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# Why Aren't We Using Passkeys? Obstacles Companies Face Deploying FIDO2 Passwordless Authentication

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## Abstract

When adopted by the W3C in 2019, the FIDO2 standard for passwordless authentication was touted as a replacement for passwords on the web. With FIDO2, users leverage passkeys (cryptographic credentials) to authenticate to websites. Even though major operating systems now support passkeys, compatible hardware is now widely available, and some major companies now offer passwordless options, both the deployment and adoption have been slow. As FIDO2 has many security and usability advantages over passwords, we investigate what obstacles hinder companies from large-scale deployment of passwordless authentication. We conducted 28 semi-structured interviews with chief information security officers (CISOs) and authentication managers from both companies that have and have not deployed passwordless authentication, as well as FIDO2 experts. Our results shed light on the current state of deployment and perception. We highlight key barriers to adoption, including account recovery, friction, technical issues, regulatory requirements, and security culture. From the obstacles identified, we make recommendations for increasing the adoption of passwordless authentication.

## 1 Introduction

On the web, passwords remain the dominant form of user authentication [13, 48]. Unfortunately, phishing and credential-stuffing attacks against passwords continue to cause extensive damage even among well-protected online services [93, 96]. Reinforcing passwords by deploying two-factor authentication [40, 77], risk-based authentication [59, 95], and account-security notifications [41, 58, 87], as well as promoting the use of password managers [60, 73] are incomplete solutions to the security problems of relying on passwords [13, 14, 48].

A decade ago, Grosse and Upadhyay [45] described an internal pilot of a USB hardware token that “protects against phishing” and “makes the server side immune to database theft.” Shortly after, the Fast IDentity Online (FIDO) Alliance was founded to develop and promote authentication standards that “reduce the world’s reliance on passwords.”

Building on earlier efforts to enhance multi-factor authentication, the FIDO Alliance’s *FIDO2* suite of protocols foregrounds passwordless, single-factor authentication for the web. As detailed in Section 2, a user’s *authenticator*—either specialized hardware (e.g., a YubiKey) or software running on an existing device—generates a unique asymmetric cryptographic keypair bound to a particular website. The private key is kept on the user’s authenticator; the website holds the public key. To log in, the user authenticates locally to their authenticator (e.g., with a biometric or PIN), which then uses the private key to authenticate to the remote website. Around the time the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) adopted FIDO2 as a web standard in 2019, media coverage focused on how FIDO2 would “kill the password” [39, 64, 74].

Starting in 2021, Apple, Google, Microsoft, and others announced *passkeys*, which are multi-device credentials following the FIDO2 standard. In part, passkeys are a rebranding of the existing FIDO2 approach, though they add features for syncing private keys across a user’s devices (to avoid needing to re-register on each device) or using a single existing device (e.g., phone) as the authenticator across all devices. The popular media again heralded passkeys as the technology that would “kill the password” [16, 66, 69, 81].

Today, most major operating systems and browsers support FIDO2-based passwordless authentication [34]. Researchers have analyzed FIDO2’s security [9, 11, 46] and usability [27, 28, 55, 57, 70, 71], finding FIDO2 more secure and usable than passwords. The FIDO Alliance and W3C have working groups dedicated to driving FIDO2 adoption [36]. It is thus surprising that, to date, only a few companies have deployed passwordless authentication, widely or at all.

We investigate why we are not using FIDO passwordless authentication by answering the following research questions:

**RQ1** *How aware are companies about FIDO?*

**RQ2** *What are their experiences deploying FIDO?*

**RQ3** *What challenges do companies face deploying FIDO?*

**RQ4** *How do companies prioritize certain obstacles?*

To this end, we conducted 28 semi-structured interviews with three types of stakeholders: (1) companies and organiza-

tions with user-facing web properties, including both those that have and have not deployed passwordless authentication; (2) vendors selling passwordless solutions to businesses; and (3) experts contributing to the FIDO2 standard. We recruited participants in a number of ways, including with help from the FIDO Alliance, enabling us to recruit chief information security officers (*CISOs*), security engineers working on authentication, and identity management leaders. Such participants are typically difficult to recruit for academic research.

Our interviews aimed to understand participants' experiences with passwordless authentication in their own organizations, identify obstacles their organizations faced deploying passwordless authentication, and elicit participants' personal opinions about the FIDO2 standard. The protocol included a card-sorting task to rate potential deployment challenges.

Around half of our participants had experience deploying FIDO-based protocols either for passwordless or two-factor authentication (*2FA*). The biggest obstacles to FIDO2 deployment participants reported relate to fallback authentication and recovery options, complexity and friction due to the drastic change, technical issues like browser support and revocation options, regulatory requirements, and security culture. We also identify both concerns and misconceptions regarding passkeys. The results of our card-sorting task reveal a mismatch between what organizations considering deploying FIDO2 believe to be pressing obstacles compared to the beliefs of FIDO experts and identity and access management (*IAM*) vendors. Even though we observe widespread agreement that FIDO2 will play a major role in making passwords obsolete in many web use cases, legacy systems make it impossible to eliminate passwords quickly. Our results suggest that FIDO2 will not eliminate passwords completely, but has the potential to reduce the number of passwords used.

Collectively, our findings provide the first comprehensive examination of obstacles and perceptions related to FIDO-based passwordless authentication. We discuss recommendations for industry and outline future research for increasing the adoption of passwordless authentication.

## 2 Background

Next, we introduce the FIDO2 standard and explore related work on passwordless authentication and studying *CISOs*.

### 2.1 FIDO2, WebAuthn, and Passkeys

The FIDO Alliance is an industry association developing and promoting passwordless authentication based on public-key cryptography. Its earlier Universal 2nd Factor (*U2F*) protocol enables cryptographic two-factor authentication [45]. All of its protocols have advantages over passwords: they are fast when used with biometrics [55], they are phishing resistant [90], and secrets are only stored locally.

The *FIDO2* W3C standard consists of two protocols. Web Authentication (*WebAuthn*) [50] describes a JavaScript interface that allows a *relying party* (e.g., a website) to perform a passwordless challenge-response protocol with a *client* (e.g., a web browser). The companion Client to Authenticator Protocol (*CTAP*) [15] specifies the communication between a cryptographic authenticator (e.g., a hardware security key or smartphone) and a client. In FIDO2, the user authenticates by proving their possession of the private key. Specifically, they create a signature that can be verified using the corresponding public key stored on the server during registration. To prevent unauthorized use, the user authenticates locally to their device (e.g., using a PIN or biometric) before the private key is used for signing. The protocol has been formally verified [9, 11].

FIDO2 differentiates between *platform authenticators* (those integrated with a device) and *roaming authenticators* (those that can be used across multiple devices). Example platform authenticators include *Microsoft's Windows Hello* and *Apple's Touch ID* when used exclusively for authentication on a given device. While roaming authenticators canonically included hardware like USB keys that could be plugged into different devices, recent smartphones can be used as roaming authenticators for cross-device authentication [71, 72]. For security, the private key and biometrics templates should be isolated from the main processor and OS (e.g., on a TPM).

Relying parties can specify authenticator types they support (roaming, platform, or both) and whether to require *user verification* via local authentication (e.g., with a PIN or biometric) or just *user presence* (e.g., pressing a button on the security key). Common use cases for user verification include passwordless authentication as offered by Adobe, eBay, Google, Microsoft, PayPal, or Yahoo [2]. In contrast, user presence is commonly used in 2FA scenarios in which a security key is used in conjunction with a password.

To increase the usability of FIDO2, the FIDO Alliance recently standardized *passkeys* [30]. Passkeys are multi-device FIDO2 credentials that third parties may synchronize over the cloud, removing the burden on the user to register multiple devices to the same website and offering convenient recovery in case of device loss or theft. Apple and Google report that their passkey synchronization is end-to-end encrypted [7, 12].

### 2.2 Related Work

**FIDO2:** Prior work on FIDO2 adoption has mainly studied client-side usability challenges. Lyastani et al. randomly assigned 94 participants to configure an account using either a YubiKey or a password [57], finding that participants preferred FIDO2 passwordless authentication over a password. However, several concerns were raised: recovering accounts if the security key is lost, hardware compatibility, and a lack of mental models explaining passwordless authentication. Farke et al. conducted a similar study with a small software company [28]. Nine participants used a YubiKey



during their daily work routine, keeping a diary of when they authenticated. Participants responded positively to security keys, citing ease of use, intuitiveness, and convenience. Some also gave up on using the key, mistakenly thinking it did not provide security benefits or feeling it was slower than using their browser’s password manager. Nawrath had 161 participants attempt passwordless registration using devices they already owned, finding a lack of platform/browser support to be a key barrier [65]. Lassak et al. studied user perceptions of biometric WebAuthn [55], finding that 67% of participants mistakenly thought biometric data was stored remotely.

Some work has examined FIDO2 from the developer’s perspective, though only on a small scale. Alam et al. [4] briefly outlined some conceptual limitations of developers implementing WebAuthn by analyzing discussions in the WebAuthn developer community. These limitations included a lack of deployment-ready solutions, wrong mental models about WebAuthn, and confusing technical details in the FIDO2 specification. Bicakci and Uzunay [10] briefly discussed potential challenges using FIDO2 as passwordless authentication, such as the lack of a convenient recovery method or support for sharing credentials. Casey et al. proposed a new protocol on top of WebAuthn because businesses may not be able to implement current FIDO2 solutions to comply with their policies [18]. We instead interviewed various FIDO2 stakeholders to gather their perspectives on the current challenges and necessary changes for large-scale deployment of FIDO2.

**Studying CISOs:** Our methods are also motivated by previous studies interviewing CISOs and security professionals in industry. Reinfelder et al. explored how security managers handle user requirements and behaviors by interviewing seven managers from large German companies [78], utilizing snowball sampling to recruit this hard-to-reach population. Haney et al. interviewed 28 cybersecurity advocates to understand how they overcome negative user perceptions of security and motivate the adoption of best-practice security measures [47]. Hielscher et al. interviewed 30 CISOs to understand whether foundational concepts from human-centered security are used in practice [49], while Ashenden et al. interviewed five CISOs from global companies to understand their approach to security [8]. Wolf et al. interviewed 27 CISOs to identify how to improve security in small businesses [97]. Similar to prior work, we utilized semi-structured interviews and snowball sampling, among other recruitment methods. Doing so enabled us to recruit 32 participants across 28 interviews.

### 3 Methods

We first describe how we generated a list of potential FIDO2 obstacles based on a literature review. We then outline our interview protocol, recruitment, and participant demographics before presenting limitations and ethical considerations.

Table 1: Potential obstacles based on our literature review.

	ID	Description
Necessity	N1	Customers are happy
	N2	Passwords are good enough
	N3	Passwords are not problematic with password managers
	N4	Secure enough with 2FA
	N5	Usability good enough with SSO
Usability	U1	No standardized fallback
	U2	Unclear handling of lost or stolen devices
	U3	Unclear handling for new devices
	U4	Unclear handling with multiple devices
	U5	Customers do not use biometrics
	U6	Roaming authenticators are not usable
	U7	Change causes friction
	U8	Customers would not switch
Deployability	D1	Libraries and frameworks do not exist
	D2	Libraries and frameworks are incomplete
	D3	Libraries and frameworks are not understandable
	D4	Libraries and frameworks written in wrong language
	D5	Need to support both passwords and FIDO
	D6	Cannot get rid of passwords entirely
	D7	Browsers do not have all functionality
	D8	User interface is OS-dependent
IT Management	M1	No need to talk to them
	M2	They do not let us talk
	M3	They do not understand
	M4	Policy forbids open-source software
	M5	Policies do not allow biometrics
	M6	Waiting for peer organizations
Finance	F1	Investment is unclear
	F2	Implementing FIDO too expensive
	F3	New communication and interfaces are expensive
Comm.	C1	FIDO incompatible with UX guidelines
	C2	Need to brand FIDO2
	C3	Unclear how to communicate about FIDO2
	C4	Design questions are hard

### 3.1 List of Potential Obstacles

Between January and May of 2022, we compiled a list of obstacles to FIDO2 deployment discussed in prior work and artifacts from the W3C and FIDO Alliance’s working group meetings, as detailed below. Table 1 presents the resultant list, which we used as part of our card-sorting task.

**Prior Papers:** Using search terms like “FIDO,” “FIDO2,” “passkeys,” and “WebAuthn” on Google Scholar, we collected potentially related scientific papers. From this list, we identified papers that covered security aspects of FIDO2 [5, 90], implementation issues [4, 75], deployments [70], user experiences [20, 23, 55, 57, 65, 89], roaming authenticators [28, 71, 72], and fallback solutions [54, 85]. Work about security proofs [9, 19] was out of scope. We also looked at non-FIDO2 work about the adoption of other security mechanisms, such as HTTPs [53, 88], 2FA [21, 80], and password managers [60].

**Online Resources:** We also analyzed online resources, such as articles and blog posts from IAMs like Okta [84] and services like Microsoft [61] and eBay [52] that had already




Figure 1: Prospective participants provided demographics and contact details in an eligibility survey. Selected participants were invited to a 45-minute interview about FIDO2 that included a card-sorting task about potential deployment obstacles.

deployed FIDO. We also examined case studies published by the FIDO Alliance covering deployments at services like login.gov, Visa, and NTT [31] from 2017 to 2021.

**W3C and FIDO Working Group Resources:** Artifacts produced by W3C and FIDO working groups, especially those dealing with adoption (e.g., the user experience working group) [36], also contributed to our list of potential obstacles. We focused on the W3C Web Authentication WG and WebAuthn Adoption CG’s open GitHub issues [99], mailing list, and meeting minutes [98, 100], and the official “FIDO Dev” mailing list [33]. We decided against including highly specific issues as our target interviewees would most likely not be deeply versed in the protocols’ implementation details.

Two researchers coded all resources in an open-coding process resulting in the first version of what we call our “list of potential obstacles.” These coders had backgrounds in cybersecurity and deep familiarity with the FIDO standards and ecosystem. In cooperation with the entire research team, we categorized and refined the list through multiple discussion sessions. We also sought input from external practitioners working at IAMs, as well as FIDO experts with whom we are in personal contact. The final list can be seen in Table 1. In the text, we refer to specific obstacles with their identifier (e.g., N1 = “Customers are happy”).

### 3.2 Interview Structure

Figure 1 summarizes the interview structure. Our extended version [56] contains the full interview script. Questions differed slightly across our three stakeholder groups: (1) “Organizations,” or companies deploying FIDO for their employees or customers; (2) “IAMs,” or companies that sell authentication solutions to other companies; and (3) “FIDO experts,” or participants in FIDO Alliance working groups [36].

Interviews began with the moderator asking participants whether they had any questions about the consent form, which we shared via email prior to the interview. After the participant consented, we started an audio recording. We reassured participants that no identifiable information—particularly company names—would be disclosed outside the research team. We then asked participants about their company and role, as well as their experience in the field of authentication.

The interview’s main section began with a discussion of the general authentication infrastructure in the participant’s

organization for both employees and customers. When not mentioned explicitly, we prompted for specific features (e.g., 2FA) to ensure a comprehensive overview. We also instructed participants to share their positive and negative experiences about authentication at their organization. Aside from FIDO experts, we then assessed participants’ knowledge of FIDO and answered any questions they raised about FIDO protocols. Next, we directed the conversation toward the use of FIDO in their organization. For participants whose organizations had already adopted any FIDO authentication options (termed *adopters*), we asked about their experience with deployment, feedback they had received, and what the biggest obstacles had been to date. We also discussed the decisions that had led to the deployment. For the others (*non-adopters*), we asked whether there had been any internal discussions about adoption and what they felt were the key arguments in favor of, and against, FIDO. We explicitly asked what it would take for their organization to adopt it. If participants did not bring up passkeys specifically, we solicited their opinion on them.

In an interactive card-sorting task on a digital whiteboard (see extended version [56]), 18 participants then rated our list of potential obstacles (Table 1) by perceived severity. We asked them to narrate their thought process in a “think-aloud” manner. They could rate obstacles as *major* (“a deal-breaker almost on its own”), *minor* (“in conjunction with other minor obstacles impedes the deployment”), or *not an obstacle*. The remaining participants ran out of time for this activity.

### 3.3 Recruitment / Participant Demographics

Apart from FIDO experts, our target participant group was CISOs. We also accepted security engineers and developers with extensive experience in authentication alongside decision-making responsibility in their organization. We emphasized that no specialized knowledge about FIDO was required to participate as we were particularly interested in the perspectives of organizations that had not yet adopted FIDO. As we had a very specific, hard-to-reach target group, we used a variety of recruitment strategies. First, we created a recruitment website that summarized the study, addressed concerns about privacy and confidentiality, and linked to the eligibility survey. We posted on social media, including LinkedIn and Twitter, and we also directly contacted people from our personal networks. We also reached out to the FIDO AI-

Table 2: Summary of participants and their organizations. For anonymity, numbers are binned and some fields are blinded. “FIDO Experts” contributed to FIDO development. “IAM” participants sell identity and access management solutions.

	ID	FIDO		Participant		Organization		
		Depl.	Expert.	Job Role	Years	Sector	Size	CC
FIDO Expert	E1	N/A	***	Blinded	>20	FIDO All.	10-49	US
	E2	○	***	IAM	>20	Telco.	> 250	US
	E3	○	**	IAM	5-10	Gov.	> 250	DE
	E4	●	***	Manager	1-5	Auth.	< 10	DE
	E5	●	***	IAM	1-5	Auth.	> 250	US
	E6	●	***	Manager	>20	Auth.	50-250	DE
IAM	A1	●	**	CISO	>20	Finance	50-250	NO
	A2	●	***	Developer	5-10	Software	> 250	NL
	A3	N/A	**	Consultant	10-20	Consulting	> 250	DE
	A4	●	*	CISO	>20	Consulting	10-49	DE
Organization	O1	○	*	CISO	5-10	Health	> 250	DE
	O2	●	**	CISO	10-20	Telco.	> 250	US
	O3	○	*	CISO	1-5	Gov.	> 250	DE
	O4	●	**	CISO	>20	NGO	50-250	US
	O5	●	**	CISO	5-10	Gov.	> 250	DE
	O6	○	*	CISO	1-5	Marketing	10-49	US
	O7	●	**	IAM	5-10	Chemistry	> 250	DE
	O8	○	*	Developer	1-5	Finance	> 250	US
	O9	○	**	CISO	10-20	Tools	> 250	DE
	O10	○	**	CISO	10-20	Electronics	> 250	AU
	O11	○	*	Manager	>20	Electronics	> 250	US
	O12	●	***	CISO	5-10	Fashion	> 250	DE
	O13	○	*	Manager	10-20	Insurance	> 250	CH
	O14	○	*	CISO	5-10	Health	50-250	DE
	O15	●	**	IAM	10-20	Energy	> 250	DE
	O16	●	**	CISO	10-20	Integration	> 250	DE
	O17	○	*	CISO	>20	Telco.	> 250	DE
	O18 <sup>1</sup>	○	**	CISO	>20	Finance	> 250	DE

**Depl.:** ● = deployed FIDO2, ○ = has not deployed FIDO2, N/A = not applicable.  
**Expert.:** Participant’s FIDO expertise (based on moderator’s subjective judgment),  
 \* = knows from media, \*\* = helped deploy, \*\*\* = involved with FIDO design.  
**Years:** Number of years of experience within the job (self-reported).

liance to distribute our recruitment text. Furthermore, the lead researcher attended the Authenticate conference in October 2022 to recruit and connect with the community. We also reached out to organizations like the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), asking them to distribute our recruitment text via their mailing lists. We conducted interviews between November 2022 and April 2023.

Table 2 summarizes our participants. We conducted 28 interviews in total, encompassing 6 with “FIDO experts,” 4 with “IAM” vendors, and 18 with “Organizations” (companies, governments, NGOs) representing a wealth of different industries. Throughout this paper, we reference participants from these three groups with the respective prefixes “E” (for experts), “A” (for authentication vendors), and “O” (for organizations). All interviews involved a single participant except for O18, which included five individuals from different divisions of the same company; we report their collective opinions as one. Thus, 32 individuals were interviewed. We reached saturation (no longer learning new information) after 25 interviews.

Our participants were mostly CISOs or security engineers working in IAM. We also interviewed consultants and individuals in management positions related to security. We had representatives of one start-up (<10 employees), three small busi-

<sup>1</sup> Interview O18 included five people from the same organization.

nesses (10-49), four medium-sized organizations (50-250), and 20 large organizations (>250). Among large organizations, eight had under 10,000 employees, six had 10,000–100,000, two had 100,000 to 200,000, and four had over 200,000. Participants’ organizations were based primarily in Germany (16) or the U.S. (8). The remaining four came from Norway, the Netherlands, Australia, and Switzerland.

### 3.4 Analysis

We transcribed our audio recordings, storing files locally. Two researchers then performed independent qualitative coding following a thematic inductive coding approach. We decided not to use our obstacles list for deductive coding as our main aim was to identify as many previously unknown obstacles as possible. In weekly meetings, the full research team refined the codebook and discussed recent interviews. Subsequently, we clustered codes into high-level categories following an affinity diagramming process. As the codebook and themes were developed jointly and iteratively, we decided against calculating intercoder reliability metrics.

### 3.5 Limitations

Like many qualitative studies, we report on a small sample of 32 individuals across 28 interviews. While the number of people overall is small, we interviewed hard-to-recruit individuals who are key decision-makers in the deployment of FIDO within their organization or in the development of FIDO standards themselves. They also conveyed knowledge they accumulated from discussions with professional colleagues. Thus, our sample size is commensurate with other qualitative studies of hard-to-reach groups. We do not claim to provide a complete overview of all FIDO2 deployment obstacles, but have likely identified those most inhibiting widespread adoption. Most of our participants work at organizations based in the U.S. or Germany; our findings may not generalize to organizations from different parts of the world.

### 3.6 Ethical Considerations

All data was collected by individuals at an institution that does not have an Institutional Review Board (IRB) or similar ethics review board. However, we followed key principles of the Menlo Report [91]—“respect for persons,” “beneficence,” and “justice”—in designing our protocol. While we collected no personal identifiers beyond participants’ email addresses and full names for correspondence, the ethical treatment of information shared with us about company internal details was a key focus. Protecting the confidentiality of participants’ companies and their inner workings, especially when discussing issues in their security infrastructure, was of paramount importance. Voice recordings were immediately transcribed

after the interview to minimize the storage of potentially identifiable information. Transcripts were stored pseudonymously in case of unintentional information leaks. All data was stored and processed in accordance with the GDPR.

We described the study procedure carefully, including all risks, and asked participants for their consent. Participants could stop the interview at any point, which nobody did. As our participants were typically highly compensated tech experts and executives, we expected that participants gaining insight into FIDO2 would be the primary value of participating. Thus, we did not offer monetary compensation, instead offering our own FIDO expertise and feedback in follow-up meetings to participants who desired them.

## 4 Results: Experiences Deploying FIDO2

This section and the two that follow present our main findings from the interviews. We start by summarizing participants' experiences deploying FIDO. We distinguish between FIDO being used for two-factor authentication (*U2F*) and the more recent proposals for FIDO2-based *passwordless* authentication. As *U2F* is older and more widely deployed, some participants' responses referenced concrete *U2F* experiences (instead of passwordless). They did, however, indicate these experiences and opinions to be applicable to passwordless deployments concomitantly. Overall, 13 participants reported that their companies had already rolled out or are currently in the process of rolling out FIDO in some way, such as via Windows Hello or YubiKeys (see "Depl." in Table 2). Seven participants reported that their organization had deployed passwordless authentication, while the remaining six reported that FIDO was being used for multi-factor authentication (*U2F*). All four IAM vendors offered passwordless authentication solutions for business customers. All organizations refrained from in-house developments and instead used an IAM vendor or the built-in functionalities of their Microsoft Azure ID instances. In contrast, thirteen organizations have not yet rolled out any FIDO solution. The remaining two participants ("N/A" in Table 2) worked in contexts (e.g., as a consultant) where FIDO deployment was not relevant. Except for one company currently in the process of preparing a passwordless rollout, none of the organizations offered FIDO-based passwordless authentication for end users. Instead, passwordless authentication was for employees.

**Reasons for Deploying:** The 13 participants who had deployed FIDO gave various motivations for doing so. The majority ( $n = 7$ ) brought up security as the main reason for deployment. Some talked about getting rid of passwords (O6, O16) or switching to a phishing-resistant 2FA solution (O4, O5). Others focused on the ability to create unique identities in warehouse or factory settings (O10, O12). One pointed out that increasing "cloudification" made measures

like location-based authentication harder to implement (O15). Three participants brought up usability concerns of passwords, including the toll of frequent password resets (O15). O6 felt passwords are cumbersome even with password managers, and E5 liked FIDO's open standardization.

**Reasons Against Deploying:** Participants whose organizations had not yet deployed FIDO can be categorized into the following three subgroups: "talked about, but decided against" (*reject*,  $n = 6$ ), "currently talking about" (*consider*,  $n = 3$ ), and "never talked about" (*unaware*,  $n = 4$ ). We represent the groups by adding *r* (reject), *c* (consider), or *u* (unaware) to their identifiers. As arguments and concerns partially overlap between these groups, we report their results collectively.

**No Need.** Most commonly, participants were uncertain whether they would need FIDO. Some said they already felt sufficiently secure (O1<sub>r</sub>, O3<sub>u</sub>, O11<sub>u</sub>, O17<sub>c</sub>, O18<sub>r</sub>). According to O18<sub>r</sub>, "*attack vectors that FIDO would protect against are rarely seen in real life*" and are already handled by measures like risk-based authentication (*RBA*). Others argued that there is no demand for FIDO from customers (O1<sub>r</sub>, O18<sub>r</sub>) or employees who use trusted intranet services (E3<sub>r</sub>).

**Costs.** Unsurprisingly, many participants brought up deployment costs (O11<sub>u</sub>, O14<sub>c</sub>, O17<sub>c</sub>, O18<sub>r</sub>). O11<sub>u</sub> said that for them to even consider FIDO, they could not have any increased expenses. The cost of security keys also came up. Even some participants who had already deployed FIDO felt that cost was one of the main obstacles.

**Change Too Big.** Some argued deploying FIDO would require too much refactoring in their IT infrastructure (O3<sub>u</sub>, O11<sub>u</sub>). Others focused on the consumer side, claiming that end users would be unhappy or overwhelmed with such a change (O8<sub>r</sub>, O14<sub>r</sub>). O8<sub>r</sub> argued that their company had to "*be very conservative with the technology [they] employ*" as their customers are very non-technical.

**Non-Universality.** Three participants felt FIDO would be less universal than their current methods. For example, O17<sub>c</sub>'s current smartcard-based authentication covers other use cases like printing and access to buildings that no currently available FIDO-based solution offers. A3 and O9<sub>u</sub> pointed out regulatory differences across countries that make it particularly complicated to deploy FIDO in international corporations.

Additional concerns included past negative experiences with alternative (biometric-based) solutions (O9<sub>u</sub>, O13<sub>u</sub>) and struggling to convince executives of FIDO's value (O11<sub>r</sub>).

### 4.1 Experience with Deployments

Participants whose organizations had already deployed FIDO reported relatively positive experiences overall. O12 and O15 reported surprisingly positive feedback from their workforce: "*our satisfaction ratings increased to the ones we last had 10 years ago*" (O12). O7 reported that their rollout initially had a relatively low acceptance and adoption rate. After a



few weeks of acclimatization, their workforce became more satisfied with the new mechanism. While O2 was satisfied overall with their deployment, they reported that a certain cohort of people was “*just not using it*” and could not be convinced until the company made security keys mandatory.

O4 reported a relatively unsatisfying deployment experience. Uptake did not exceed 65% even after a year. The adoption of biometric-based methods was even lower, stagnating at 15-20%. They attributed their experience to various factors, including mistrust towards the (government-affiliated) employer and technical issues that caused some employees to be locked out of accounts during the initial rollout. Participants also reported both temporary obstacles and persistent issues during and after their deployments. For example, O12 reported that onboarding security keys in Microsoft Azure self-service accounts was relatively complex, requiring a lot of assistance from their IT department. Three participants reported technical issues that required fixes from providers (in their case Microsoft and Apple). A4 felt changing the Active Directory structure was their biggest obstacle during deployment. Furthermore, O7 and O10 emphasized their struggles in convincing management, while O15 and O16 pointed out struggles incorporating legacy software into FIDO-based flows. A1, working in finance, brought up legal issues they encountered after the release of passkeys, causing their deployment to be put on hold entirely. As O2 pointed out, especially in global organizations, physically distributing security keys can become very challenging.

## 4.2 Consumer-Facing Authentication

Most participants’ organizations did not have immediate plans to roll out FIDO for consumer-facing authentication. Only A1 (already in the process of deploying consumer-facing FIDO2), O13, and O15 expressed interest in doing so soon.

As a company, the number of customers is critical. O15 argued that it is good to offer many authentication options to accommodate as many customers’ desires as possible. However, three other participants argued that introducing anything that may exclude potential customers (e.g., those whose phones lack FIDO2 support) would be harmful to the business (A3, O14, O15). According to O14, in sectors like health services, it is reasonable to prioritize availability over security and usability. Thus, for these businesses, mandatory FIDO deployment is out of the question. Surprisingly, three participants expressed that the security of individual accounts (which consumer-facing FIDO would protect) is of little value and not a priority (A3, O15, O18). According to O18, account security is the customer’s responsibility: “*Everybody knows they should not write down or share [passwords]. They act against better knowledge by contravening it.*” Thus, unless accounts can be compromised at scale, there is little incentive for those companies to protect individual user accounts. As many app-centered services use long-lived access tokens and

already offer biometric-based local authentication, O14 found FIDO2’s usability advantages unconvincing. O13 and O14 mentioned that supporting security keys would be unnecessary as their user bases are small.

## 5 Results: Perceptions of FIDO

All participants agreed that the FIDO ecosystem has passed its inflection point and is here to stay. For example, E4 said, “*FIDO is the technology with the [greatest] potential to replace passwords.*” Nevertheless, others felt adoption was much slower than expected and that, even with passkeys, some key issues remain unsolved or are entirely “unsolvable.”

**Awareness:** The vast majority of participants had at least some level of awareness of the FIDO standards prior to the interview. While this can be attributed in part to our recruitment process, about half of the participants were recruited from outside “the FIDO community.” Participants from IAM providers and consulting firms consistently reported similar impressions from their work with business customers (A3, E6, O10, O16). E5 said, “*Awareness is there; people want to implement it!*”

Some participants (e.g., O2) reported that the mindset of passwords being “good enough” is not an obstacle in their organization. A2 pointed out that enterprises especially are considering FIDO2 rollouts, but not yet committing. In contrast, others felt that the FIDO standard remains unfamiliar, particularly among people in IT management; at best, they may recognize it as “*logging in with biometrics*” (A3). From the IAM vendors’ perspective, E4 noted that business customers usually do not come asking for FIDO, but instead are happy if it is included by default in the package offered to them. O9 similarly said that, despite awareness of FIDO, deploying it is not really a priority for many companies.

While most participants were familiar with FIDO, the nuance between FIDO as an additional authentication factor (U2F) and single-factor, passwordless FIDO2 was frequently lost. When talking about “FIDO,” most non-expert interviewees primarily discussed FIDO as a means of 2FA, not a means of replacing passwords entirely.

**Misconceptions:** Adding to findings about wrong mental models [4], our participants also expressed a variety of misconceptions related to the complexity of the FIDO ecosystem [4, 6]. Many non-experts appeared to have a mental model of FIDO focusing on roaming authenticators; three explicitly expressed this misconception. Such a misconception is particularly undesirable with regards to consumer-facing authentication as participants worried they would burden customers with purchasing extra devices if they deployed FIDO.

O8 expected that FIDO2 required the user to install an extra app, which then securely stores the private key. Similarly, O3 thought passkeys would only work with a central trusted entity



similar to a public key infrastructure (PKI). O5 was not aware that roaming authenticators can require “user verification” (e.g., entering a PIN) and incorrectly feared that unfettered access to accounts would always be possible if someone got hold of the security key. O18 also reported the mistaken belief that security keys could just be erased and used for storage like a USB flash drive and that one could simply order untrustworthy security keys online, creating security threats. These assertions suggested an unawareness of the FIDO Alliance’s authenticator certification program [37].

**Passkeys:** As passkeys were a recent development when we conducted the interviews (November 2022 through April 2023), there was lower awareness than for FIDO2 overall. Note that, especially in early interviews, we did not use the explicit term “passkeys” with every participant. While some participants had spent time learning about passkeys, others requested that we explain the concept during the interviews. Opinions about passkeys were split, with 10 participants fully in favor and 8 expressing criticism. The remainder indicated no clear positive or negative attitude.

Apart from high-level judgments like “*it’s a fantastic step forward*” (O6, O12), some participants felt that passkeys are what will give FIDO2 the momentum to replace passwords in the long run (E4, O4). Several explicitly said passkeys solve what they felt was FIDO’s biggest issue, account recovery (A2, E1, E4, E5, O4). Despite generally being in favor, O15 hoped that passkeys would continue to follow FIDO’s standards-based approach to ensure that “*Apple doesn’t turn right while Google turns left*.” In contrast, A1 was skeptical about passkeys’ ability to replace passwords, expecting they would be useful only for “low-value accounts.”

Some participants arguing against passkeys were passionate in their criticism. They considered the hardware binding of keys to be FIDO’s very heart, and they felt passkeys lacked this binding (A1, O7). For example, A1 said that “*passkeys is essentially a really good password manager*.” A4 and O17 were similarly concerned about synchronization to the cloud. E6, who is involved in standards developments in the FIDO Alliance, admitted that passkeys were not the first choice from a security standpoint, yet were the only solution that could adequately address the issue of transferability. They felt that transferability constituted FIDO2’s most fundamental drawback at the time of passkeys’ development.

Some participants did not trust Apple and Google’s ability to securely store the private keys. O13 disagreed with this concern, pointing out that when currently using *Apple’s iCloud Keychain* or *Google Chrome’s built-in password manager*, users already trust these services to store login credentials. In that case, however, users are currently given the choice of whether to use password managers and their cloud-based synchronization functions. In the case of passkeys, they must trust the service. Thus, as A2 pointed out, passkeys may exclude users concerned about privacy as they would not trust

Apple or Google. E1 and E6 both raised concerns about the usability of passkeys in a cross-ecosystem context. While there is a QR code-based solution for transferring passkeys (e.g., from an Apple iPhone to a Microsoft Windows PC), this process may be confusing and error-prone for users. More generally, A1 and E5 argued that unless the ecosystems (Apple, Google, and Microsoft) themselves are completely passwordless, one cannot really claim a security enhancement as security overall boils down to the security of the passwords used to protect those cloud-based accounts.

## 6 Results: Deployment Obstacles

Next, we report on the deployment obstacles participants expressed during the interviews. The full codebook can be found in the extended version [56]. Obstacles only relevant to company-internal deployments are marked with “(W).” Consumer-deployment obstacles are marked with “(C).” Unmarked sections apply to both. In this section, we refrain from subjective judgment, revisiting the matter in Section 7.

### 6.1 Regulation and Requirements

Regulatory requirements—both in terms of national laws and companies’ internal policies—were the obstacle to FIDO2 deployment discussed most frequently in our study. Participants reported various concerns that FIDO would collide with their internal compliance and existing regulatory frameworks.

**Non-Compliant Policies (W).** O1, O3, and O8 pointed out policies requiring them to practice “digital sovereignty,” or not to rely on a single vendor for their IT infrastructure. For a FIDO deployment, this not only runs up the bill, but also requires in-house expertise to ensure interoperability, making it hard to commit to drastic changes in authentication infrastructure. For example, O1 noted that if passwordless FIDO were deployed, regulations like password-composition requirements would need to be suspended. O9 mentioned that some security policies demand two completely separate factors for authentication. Others shared that occupational safety regulations hinder the applicability of using biometrics.

**eIDAS (C).** Participants working in finance shared that a severe obstacle from a federal regulatory perspective originated with Apple’s decision to synchronize all passkeys automatically, leaving no option for device-bound credentials [51]. According to the European “Electronic Identification, Authentication, and Trust Services” (eIDAS) regulation, an individual’s identity must be bound to a specific hardware device. Thus, credentials stored on a hardware device cannot be easily transferred or replicated.<sup>2</sup> This issue is particularly relevant for all organizations involved in the payment industry. E4 said that “*no serious bank will use [FIDO]*.” A1’s organization had prepared a consumer-facing rollout of passwordless

<sup>2</sup>See Annex 2.2.1 of the regulation EU 2015/1502 [25].

FIDO authentication for their app in September 2022. Upon Apple’s release of their passkey implementation, these developments had to be stopped entirely. They now implement hardware binding in-house, independent of FIDO, considering this to be their only compliant option for passwordless authentication. A1 was particularly frustrated, saying, “*Apple has taken a big dump on FIDO!*” FIDO experts reported being aware of these issues and are currently talking to European regulators (E1, E6). They felt the main challenge would be convincing legislators that passkeys are sufficiently secure.

**PSD2 (C).** While the FIDO Alliance claims [35] to comply with PSD2,<sup>3</sup> banks struggle with its requirements. While the FIDO standards cover the requirement of *Dynamic Linking*<sup>4</sup> in the form of transaction confirmation displays [22], it is not enforced that all available FIDO-compliant authenticators implement the necessary functionalities. O18 explained that since they have no influence on how security key vendors implement transaction-confirmation displays, O18’s organization cannot offer FIDO in a PSD2-compliant manner.

**Further Legislation (W).** A3 pointed out that in U.S. states like California [44], employers must indemnify expenditures incurred in direct consequence of their employees’ duties (e.g., reimbursing cellular plans when prompting employees to use private phones at work). As this requires processing reimbursements, A3 suggested it may deter companies from using biometric FIDO authentication in workplaces.

## 6.2 Usability Challenges

**Complexity and Friction.** Nine interviews highlighted the challenges of explaining FIDO to users and non-technical stakeholders, such as management. Participants reported comparing security keys to physical keys as an analogue for non-technical individuals. However, as security keys may be protected by a PIN, sharing them with others does not automatically enable access. Explaining this difference to non-technical people was challenging (E2). As passwordless FIDO authentication requires both possession of the device storing the private key and knowledge of the PIN, some might consider it 2FA, causing confusion (E6). E4 expressed difficulties conveying recommendations for everyone to possess multiple security keys in case of loss or destruction. E6 pointed out the challenge of differentiating proprietary (server-side) biometric authentication solutions from FIDO (W). A3 and O12 reported the onboarding process for security keys to be convoluted, with employees having trouble navigating menus to enroll their key (W). Expert participants who developed FIDO reported difficulty explaining key concepts to UX designers, leading to poorly designed user interfaces (E6, O7).

<sup>3</sup>The “Payment Services Directive 2” (PSD2) regulates payment services in the European Economic Area. It introduced regulations on strong customer authentication (e.g., via mandatory 2FA) and enforces secure open standards.

<sup>4</sup>*Dynamic Linking* demands that “the payer is made aware of the amount of the payment transaction and of the payee” [26].

Consumer aspects played only a minor role. Some participants expressed fears that FIDO2 is not necessarily easy to understand. E6 explained that, in practice, user experience is one of the concerns companies considering consumer-facing, passwordless FIDO2 most frequently raise (C). E1 and O13 emphasized that operating systems and browsers’ different approaches displaying FIDO interface elements make it hard for users to recognize it as the same login mechanism across devices (C). E1 extended this criticism to online services putting minimal effort into clear interface design and ignoring the FIDO Alliance’s UX guidelines [38]. O18 pointed out that users might mistakenly believe they are more secure with passwords as they are more aware of the risks.

**Recovery and Fallback.** Opinions were mixed on the degree to which the lack of standardized recovery remains an obstacle. A2, E1, and E5 felt that passkeys fully allay concerns about account recovery. In contrast, A1 and E4 stated that passkeys depend on an individual platform, almost in a “proprietary manner” (despite the technology itself being open), meaning that recovery has not been solved. Several participants reported that questions around fallback authentication are still among the most common concerns when talking to prospective customers. E1, E5, and O6 argued that the options for setting up fallback mechanisms for security keys remain convoluted, while E3 thought that setting up a second security key is a trivial and effective solution. This is also the strategy the FIDO Alliance recommends [42]. E5, however, disagreed: “*That’s not really a great user experience, it’s a practical solution. . . In an enterprise [or for] high-value transaction cases that level of inconvenience might be okay. But for the broad consumer, not at all.*”

## 6.3 Technical Challenges

Overall, participants felt the technical aspects of FIDO appear to be mostly sorted. A2 even pointed out that there is a Conformance Test Tool available for FIDO2 [29]. Supporting both FIDO and passwords alongside each other was only considered a small issue. The biggest concern among participants was that libraries and standards are not easily understandable.

**Complex for Developers.** As addressed by prior work [4], in contrast to passwords, FIDO protocols are complex and not meant to be implemented by non-specialist developers. Participants familiar with implementing FIDO2 agreed that it is difficult to implement and mentioned a lack of documentation. In fact, E6 recommended that companies should not attempt to implement FIDO in-house as the complexity poses the potential for insecure implementations and misconfigurations. E5, who implemented FIDO for a well-known IAM vendor, shared this view, saying that in the API there are numerous “*options that are not obvious and combinations that don’t make sense or offer the protection you think.*” E4 claimed that implementing FIDO increases the “*complexity of the authentication stack by a factor of 10.*” Nonetheless,

E6 does not consider this complexity a major hurdle because they think vendors already offer sufficient solutions.

**Specific Technical Issues.** Not all browsers, especially in the mobile domain, are yet fully supported. In the past, certain built-in browsers (e.g., Samsung Internet Browser) lacked FIDO support. At the time of conducting the interviews, FIDO2 worked on 95% of mobile browsers [24], with Mozilla Firefox being a prominent exception as it only partially supported FIDO2 (Touch ID and PIN entry were not supported on certain operating systems). Similarly, for passkeys, browser support was very limited [17]. On certain OS and browser configurations, device-bound FIDO credentials and autofill UI were not supported. Participants argued that this impedes the universality, especially keeping consumers in mind (C). O4 pointed out that if a company primarily uses Microsoft, it is not trivial to also handle authentication from Google or Apple devices uniformly. Additionally, O12 mentioned that Windows Hello for Business is limited to ten local identities, which makes it unsuitable for settings like reception workstations where more than ten people share a device (W) [63].

**Legacy Software (W).** While issues with legacy software are well-known in the security community, they play a particularly crucial role in FIDO2 adoption. Eight participants specifically mentioned such issues. As mentioned above, FIDO is rarely implemented in-house. Existing FIDO2 solutions offered by IAM vendors are usually closely integrated with cloud-based services like Azure Active Directory. However, such cloud-based solutions are usually not supported by old applications like process controllers for industrial machines or warehouse software. Some participants viewed this as a justification for not implementing FIDO2 at all to avoid a heterogeneous authentication infrastructure (O12, O18). Others felt that tooling to circumvent such challenges should be made available by IAM vendors, which is not yet the case (O2).

**End-of-Life Systems.** From a consumer perspective, participants pointed out that supporting old operating systems and browsers is crucial (O1, E5, A2). Web services have to be mindful that many organizations still run on Windows versions that do not support passkeys or other FIDO protocols. A2 voiced that you cannot tell consumers that they can “*only access the website using a specific OS version.*” This argument becomes particularly evident with services that target non-tech-savvy demographics or must be available for the entire population (e.g., digital government services) (C).

## 6.4 Lack of Universality

One strength of passwords is their near-universal applicability, independent of the devices and environments where they are used. FIDO2 cannot live up to this universality.

**Production Environments (W).** In environments such as production sites, biometric authentication is often not well-suited as workers wear gloves, masks, or have dirty hands, preventing reliable usage of biometric sensors (A3, O9, O11).

**Buried Entry (W).** O6, a small-business CISO, highlighted that certain software licensing systems restrict access to important security features, like SSO integration with Microsoft Azure, to larger teams. This practice of hiding security functionalities behind paywalls disadvantages smaller businesses.

**Exclusion of User Groups (C).** From an ethical perspective, A1 and E2 pointed out that FIDO excludes users who do not have the financial means of purchasing mobile phones or security keys, or even just users who struggle with technology. This is particularly critical for services like bank accounts. If a service is entirely passwordless, in the worst case some user groups would be completely excluded. A3 supported this argument when pointing out that, in lower-income countries, people often have older phones that do not support FIDO protocols or share devices with family members [3, 82]. From an accessibility standpoint, A3 and O1 argued that sharing passwords is often the only means of interacting with web services for some people (e.g., the elderly).

**Biometrics (W).** Contrary to our expectations [55], concerns about where the biometric data is stored with FIDO2 were not universal and were only raised by European workers' councils in France and Germany (O7, O10). Some participants who had negative experiences with proprietary biometric-based solutions raised concerns about biometric FIDO2, projecting their prior negative experiences (O6, O11). O18 raised concerns about the limited value of FIDO for mobile apps that already offer local biometric authentication (C).

## 6.5 Organizational Challenges

**Manageability and Logistics.** While measures for centralized management of username/password credentials have long been available and standardized, the management possibilities for FIDO credentials are still in their infancy.

**On- and Off-boarding (W).** O12 considered it problematic that the FIDO onboarding process is unnecessarily complex due to its device-centric nature. They criticized that FIDO credentials cannot be managed centrally by IT departments for non-technical employees who struggle to register credentials. A3 and O2 referenced similar experiences. Some participants did not like that security keys would need to be recalled when a customer closes an account (O18) or an employee leaves a company (E11). While employee accounts can be closed centrally regardless of whether they use security keys or passwords, an organization might still want to physically retrieve security keys for asset management and cost control (A3, O1).

**Credential Sharing (W).** Scenarios like showcasing, exhibitions, or temporary accounts can only be effectively handled with shareable credentials (A1, O1). Despite the security challenges, these cases form a substantial portion of the workflow for businesses like small companies and start-ups.

**Passkey Management (C).** E5 pointed out an issue that might emerge once passkeys are common. As the number of accounts users have is huge, the number of passkeys a user



Table 3: This table shows how the 18 interviewees who completed the card-sorting task rated potential obstacles.

	Customers happy	Pwd good	Pwd managers	2FA secure enough	SSO usable enough	No std fallback	Stolen unclear	New dev unclear	Multiple unclear	Wouldn't use bio	Roaming auth	Friction	Used to pwd	Libs don't exist	Libs incomplete	Libs not understand	Libs wrong language	Issue support both	Can't get rid entirely	Browser support	Unified experience	No need	Won't allow	Don't understand	No open-source	Bio forbidden	Peer organizations	Why invest	Impl. costs	New comm costs	Incompatible w/ UX	Can't brand	Can't communicate	Color: icons hard	
	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	U1	U2	U3	U4	U5	U6	U7	U8	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	F1	F2	F3	C1	C2	C3	C4	
ID	Necessity					Usability								Deployability								IT Management						Financial		Comm.					
E1	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	
E2	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	
E4	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	
E5	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	
A1	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	
A2	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
A3	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
A4	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
O1	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
O3	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
O4	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
O5	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
O6	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
O8	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
O10	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
O13	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
O16	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
O17	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
Priority	.59	.61	.39	.94	.82	1.06	.88	.88	.76	.82	.56	1.18	.88	.67	.71	.93	.69	.73	1.20	1.06	.88	.89	.59	.88	.44	.53	.61	.89	.76	.72	.33	.22	.78	.33	

Major Obstacle = ●, Minor Obstacle = ○, Not an Obstacle = ◻, Skipped = -, Priority = Mean rating.

must manage will be, too. This raises the challenge of user-friendly management and revocation of FIDO credentials.

**Stakeholders with Power.** FIDO at its core is built as an open standard and has always valued its cooperative decision-making processes. Nevertheless, a number of participants pointed out that a few powerful stakeholders are most influential in the FIDO realm. This makes it substantially different from passwords, which cannot be influenced by a corporation.

**Solo Efforts.** This hurdle has become particularly evident when passkeys were first released by Apple despite them being a joint endeavor of many FIDO affiliates (E4, E5). E5 fears that the companies, being as big as they are, have the power to block the development of FIDO if it does not fit their company-internal agenda. E5 explained, “If Google has objections, and they do not implement [a feature] in Chrome, it’ll never gain adoption.” As one example of this, device-bound FIDO credentials are not supported by Apple. One can see from that example that FIDO’s success is partially dependent on the cooperation of all stakeholders.

**Conflict of Interest.** Other participants speculated about potential reasons for FIDO2’s slow adoption. For some companies involved, a conflict of interest may have emerged since the focus of FIDO shifted from roaming authenticators to platform authenticators. Security key vendors like Yubico have an interest in maintaining their market (E6, O11, O12).

## 6.6 Prioritization of Obstacles

With our card-sorting task, we aimed to learn more about participants’ views of the relative severity of obstacles to FIDO deployment. As Table 3 shows, there was no particular consensus obstacle. FIDO and IAM experts overall were more concerned than representatives from organizations. In Table 3, we calculate participants’ mean severity per obstacle, artificially weighing “major” as 2, “minor” as 1, and “no obstacle” as 0 to indicate and reflect trends.

**Necessity.** Overall, participants confirmed that FIDO is “necessary.” They agreed that customers overall are not satisfied (N1), that passwords should be replaced (N2), and that password managers do not sufficiently solve the problem (N3). A more salient obstacle is that existing 2FA solutions are already considered to be secure enough by about half of the organizations (N4). The same applies to single sign-on (SSO), which is considered to be usable enough (N4).

**Usability.** The most pressing usability obstacle is the lack of a standardized fallback procedure (U1), one of the three biggest obstacles identified overall. Device theft and handling multiple (or new) devices (U2-U4) was rated at least a minor obstacle by most. Some, however, considered these issues to be solved with passkeys. Participants overall did not think that roaming authenticators should be considered unusable (U6). Change causing friction and users being habituated to passwords were considered bigger obstacles; the complexity of change (U7-U8) may outweigh FIDO’s advantages.



**Deployability.** Most participants considered deployability (D1-D4) not to be an issue. The most pressing concern among experts was that libraries are not easily understandable (D3). The lack of full support by mobile browsers (D7) was considered a major obstacle by experts and also raised as a minor concern by representatives of organizations.

**IT Management.** Three participants rated all management-specific hurdles as major (M1-M3). However, they generally expressed how management can severely impede deployments while emphasizing this not being the case for FIDO in reality. All others rated these issues to be minor at worst. Open-source software (M4) or biometrics being not allowed (M5) do not appear to be obstacles. Some participants in larger companies reported waiting for peer organizations. However, participants also pointed out that being innovative can be an asset and thus not necessarily a hurdle to FIDO (M6). Generally, FIDO and IAM experts rated these aspects much worse than organizations. As organizations have better insights here, this indicates that management is likely not a blocker in reality.

**Financial.** Most participants rated all financial concerns (F1-F3) as at least minor obstacles. To them, it all boils down to a cost-benefit analysis. Thus, it appears that FIDO's value proposition is not yet entirely clear or it does not solve concerns that are urgent and worth investing in.

**Communication.** Figuring out how to properly communicate FIDO to the user (C3) was a minor obstacle for most. The other categories (C1, C2, C4) were not considered obstacles.

In summary, the worst-rated obstacles were increased friction for users (U7), the lack of universal support in mobile browsers (D7), and the lack of a standardized fallback (U1).

## 6.7 Distinguishing Stakeholders Views

Experts and IAM vendors sometimes judge the severity of obstacles differently than organizations. Only experts and IAM vendors raised concerns regarding FIDO being hard to explain and understand. Practitioners might be more oblivious to the challenging task of communicating FIDO's functionality. It could also indicate that in practice the technical functionalities are actually easier to convey than experts think. Shortcomings in support and issues with legacy software were raised by seven organizational representatives, but only one FIDO expert. This might hint at how experts sometimes disregard concerns surrounding this topic as insignificant and easy to fix. However, these pieces of software often comprise a major part of the core business infrastructure. Similarly, only organizations addressed the lack of universal applicability for "non-desk" staff (e.g., in healthcare). Only experts and IAM vendors discussed ethical concerns with FIDO surrounding universal accessibility independent of socioeconomic status and abilities. The experts may take a more idealistic viewpoint on the "purpose" of authentication, whereas organizations apply a pure "business lens."

## 7 Discussion

Next, we discuss our thoughts on the future of passwordless authentication, give recommendations for industry, and outline important avenues for future research.

### 7.1 A Passwordless Future

**Will We Get Rid of Passwords?** According to our findings, not in the near future. However, there is agreement that FIDO2 will play a major role in making the password obsolete in many cases. E5 said that the term "passwordless" should not be understood as eliminating passwords, but rather as having "less passwords [sic]." With legacy software that is often commissioned for over 30 years and written in languages few still understand today, it is unlikely that FIDO will be implemented in such cases (O10). Even once FIDO is deployed, it is still a long way before its security benefits can flourish [90]. FIDO-protected accounts only fully benefit from being more secure if they are used without a password. However, especially for the consumer case, the password will most likely remain the primary fallback. So far, only Microsoft offers "password-free accounts" [92], allowing users to delete the password after enrollment into their authenticator app. This was also mentioned by interviewees who criticize Apple's and Google's passkey implementation, arguing that they themselves must be passwordless before passkeys can offer their full security advantage. While this is technically true, it should not be used as an argument against FIDO as these major services are known for paying very close attention to account protection (e.g., Apple enforces 2FA for all accounts attempting to use passkeys [7]). FIDO also offers a variety of usability advantages over passwords. The same cannot necessarily be said about all other services on the web.

**FIDO as a Convenience Feature.** FIDO, often perceived primarily as a security technology, should also be recognized for its convenience. When pitching FIDO, it is crucial to emphasize the convenience it brings (E4). In fact, according to some, overall usability will likely be a stronger motivating factor for adoption than security alone (O1). To broaden its appeal, the security community should adopt a narrative that highlights how FIDO makes logins easier and faster, in turn increasing customer/employee satisfaction. Shifting the focus to the seamless user experience could help persuade those who are currently hesitant due to misconceptions, such as believing that current 2FA systems are "secure enough."

### 7.2 Top 5 Obstacles

**No Standardized Fallback.** Confirming Bicakci et al. [10], one of the biggest obstacles we observed was the lack of a standardized fallback. While the FIDO Alliance gives recommendations for handling fallback in different scenarios (e.g., having two security keys) [42], these can neither be consid-

ered universally applicable nor are they usable and secure. Some fallback procedures described by our participants involved having a one-time code sent to a predefined colleague who would then share the code in a personal conversation or over the phone. Apart from availability issues (person receiving the code not being available), such measures can involve fear and shame of admitting the loss to superiors [79] and be susceptible to social engineering attacks.

**Complexity and Friction.** Introducing any new technology will temporarily lead to confusion, resistance, and friction for users and stakeholders. At all times during deployments, it is important to inform, educate, and communicate with all parties involved. To convince management, a clear communication plan emphasizing FIDO’s usability, user experience, and security benefits is crucial. It is vital not to disregard these stakeholders. A successful and secure deployment will partially depend on factors that are independent of FIDO’s theoretical security. Highlighting success stories or case studies from other organizations could help. FIDO will most likely not integrate seamlessly with existing systems. Thorough testing and engaging with all IT teams are thus indispensable for proper integration with existing infrastructure (A4). Our results echo previously raised concerns about FIDO documentation being confusing [4]. Developers should be assisted with training sessions, clear explanations, and good documentation [17, 43, 76, 101] to help them understand how FIDO and especially its security work (E5). If the user interface or onboarding process for FIDO are poorly designed or difficult to navigate, it will create frustration and resistance. To ensure intuitive and user-friendly interfaces that foster adoption, educated UX designers need to be involved from the early stages of the deployment process. Usability testing with different user groups, not only technical staff, is key (O4).

**Technical Issues.** While prior work identified a lack of deployment-ready solutions [4], this was of little concern in our sample. However, participants described various examples of technical problems, with incompatible legacy systems and incompatible browser and OS configurations being most common, confirming findings from Nawrath concerning a lack of platform support [65]. As end-of-life systems are a reality in industry and frequently encountered when it comes to consumers, the FIDO Alliance must develop guidelines and propose alternative solutions for such systems. Similarly, the current situation surrounding the support of device-bound credentials or Mozilla Firefox’s lack of support for user verification are harmful to a smooth user experience. Note that Mozilla added support with Firefox 114 in June 2023 and announced it will support passkeys with Firefox 120 in November 2023 [68].

**Regulatory Requirements.** Another frequently named obstacle was regulatory requirements like the payment directive PSD2 and European eIDAS regulation. Members of the FIDO Alliance explained working on convincing legislators that passkeys are compliant with the regulations. Other

entities like the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) are actively asking whether passkeys and FIDO2 are sufficiently addressed in their newest revision of the digital identity guidelines SP 800-63-4 (Draft) [86]. Participants also reported various concerns that FIDO conflicts with internal rules and existing policies and will ultimately require new policies and best practices.

**Security Culture.** Even 24 years after a canonical paper exhorted that “users are not the enemy” [1], we found that this mindset still has not entirely vanished. Some interviewees felt that security should be pushed on the workforce if the “experts” think a specific security measure is relevant [83]. For example, one company was unsure how to define a policy for handling the security key and whether it could be left in the computer or if it should be securely stored in a locker. Deciding on the latter, they found that most people disregarded the policy as ignoring it allowed for more flexibility.

When talking about reasons for and against deploying consumer-facing FIDO, participants elicited a mindset that taking care of account security is the responsibility of the customer. For FIDO deployments, this mindset may become an issue as those companies likely have little to no intent for changing the authentication landscape for their customers. The compromise of single accounts often causes companies little harm. At worst, they need to reimburse the owner. They follow the idea that telling customers how to behave “correctly” is sufficient and that it is governments’ task to properly educate citizens about digital safeguards.

### 7.3 Recommendations for Industry

**Prepare Smooth Deployment.** To ensure a smooth deployment process, O10 emphasized the importance of adapting security policies right from the beginning. This is also recommended in the “enterprise journey” resources of the FIDO Alliance [32]. To handle the distribution of security keys in international corporations, O2 recommended using a security key distribution service like YubiEnterprise Delivery [102]. O4, who had a relatively unsuccessful deployment, self-reflecting saying that others should not be “the typical tech guy.” O4 reported only having piloted FIDO deployment with peers from the tech department. However, as their experience and opinions are not representative of the entire workforce, they should not be used as a reference.

**Increase Acceptance in Workforce.** To decrease the friction originating from change, O4 recommended onboarding training in very small groups and making rollouts on a per-department level as each will likely bring up their own requirements and issues. To foster confidence in FIDO’s trustworthiness, O5 recommended communicating transparently that the workplace does not have access to the key even if it is used for private accounts. O12 pointed out their positive experience with their CISO advertising the new authentication options occasionally to familiarize the workforce. Several

participants from all participant groups recommended using an IAM provider or using the methods the operating system already supports to obviate the issues caused by the complexity of implementing FIDO in-house.

**Little Care for User Experience.** Many participants from organizations perceived any topics related to user experience as unimportant. Experts and IAM vendors seemed to be more aware of the topic. Early adopters reported negative experiences about never reaching high adoption rates due to technical and UX issues during rollouts, stressing the importance of a good user experience. When it comes to consumer-facing FIDO2, it is particularly concerning that certain settings are wildly inconsistent. Every browser and OS has its own way of doing and naming procedures. On websites where passwordless sign-in is possible, the process gets even more confusing.

**Implement a Secure Fallback.** It must be acknowledged that FIDO is only more secure than passwords if any existing passwords are disabled. If passwords continue to be used as an alternative or fallback option, FIDO's security guarantees can be easily bypassed via downgrade attacks [90]. The FIDO Alliance gives recommendations for handling fallback in different scenarios [42]. Many consumer-facing websites continue to rely on their already existing fallback infrastructure (e.g., out-of-band communication via email or SMS). However, this level of security is often insufficient in high-risk scenarios like online banking (e.g., no real-time phishing resistance). Kunke et al. [54] evaluated 12 different account recovery options for their use in the FIDO2 passwordless authentication context (before passkeys had been announced). They suggested either registering multiple authenticators during account setup (as suggested by the FIDO Alliance) or relying on help desk personal verifying the user (e.g., via an identity card).

## 7.4 Future Research Directions

**Passkey Management and Revocation.** Another issue raised was the question of what happens once passkeys are more commonly in use for a variety of accounts. The problem of password reuse [67] originated due to the ever-increasing number of accounts everyone holds. This means that users at some point will hold a large number of passkeys. This issue is even aggravated as with passkeys people will hold multiple for every account when they register with more than one ecosystem. As of now, it is unclear how to properly handle those passkeys, especially in cases such as revocation. Notably, commercial and open-source password managers are already in the process of deploying functionalities to manage passkeys [94]. However, the vast majority of the population does not use password managers except for those built into browsers [73, 103]. This issue should be addressed before passkeys find more widespread adoption. As of October 2023, vendors have started working on a cross-ecosystem future (e.g., Chrome accessing passkeys stored in iCloud Keychain) and integrating passkey managers into their products [62].

**Assisting Migration.** Online services have become ubiquitous. Thus, in most situations, users will not be creating new passwordless accounts, but instead be migrating existing accounts to FIDO-based authentication. To facilitate this, companies have started to deploy small notifications that advertise the usability and security advantages of FIDO2 and address misconceptions [55]. Once passkeys are offered by more services, convincing users to migrate away from passwords will become an important aspect. Studying users' migration concerns and issues will help to drive the adoption of a usable and secure passwordless future for everyone.

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