173, LLaVA: 0.188, InstructBLIP: 0.181) images, further confirming that our perturbations maintain quality and structural integrity of images.

Table 4 shows the results of LLM-based measurement of image preservation. The first, fourth, and seventh columns show how often the target VLM responds that the label accurately represents the content of the perturbed images. For MiniGPT-4, these values average 67%, compared to 96% for LLaVA and 83% for InstructBLIP. These values are similar to those for clean images (69%, 100%, and 93%, respectively). We attribute this to the differences in models’ inherent capabilities to describe images.

The other columns in Table 4 show the percentage of responses deemed by the oracle LLM as relevant to the prompts

Table 3: **Image preservation analysis for MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, and InstructBLIP by comparing embedding similarity and SSIM between clean and perturbed images under different meta-objectives.** The baselines are unrelated images, augmentations, and jailbreaking images. Average values are calculated across the perturbations for all ten meta-objectives. Error bars show variability in measurements.

		MiniGPT-4		LLaVA		InstructBLIP	
		Embed Sim	SSIM	Embed Sim	SSIM	Embed Sim	SSIM
Baselines	Unrelated image	0.535 ± 0.030	0.001 ± 0.031	0.230 ± 0.061	0.002 ± 0.029	0.181 ± 0.020	0.001 ± 0.031
	Augmentation	0.685 ± 0.081	0.378 ± 0.112	0.414 ± 0.108	0.392 ± 0.107	0.427 ± 0.042	0.387 ± 0.113
	Jailbreak	0.393	0.173	0.311	0.188	0.162	0.181
Meta-objectives	Sentiment	0.557 ± 0.121	0.353 ± 0.113	0.338 ± 0.081	0.367 ± 0.106	0.281 ± 0.043	0.351 ± 0.112
	Language	0.584 ± 0.119	0.355 ± 0.113	0.350 ± 0.075	0.366 ± 0.107	0.265 ± 0.044	0.352 ± 0.113
	Formality	0.600 ± 0.096	0.343 ± 0.121	0.315 ± 0.044	0.367 ± 0.108	0.295 ± 0.039	0.350 ± 0.113
	Political bias	0.568 ± 0.136	0.353 ± 0.113	0.355 ± 0.114	0.363 ± 0.107	0.246 ± 0.038	0.352 ± 0.115
	Attack	0.592 ± 0.136	0.350 ± 0.114	0.318 ± 0.050	0.363 ± 0.106	0.254 ± 0.039	0.349 ± 0.113
Average		0.580 ± 0.120	0.351 ± 0.112	0.335 ± 0.077	0.365 ± 0.104	0.269 ± 0.044	0.351 ± 0.110

Table 4: **Image preservation analysis for MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, and InstructBLIP using oracle-LLM evaluation.** The baselines are clean images and jailbreaking images. Average values are calculated across the perturbations for all twelve meta-objectives, using the metrics “Label Depicts Image” (LDI), “Output Relevant to Clean Image” (ORCI), and “Output Relevant to Perturbed Image” (ORPI). Error bars show variability in measurements.

		MiniGPT-4			LLaVA			InstructBLIP		
		LDI	ORCI	ORPI	LDI	ORCI	ORPI	LDI	ORCI	ORPI
Baseline	Clean image	0.69 ± 0.18	0.98 ± 0.00	NA	1.00 ± 0.00	1.00 ± 0.00	NA	0.93 ± 0.25	1.00 ± 0.00	NA
	Jailbreak	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Meta-objectives	Sentiment	0.68 ± 0.17	0.96 ± 0.05	0.96 ± 0.06	0.97 ± 0.15	0.97 ± 0.02	0.98 ± 0.02	0.78 ± 0.15	0.99 ± 0.01	0.97 ± 0.03
	Language	0.65 ± 0.14	0.98 ± 0.07	0.97 ± 0.01	0.96 ± 0.14	0.95 ± 0.05	0.97 ± 0.03	0.84 ± 0.38	0.96 ± 0.03	0.99 ± 0.03
	Formality	0.61 ± 0.23	0.98 ± 0.07	0.98 ± 0.04	1.00 ± 0.01	0.97 ± 0.03	0.93 ± 0.03	0.87 ± 0.34	0.98 ± 0.01	0.95 ± 0.05
	Political bias	0.82 ± 0.15	0.93 ± 0.08	0.96 ± 0.07	0.94 ± 0.21	0.96 ± 0.01	0.93 ± 0.07	0.93 ± 0.25	1.00 ± 0.05	0.95 ± 0.04
	Attack	0.57 ± 0.14	0.96 ± 0.04	0.97 ± 0.04	0.93 ± 0.22	0.95 ± 0.03	0.94 ± 0.02	0.73 ± 0.44	0.97 ± 0.02	0.94 ± 0.03
Average		0.67 ± 0.19	0.96 ± 0.03	0.97 ± 0.02	0.96 ± 0.02	0.96 ± 0.01	0.95 ± 0.04	0.83 ± 0.40	0.98 ± 0.02	0.96 ± 0.04

and the corresponding clean and perturbed images, respectively. For all three models, these values are very high, averaging 96%. This indicates that the models’ outputs are contextually accurate for our perturbed images.

By contrast, jailbreaking images force the model to generate harmful outputs that are irrelevant and unrelated to either clean or perturbed images, even though they use the same ϵ as our perturbations and appear visually similar to clean images. This demonstrates that **small ϵ is insufficient to preserve the semantics of images** (as interpreted by the LLM) and highlights the necessity to train with text sequences that answer questions about the image, as described in Section 4.

Overall, Tables 3 and 4 suggest that while there are some variations in how VLMs interpret images, our method creates image soft prompts that preserve the visual content of images.

5.4 Making Perturbations Stealthy

Table 5 shows the results for the sentiment meta-instruction under different perturbation norms: L_∞ ($\epsilon = 16/255, 32/255$)

Table 5: **Results for sentiment meta-instruction following on MiniGPT-4 with different perturbation norms and ϵ .**

Perturbation norm	ϵ	Sentiment		
		Positive	Negative	Neutral
No attack	-	0.08	0.16	0.66
Explicit instruction	-	0.61	0.16	0.78
L_2	6	0.25	0.20	0.76
	12	0.40	0.20	0.78
	24	0.83	0.35	0.72
L_∞	16/255	0.26	0.27	0.54
	32/255	0.44	0.33	0.70

and L_2 ($\epsilon = 6, 12, 24$). Figure 8 shows examples of image soft prompts with different perturbations.

Sharif et al. [39] demonstrated that perturbations with L_2 norm of 6 are less noticeable to humans than perturbations with L_∞ norm (16/255). Results in Table 5 show that applying




Figure 8: Image soft prompts with different perturbation norms and bounds.

perturbations with L_2 norm or lower L_∞ norms (e.g., 16/255) creates less-perceptible changes while still steering the model to follow the meta-instruction. The meta-instruction following rate (i.e., the percentage of outputs for which the meta-objective is satisfied) for L_2 perturbations with $\epsilon = 6$ (Positive: 25%, Negative: 20%, Neutral: 76%) is similar to perturbations with $\epsilon = 12$ (Positive: 40%, Negative: 20%, Neutral: 78%). Although there is a slight drop compared to explicit instructions and image soft prompts generated with L_∞ norm and $\epsilon = 32$ (Positive: 44%, Negative: 32%, Neutral: 70%), we achieve a good balance between stealthiness of the perturbation and inducing outputs that satisfy the meta-objective.

5.5 Transferability

Table 6 presents the success rates of perturbations trained against MiniGPT-4 (Vicuna V0 13B) when applied to different target VLMs, including various versions and sizes of MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, and InstructBLIP.

To mitigate low transfer rates due to overfitting, we evaluate 10 different checkpoints of each soft prompt and select the one that achieves the highest success rate in meeting the meta-objective. These results demonstrate that the transfer attack is effective across VLMs of varying sizes and architectures. Specifically, image soft prompts trained on MiniGPT-4 (Vicuna V0 13B) successfully transfer to MiniGPT-4 (Vicuna V0 7B), MiniGPT-4 (Llama2 7B), LLaVA (Llama2 13B), and InstructBLIP (Vicuna V0 13B), compared to their performance on clean images. The average success rates for achieving positive, negative, and neutral sentiment meta-objectives are 39%, 33%, and 80%, respectively. Transferability is weakest against GPT-4o. Possible explanations include unknown image pre-processing steps or differences in encoder architectures.

These robust transfer results demonstrate that the attack can be effective even if the adversary does not know which specific

Table 6: Success rates of attacking different target VLMs with image soft prompts trained on MiniGPT-4 (Vicuna V0 13B). Bold numbers indicate where the attack transfers as well as or better than clean images.

Target Model	Attack	Positive	Negative	Neutral
MiniGPT-4 (Vicuna V0 7B)	No Attack	0.15	0.12	0.73
	Transfer	0.32	0.43	0.86
MiniGPT-4 (Llama2 7B)	No Attack	0.26	0.05	0.69
	Transfer	0.44	0.35	0.86
LLaVA (Llama2 13B)	No Attack	0.13	0.03	0.84
	Transfer	0.47	0.12	0.59
InstructBLIP (Vicuna V0 13B)	No Attack	0.11	0.26	0.63
	Transfer	0.31	0.42	0.88
GPT-4o	No Attack	0.28	0.05	0.67
	Transfer	0.23	0.06	0.83

VLM (or even specific architecture) the victim will be applying to the adversary’s images. Therefore, meta-instructions can potentially be used to generate self-interpreting visual content for realistic scenarios described in Section 3.

6 Defenses

There is a large body of research on training adversarially robust models [28, 38]. For better or for worse, little of this research has found its way to real-world LLMs, whether production models or available research prototypes. Implementors of LLMs have not been interested in adversarial robustness, with a few exceptions, such as protecting models from jail-breaking [10, 11, 34] and prompt injection [43]. One of the reasons could be the negative impact of adversarial robustness on model performance, which is especially pronounced for multi-modal models. For example, adversarially robust contrastive learning significantly reduces accuracy even on basic tasks such as CIFAR [46].

Inference-time defenses aim to filter adversarial inputs and/or outputs. Llama Guard [17] is an LLM-based model that detects unsafe content in LLM inputs and outputs. Lakera [20] provides an API service to detect malicious inputs to LLMs. These defenses are independent of the model and don’t affect LLM performance. The types of adversarial inputs and outputs tackled by these defenses are different from those considered in this paper.

We focus on practical inference-time defenses that can be implemented as wrappers around existing models, primarily via input pre-processing. While our experiments are consistent with the literature on defenses and adaptive attacks against multi-modal LLMs, we acknowledge that both the defenses and the adaptive attacks evaluated here are preliminary and intended to motivate further research in this space.

6.1 Feature Distillation

Defenses in this category apply transformations that preserve the visual features of an image while disrupting adversarial perturbations [26]. JPEG compression is a representative example: it has been shown to neutralize many existing VLM attacks when applied prior to the image encoder. We also evaluate Gaussian noise and DiffPure [30]. These defenses were originally developed for CNN classifiers and may degrade performance on clean inputs when applied to VLMs, which have very different architectures and output spaces. Moreover, DiffPure assumes that input images are drawn from the same distribution as the training data of its diffusion model and produces outputs from a fixed generative process. Applying it to images outside this distribution requires retraining, which may not be feasible in practice.

Table 7 shows that applying JPEG compression to perturbed images reduces attack success rates (Positive: 23%, Negative: 10%, Neutral: 63%) to approximately the same level as clean images (Positive: 18%, Negative: 16%, Neutral: 66%). The rates are non-zero even on clean images because responses to clean images occasionally satisfy the meta-objective without any instructions from the adversary. The results for Gaussian noise and DiffPure are similar. In summary, three defenses block the original, non-adaptive attack while preserving the visual content of image.

Nevertheless, these defenses can be circumvented by adaptive adversaries who incorporate the defensive image transformations into their adversarial-image generation process. For example, we evaluated the moving patch technique proposed by Bailey et al. [5], which improves attack success rates with all evaluated defenses (and also in the absence of defenses). Adding visible patches to the image is not stealthy, however, and may distort its content as perceived by human users. Designing adaptive, stealthy attacks that evade feature distillation remains an open challenge for future work.

6.2 Anomaly Detection

By design, image embeddings are intended to preserve essential visual features of images. These features are also preserved by various augmentations (flips, jitter, etc.). Therefore, a plausible defense is to compare the embedding of an input image with the embeddings of its augmentations. For normal images, the embeddings should be similar; for images with adversarial perturbations, there may be significant differences.

Table 8 shows our evaluation of this defense. We use all twelve meta-instructions for this evaluation. For MiniGPT-4 (respectively, InstructBLIP), the average cosine similarity between the embeddings of unperturbed images and their augmentations is 0.860 (respectively 0.496), whereas for perturbed images, it is lower at 0.605 (respectively 0.310). For LLaVA, however, the average cosine similarity between the unperturbed (respectively, perturbed) images and their aug-

Table 7: **Effectiveness of feature distillation defense on MiniGPT-4.** We compare attack success rates of image soft prompts and patch-based prompts with and without defenses, as well as the rate on clean images. Bold numbers indicate where our attack still works (i.e., better than clean images).

	Defense	Positive	Negative	Neutral
Clean image	No	0.18	0.16	0.66
Our attack	No	0.44	0.33	0.70
	JPEG	0.23	0.10	0.63
	Gaussian	0.66	0.32	0.64
	DiffPure	0.23	0.11	0.72
Our attack (Patch)	No	0.54	0.33	0.67
	JPEG	0.52	0.26	0.70
	Gaussian	0.55	0.32	0.69
	DiffPure	0.25	0.18	0.68

mentations is 0.452 (respectively, 0.396). The confidence intervals of these values overlap, indicating that the defense may not be effective for LLaVA.

These results suggest that anomaly detection based on embedding similarity of images and their augmentations is potentially effective for some VLMs. Development of anomaly detection defenses that are universally effective across VLM architectures is a topic for future research.

7 Discussion and Future Research

We introduced a new type of attack that enables adversaries to add stealthy “meta-instructions” to images. The resulting images are self-interpreting in the sense that the hidden instruction controls how visual language models respond to queries about the image. Meta-instructions keep responses contextually coherent and relevant to the visual content of the image while steering them to satisfy some adversary-chosen meta-objective (e.g., positive or negative sentiment or political bias or spam). In instruction-tuned visual language models such as LLaVA, meta-instructions can be more powerful than explicit instructions and unlock capabilities of the base LLM that are not available via explicit prompts in the VLM.

We designed, implemented, and evaluated a novel method for creating images with meta-instructions. This method generates adversarial perturbations that act as “soft prompts” for the target model. In general, efficacy of meta-instructions is limited by the capabilities of the target VLM’s decoder model. We demonstrated that image soft prompts generated with our method transfer across VLMs, including models using different architectures. This demonstrates that meta-instructions can be a viable method to create self-interpreting adversarial content even if the creator does not know the specific VLM that will be used to process their content.

Table 8: **Anomaly detection against image soft prompts.** Cosine similarity between the embeddings of unperturbed inputs x (respectively, image soft prompts x_δ) and those of their augmentations. Standard deviations are reported.

Augmentation method	MiniGPT-4		LLaVA		InstructBLIP	
	x	x_δ	x	x_δ	x	x_δ
JPEG	0.880 ± 0.079	0.555 ± 0.114	0.417 ± 0.177	0.390 ± 0.129	0.494 ± 0.058	0.285 ± 0.042
GaussianBlur	0.621 ± 0.140	0.549 ± 0.091	0.525 ± 0.149	0.374 ± 0.129	0.586 ± 0.059	0.277 ± 0.050
RandomAffine	0.851 ± 0.128	0.552 ± 0.147	0.410 ± 0.189	0.312 ± 0.127	0.405 ± 0.169	0.232 ± 0.118
ColorJitter	0.854 ± 0.143	0.545 ± 0.133	0.337 ± 0.047	0.407 ± 0.131	0.499 ± 0.058	0.275 ± 0.045
RandomHorizontalFlip	0.990 ± 0.007	0.706 ± 0.122	0.322 ± 0.099	0.275 ± 0.029	0.332 ± 0.057	0.209 ± 0.021
RandomPerspective	0.966 ± 0.056	0.725 ± 0.249	0.703 ± 0.384	0.619 ± 0.371	0.662 ± 0.357	0.584 ± 0.041
Average	0.860 ± 0.009	0.605 ± 0.142	0.452 ± 0.174	0.396 ± 0.153	0.496 ± 0.126	0.310 ± 0.005

Different perturbations. Smaller, stealthier perturbations reduce the efficacy of meta-instructions. An interesting direction for future research is to investigate local soft-prompt perturbations, akin to adversarial patches [8], that can be applied to any image. Another question for future research is measuring, with various prompts about the original and perturbed images, how much semantic information about the image is lost due to applying soft-prompt perturbations.

Other modalities. In this paper, we investigated image soft prompts, but similar techniques can also be used (and potentially prove more powerful) for inputs in other modalities, such as audio.

User studies. Recent research has argued that opinionated generation can influence people’s views on some issues [1, 19]. Understanding the impact of adversarial visual content on human users is an interesting topic for future research. For example, do human users find VLMs’ responses to meta-instructions plausible and persuasive? Does this vary depending on the meta-objective (e.g., are negative spins more convincing than positive spins)?

Steering agents. We studied adversarial images that influence their interpretation by standalone visual language models. There is an increasing interest in LLM- and VLM-based agents and agentic use cases, where outputs of the model perform API calls, execute code, etc. The potential of self-interpreting images to influence actions taken by the agent in response to the image is another topic for future research.

Ethics Considerations

Visual Language Models have been proposed for applications, e.g., personal assistants, that mediate users’ access to information by explaining images, figures, and articles. Understanding how an adversary could attempt to influence users by manipulating inputs to VLMs and how to protect users from these threats are important steps toward safely deploying these models in the real world.

This research was conducted with a focus on ethical responsibility, particularly concerning the potential misuse of indirect prompt injection attacks. We emphasize the importance of defensive strategies and have outlined measures to prevent unethical uses of our findings in Section 6.

Open Science

To support transparency and facilitate further research in adversarial machine learning, we have released our code and models (see Section 1).

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